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2ABSTRACT
The main theme of this thesis is a sociological analysis of a 
process of political conflict in a village community. The village - 
Tundwa - has a population of just over a thousand persons and is 
situated on an island lying just off the north Kenya coast, near the 
border with Somalia. It is a village where political factionalism 
is an important element in social life. My aim in this thesis has been 
to show that conflicts between the factions were an expression of under­
lying social and economic causes and that the recruitment of support 
for the factions was based on the pre-existing structure of linkages 
in the community. The focal material of this thesis is therefore con­
tained in Chapter VIII where I describe in detail the series of 
connected Social dramas* or crisis situations which punctuated the 
development of factional conflicts in Tundwa in 19^5-
The first part of the thesis is devoted to an analysis of the 
three most important aspects of Tundwa*s social organisation - economic 
organisation, kinship and social stratification. Each of these aspects 
of social organisation creates a contextual framework for social action, 
and each of them is influential in determining the alliances of people 
in political crises. These frameworks do not always coincide however 
and so one has situations where people have a conflict of loyalties - 
perhaps between their loyalties to kin as opposed to their economic
3interests, or perhaps "between their economic interests and their 
social status.
In the second part of the thesis I concentrate exclusively on 
the politics of Tundwa. First I describe the relationship between 
the people and the Central government. The character of this relation­
ship provides a further dimension to our understanding of political 
action. In Chapter VIII and the Conclusion I show that by looking 
at factionalism in dynamic sociological terms we can understand its 
basic underlying causes.
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5INTRODUCTION : THE PROBLEM
This is a study of political action in a Kenya village community, 
hased on field work which I carried out in 1965-6. The village,
Tundwa, is of sociological interest for several reasons. In the first 
place it is internally stratified into three ascriptive strata; the 
Masherifu or reputed descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, the Waungwana 
or free men, and the Wachumwa or ex-slaves. Secondly it is a community 
within which there are considerable differences of wealth. Unlike 
status in the stratification system which is ascribed by birth, 
economic status may be achieved within a manfs lifetime. There is a 
rough but not finite coincidence between ascriptive status and achieved 
economic status.
Thirdly this is a community whose structure is based on a net­
work of inter-personal linkages rather than on a patterning of inter­
related groups. The strata are not groups but ascriptive categories. 
There are no economic groups based on co-operative production since 
this is an economy based on individual ownership of property. There 
are no lineages or other large-scale kinship groupings. This is a 
non-unilineal Kinship system in which groupings based on kinship are 
limited to certain minimal household units.
Fourthly there is no formal system of authority relations here. 
There are, it is true, government recognised leaders (a Headman and his
1. This research was made possible by the award to me of a University 
of London Postgraduate Studentship.
6deputy) but these men are not given the kind of local support such
that one could speak of them as political leaders of the village.
Apart from crime, and civil offences such as tax-avoidance, which are
the concern of government officers, social control here is 'diffuse*
*]
rather than 1 organised*.
Finally this is a society which has been subject to many 
drastic changes in the past seventy years. Probably the most import­
ant of these was brought about by the intervention of Britain into the 
area around the turn of the century. Not only did British interven­
tion bring to an end the virtual political autonomy of the village, 
but it also meant the abolition of slavery and with it the economic basis 
of the stratification system. I think it is reasonable to say that the 
people of Tundwa are still adjusting to this situation. But there have 
also been other changes. With the development of urban centres in 
Kenya, a process of migration and emigration from the village began - 
a process which involved both men and women and which has gone on until 
the present time* Political changes too - first the experience of 
colonialism and then the process of Independence - have all affected 
the people's interaction with one another and with the outside world.
It is in this context that political action takes place. During 
1965-1966 when I carried out my field work there were first two, later 
three political factions in the village. Political activity is one 
of the very rare occasions on which men in this community act together
1. Following Radcliffe-Brown*s distinction (1952 p* 205)*
7and as such it is of interest in itself. But in the absence of other 
political, economio or kinship groupings in the community, one is also 
faced with the problem of how such factions arise and how they recruit 
support.
In Tundwa factions seem to represent temporary crystallisations
in an overall pattern of individual linkages. They do not represent
the conflict of pre-existing and permanent groups in the village since
there are no such groups. As Nicholas has pointed out however,
factions are typically not corporate groups since they are ephemeral
and non-institutionalised. In addition Nicholas makes the point that
factions are leader oriented. They are in fact ego-centred quasi- 
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groups rather than corporate groups. The significance of factions is 
that they organise political conflicts, and as Nicholas points out they 
are often associated with social change. In many cases this is be­
cause social change in the kind of societies we study is usually that 
brought about by colonial intervention. Such intervention often leads 
to the disruption of the traditional political system in which political 
conflict may have been institutionalised, and the setting up of an ex­
ternal authority. Colonial intervention may also lead to economic 
changes - labour migration, the introduction of cash crops and new 
methods of agriculture. All such developments change the previous 
structure of wealth differentials, though in many cases those who were 
traditionally wealthy are those best able to benefit from new opportuni­
ties.
1. R. Nicholas (1965, p.21-6o).
2. I use this word in A. Mayer’s sense (1966, p,97-8).
8Tundwa is in exactly this position. Its traditional political 
system was ignored hy the colonial rulers and the system of patri-clans 
on which it was hased has declined in importance. The centre of power 
has passed from the village to the central government. New economic 
opportunities and the abolition of slavery have led to a redistribution 
of wealth - though this process has not yet gone far enough to sharply 
change the pattern of wealth differentials within the community. The 
point however is that wealth differentials in pre-colonial times had 
bolstered up a traditionally powerful minority in the village, and 
any redistribution of wealth was likely to endanger their position.
In any such situation the traditionally powerful and wealthy 
minority will try to readjust to the new status quo in order to pre­
serve their privileges. At the same time the traditionally under­
privileged aim to turn the new opportunities into political power for 
themselves. In the absence of political parties (where these are 
banned for instance) a situation of this kind at the village level 
creates political factions. Such factions are aimed primarily at 
achieving a monopoly of access to the real source of power - the central 
government - which lies outside the village, with the ultimate aim of 
preserving the status quo within the village. In this thesis I wish 
to examine the context in which factions have arisen in the village, 
and to show how the leaders of such factions take advantage of their 
diverse linkages with others in order to recruit support.
This is also a study of social status, since it will be my
9contention that an increasing lack of correlation between ascriptive 
and achieved status is a typical feature of one stage in the develop­
ment of political factions. As I explained earlier this is a strati­
fied society, divided into three ascriptive categories. A person1s 
status within the stratification system is fixed by birth, and mobility 
within the system is practically impossible. On the other hand there 
are, and always have been, ways of achieving status independently of 
this ascriptive system. One way of doing this was through achieving 
wealth, the other through piety. However, since piety could not be 
translated into wealth, nor wealth into ascriptive status, these three 
means of achieving status tended to form three separate frameworks.
The slaves, however, who were at the bottom of the ascriptive framework, 
were barred in pre-colonial times from advancing within any other frame­
work. Since the abolition of slavery, however, they too have entered 
into the competition for economic resources, and to a lesser extent 
for piety, and in this way some of them have achieved status independ­
ently of their descent status. What I want to examine in this thesis 
is how the contradictions between ascriptive and achieved status have 
begun to show themselves in political action.
In the first part of this thesis I shall discuss the various 
frameworks within which social action takes place, the most important of 
these being the framework of economics and the framework of stratifica­
tion. I also include here an analysis of kinship networks because 
kinship linkages are the basis of any leader’s support, and because
10
kinship linkages cut across the patterns of achieved status and to 
some extent those of ascribed status too* I also discuss ideology - 
the view of social reality which is preserved by the people themselves. 
Ideology upholds a view of the village situation and the wider environ­
ment which, although it does not strictly accord with reality, neverthe­
less influences people1s actions. In the second part of this thesis 
I discuss the formal political framework of the village (i.e. that set 
up by the central government) and then analyse political conflict as 
it expresses itself in factionalism. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the basis of factionalism in a society which is less formally 
structured than most societies studied by social anthropologists.
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I* THE VILLAGE, THE AREA AND THE PEOPLE
1 2 The village of Tundwa is situated on Faza island which lies
just off the north Kenya coast, near the border with Somalia* A small
island, about fifteen miles by ten, Paza is the largest of the islands
that make up the Lamu archipelago* It is an island fringed by mangrove
trees and swamps and much of its area is taken up by salt flats on which
the sea encroaches every six hours. The central area of the island is
dotted with coconut and tamarind trees and small patches of annual
crops, and here are situated most of its nine villages.
Paza is one of the most isolated places in Kenya. To reach it
from Mombasa, Kenya’s main port, one has to make a journey of two hundred
and fifty miles. The first stage of the journey is to Lamu, two hundred
miles north of Mombasa, a journey of ten hours by bus over unmetalled
roads, often flooded and impassible during the rainy season. Lamu is
a small town situated on another island to the south of Paza. Here
is situated the headquarters of Lamu District, of which Paza forms a
separate Division. Prom Lamu two or three small and very old motorised
passenger boats ply irregularly to Paza island* The boats take about
four hours to cover the thirty five mile journey, from Lamu harbour
through the narrow mangrove bordered channel between Manda island and
the mainland, across the stretch of open sea that separates Manda from
1• Pronounced Tchundwa.
2. On maps the island is labelled Pate or Patta island, after the ancient 
town of that name which is situated in its south-east corner. This is 
not the local usage however, and it is this to which I have kept.
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Paza island, and round the mangrove-edged island of Paza to Rasini, 
the main village on the island and its administrative centre*
Most of the people of Faza*s nine villages call themselves 
Bajunis. The Bajunis are a ‘people* who are united "by a sentiment of 
common identity. They share a common 'language - Kitikuu, a dialect 
of Swahili - and a common religion, Islam. They claim that about three 
quarters of the land on Paza island together with a large tract on the 
mainland opposite belong to all the Bajuni people by right of customary 
usage. But not all Bajunis are to be found in this area. Some are 
to be found in all the small off-shore islands north of Paza, and even 
as far north as Mogadishu in Somalia. Small pockets of them are also 
to be found in most communities along the Kenya coast and even as far 
south as Pemba, Tanga and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.
The Bajuni have never been united under an overall political 
system. They are not then a * tribe* in the normal Africanist sense 
of the word. For hundreds of years each village has been a city state 
in itself, each with its petty ruler with his soldiers and his slaves, 
his supporters and his enemies* This state of affairs of course came 
to an end with the advent of British colonial rule around the turn of 
the century and the introduction of a reasonably effective administra­
tive system. But even today political action tends to unite or divide 
people within villages rather than creating links between villages.
And until today the village is the basic sociological unit within which
1. An anthropological study of the Somali Bajuni has been made by the 
Italian anthropologist, V.L. Grottanelli (1955)* In addition 
A.H.J. Prins has worked amongst Bajunis in Lamu and in Malindi 
(prins: 1961 and 19^5)*
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almost all social activities take place, and it is largely autonomous 
in the fields of marriage and subsistence economy.
There are nine villages on Faza island, with a total population
1 2 of about 8,000, The main village is Rasini, built at the mouth of
an estuary and on an islet of its own so that at high tide it is im­
possible to reach it from the other villages without a small boat,
Rasini is the administrative headquarters of Faza Division, and is a 
large village of about 2,000 people. The District Assistant - the 
government officer responsible for Faza Division - lives in Rasini, 
and all government business is conducted from there. Here there is 
also a Primary school and a Dispensary, Rasini is a village of square 
mud houses and palm-thatched roofs. The only two-storied buildings 
in the town are the government offices and police quarters, which are 
ancient stone edifices on the water front. Rasini is primarily a 
fishing village, though there are also many men who have farms, and 
many who find employment simply because Rasini is the commercial, ad­
ministrative and distributive centrefor the whole island.
There is no telephone link between Rasini and Lamu, and only 
a minimal postal service. All communication between the District 
Assistant and his superiors in Lamu has to rely on messages sent by hand
1. The Kenya census of 1962 put the total population of the island at
5,500 but I think this was an under-estimation - see p.21,
2. Again this village is usually labelled Faza on maps. I was corrected
many times by the people in this usage however - Faza is the.name of
island they affirm, whilst the main village is called Rasini. The 
latter comes from the Arabic rasen meaning two heads or promontaries. 
Interestingly, however, the Pate people sometimes refer to Rasini as
* Paza*.
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with the "boat captains* The District Assistant has no boat of his 
own. The significance of these inadequate communications is mainly 
political. It means that surveillance from above is very difficult 
and limited, and this gives much rein both for the local representative 
of government and for the Bajunis themselves* During 19^5 the District 
Commissioner (the District Assistants immediate superior in Lamu) 
visited only once - a very brief visit during which he gave a speech 
in Rasini* The District Assistant is also hampered in his work by 
the fact that he is kept most of the time very busy in Rasini and has 
only a handful of police, all of whom are stationed in Rasini.
He is also hampered by the difficulties of communication within 
the island. There are no roads and not even one wheeled vehicle. It 
is impossible to use even a bicycle there because of the thorn-filled 
and soft sand and the mud of the mangroves, quite apart from the fact 
that the sea air and salty ground rusts any metal after a few weeks. 
Hence all communication within the island is by foot. There are many 
donkeys but these are used mainly for transporting goods rather than 
for riding.
To the north east of Rasini lie two villages - Bajumwali which 
has about a thousand people, and Nyabogi which is little more than a 
hamlet. The men of these two villages are mainly farmers, though many 
of their farms are situated in the more central area of the island, 
since the land nearby is sandy and infertile* Bajumwali and Nyabogi 
are separated by a wide stretch of sand and mud, dry when the tide is
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out and the sea filters away down an inlet which gives them access to 
the sea. But it is not until one comes to ICisingitini - almost an 
hour's walk from Rasini, that one reaches the open sea. ICisingitini 
is a village almost as big as Rasini and like Rasini many of its people 
are actively employed in fishing, although there are some farms round 
about.
To the south east of Rasini lies Siyu, in the very centre of 
the island and apparently at its widest point. In fact the black mud 
of the mangroves on one side and the salt flats on the other make it
one of the narrowest area. But the land round about is the most
fertile on the island and Siyu is surrounded by its farms. Siyu is 
somewhat bigger than Bajumwali, though not as big as ICisingitini*
What is noticeable immediately is that many of the houses there are 
of stone, bigger and more well built than those of other villages men­
tioned so far. It is said locally that Siyu was founded by Omani
Arabs before the Bajunis arrived on the island. Now-a-days most of
its population is Bajuni, though a small group claim to be descendents 
of the original Omani settlers.
Beyond Siyu, in the south of the island, the land becomes more 
barren with thorn forests and scrub grass and salt flats right up to 
Pate town, a further one and a half hour's walk. Pate town itself is 
more like a museum than a living settlement. More than half of it is 
stone ruins and the people still live in two-storied stone houses with 
paved paths between the houses. The Pate people also claim to be Arabs,
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descendants of Omanis who settled there in the thirteenth century and 
at one time exerted their sovereignty over the whole north Kenya coast. 
Now-a-days the Pate people, of whom there are only about five hundred, 
earn their living by growing tobacco between the ruins of their old 
town. They barely interact with people from the other villages.
Contact is kept to a minimum by the people of Pate settling all their 
needs direct from Lamu by dhow, whereas the other villages are served by 
Rasini in this respect.
Tundwa, the village with which this thesis is concerned, is 
situated in the central and most fertile part of the island, h&lf an 
hour’s walk from Rasini. It is a village of just over one thousand 
people and has 239 palm thatched single-storey houses built of mud on a 
framework of mangrove poles. The only stone buildings in the town are 
the three mosques, and the ruins of an old fort, an old house and four 
ancient mosques. People say that the town was much bigger in the past 
than it is now, and certain evidence would seem to support this conten­
tion. Firstly the Friday mosque, the biggest of the three at present 
in use, is situated right on the outskirts of the village, with the 
nearest house twenty five yards away. It is said that this mosque was 
once almost in the centre of the village. The four old ruined mosques 
are all just beyond the periphery of the present village. In the 
second place some of the land surrounding the village is very uneven, 
which suggests that houses were built there in the past. Thirdly, 
the village is separated on nearly all sides from its cultivated land 
by a belt of scrub land dotted with small thorn bushes and here and
Tundva ' Village from the east
Village houses
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there a giant tamarind tree. Some of this land may well have had 
houses built on it in the past.
There is no central point to the town - no market or square or 
meeting place. If men congregate at all they do so in small groups 
near a shop or one of the mosques. Women gather in small groups in 
the yards of each other’s houses or by the wells. The town is not laid 
out in any particular pattern. Little footpaths run between the houses 
and through the coconut palms, banana and paw-paw trees which are inter­
spersed between the houses. The town is divided into thirteen locations 
(mitaa) which merge into one another. For the most part these locations 
have no social significance, though in the past certain locations were 
solely occupied by slaves. Nowadays, although this is no longer 
strictly true, there still tends to be a predominance of Wachumwa in 
such areas.
Like the other villages on the island Tundwa has neither 
electricity nor piped water supplies. There are several wells in the 
village as well as one government and seven private water tanks which 
collect water during the rainy season and store it for the dry season.
On one side of the town there is access to the sea through a 
long, narrow and winding channel through the mangroves. When the tide 
comes up, this channel and the mud flats on one side of the village are 
flooded with water. In this place are anchored the two or three small 
dhows used by the village's fishermen.
Beyond the belt of dry thorn and grass are Tundwa's farms, full
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of coconut palms, tamarind, cashew nut and mango trees* Here there 
are also patches of maize, simsim, cotton and millet* The farms 
stretch as far as the cultivated areas of the surrounding villages and 
intermingle with them* In some cases Tundwa men have to walk as far 
as seven miles in order to reach their farms.
In the 1962 census Tundwa is reported to have had a population 
of 667 persons. My own census of November 1965 showed it to have a 
population of 1042. There are two reasons why it seems unlikely that 
the population could have increased by 375 only four years. In 
the first place there has been a continuous and steady flow of emigra­
tion and migration from all the villages on the island. Most of this 
emigration has been to Mombasa and it has been going on for almost half 
a century. The evidence which I mentioned earlier as indicating that 
the village was once much bigger in the past is suggestive of a gradual 
population decline. In the second place the natural rate of increase 
appears to be very low* Lamu District has one of the lowest fertility 
rates in the country and there is a high degree of infant mortality. 
During the period March 1965 to January 1966 my own records of births 
and deaths in Tundwa showed a net increase of only three. 36 births 
were counter-balanced by 33 deaths, of which 26 were of children. In 
other words, it seems probable that the census of 1962 greatly under­
estimated the population not only of Tundwa, but the total population 
of all the villages.
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Table 1* Breakdown of Tundwa population "by age and sex (November 1965)
Sex/Age categories Number Percentage Total
Adults Males 276 26.556 626
Females 350 33 .%
Children
Males 240 23 $ 416
Females 176 17 %
Total 1042 100 % 1042
A breakdown of Tundwa*s population shows a high proportion of 
women as opposed to men* One of the reasons for this is the labour 
migration of men to Mombasa and other urban centres in Kenya* As will 
be made clear in later chapters however, Tundwa women also migrate to 
Mombasa as prostitutes, as well as accompanying their husbands there*
So this is not the total answer - and indeed I cannot fully explain 
this demographic feature* If we accept the 1^ 62 census figures, it 
is a feature also of all the other villages except Pate where the numbers 
of males and females are exactly equal. Migration of men has taken 
place from all villages - though far less from Pate than from other 
places* But the migration of women is not so common from other villages 
as it is from Tundwa - and it is unknown from Pate. In Tundwa the 
imbalance will largely right itself in the next generation as can be 
seen from the proportion of male as opposed to female children.
Economy of the island
Nearly everyone on the island depends either on agriculture or
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fishing in order to make a living, Fishing in most of the villages 
is purely for the internal market* The fishermen of ICisingitini and 
Rasini however sell much of their produce to an Indian-owned company 
operating from Lamu. The company has a refrigerated boat which collects 
the best fish and takes it to Mombasa to sell. Towards the end of 
however plans were in hand to build a refrigeration plant on a small 
islet near to Rasini where fish can be stored. I believe this has 
now been substantially completed.
Most men on the island are however involved in agriculture.
As I have mentioned the Bajunis claim a large area of land opposite 
the island to be theirs by customary right. Traditionally this area 
was planted with annual crops rather than trees and the cultivators 
were the slaves and some of the poorer free men. They would spend a 
good part of the year living there, first clearing and firing the bush 
land, then hoeing the ground and planting and later watching over and 
harvesting the crops. The soil on the mainland is more fertile than 
that on the island and is said to have produced considerably higher 
yields. But it seems that cultivation on the mainland has always had 
its dangers and was insecure at the best of times. To begin with 
there are large herds of elephants in the area which frequently destroy 
crops. But more importantly there seems always to have been a threat 
from Somali raiders from the north. They came down and despoiled the 
villages and took the crops and sometimes killed or took as prisoners 
all the slaves they found working there. When the British arrived
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they drove hack the Somali marauders and effectively policed the border.
A period of relative security ensued, and with the ending of slavery any
man from the island has considered it his right to clear a plot of the
fertile land there. But in recent years the marauders - who are known
as niashifta - have returned to pillage the villages, loot the houses
and take the crops. The matter has now taken on a political tinge.
Since Independence there has been a border dispute between Kenya and
Somalia and Somalia has armed the marauders. For the past three to
four years cultivation on the mainland has been almost impossible. In
early 1965 only six men from Tundwa went to the mainland, together with
a few men from other villages. They cultivated a small area of about
three miles square there. Towards the end of the year the settlement
was attacked by the Shifta and one of the men from Tundwa was captured.
Until four years ago there were several small villages on the mainland
and one larger settlement - ICiunga - all occupied by Bajunis. With
the new wave of Shifta raids the people of these villages have fled -
some to Mombasa, some to Lamu, and many also to the island of Faza.
In July 1964 there were about 450 refugees living in the various villages
on the island. Most of these were in Rasini and none at that time
were in Tundwa* During 1965 two small groups of refugees arrived in
the village, and one of them, composed of two women and a child settled
down there. Some of the refugees, and especially those from Kiunga,
have tried to return to the mainland only to be driven away again and
again by fresh raids. Eventually they have begun to settle down in the
1* I am indebted to the then District Assistant, Suleiman Shakombo, 
for this information*
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island and have built themselves two small hamlets - one near Siyu, 
called Shanga after the ancient town near whose ruins it is built, and 
one near Mtangawanda in the far southern corner of the island opposite 
Pate town.
With the ending of mainland agriculture the people of the island 
suffered some temporary hardship. Fortunately, however, the population 
of the whole area appears to have declined between the wars owing to 
extensive migration to Mombasa, and with it the numbers requiring land 
to cultivate. The new hardships seem simply to have had the effect 
of accelerating the process of migration. Annual crops, traditionally 
grown on the mainland, are now grown on the island, on land which is 
probably owned by people who have long ago emigrated to Mombasa. At 
present there is no shortage of land on the island for all those who 
wish to use it, but were the population of the island to increase with­
out the alternative of mainland agriculture again becoming possible 
there would definitely be pressure on the land. In 1967» however,
Kenya and Somalia came to some agreement on the border problem and it 
seems likely that mainland agriculture will again be safe in the future. 
In the following chapter, however, I shall examine the economic organisa­
tion of Tundwa as it existed during 1965*
PART 1. FRAMEWORKS
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II. ECONOMIC ORGANISATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OP WEALTH 
"There is no work in Tundwa, only farming", A Tundwa migrant
In this chapter I wish to substantiate the argument that wide 
divergences of wealth are a typical feature of Tundwa*s economy. This 
will lead on to my later analysis of factionalism where I shall show 
that a basic discontent about inequalities in wealth is one of the 
driving forces of political action. I shall also map out in this 
chapter the nature of the linkages which are created by the production 
and consumption of goods since such links may be called upon in the 
recruitment of political support. Economic linkages fall into three 
main types. First there are the relationships of economic dependency 
which are usually created by marriage and the birth of children. The 
second type of relationships are those created by indebtedness - the 
relations, that is, between money lenders and borrowers. Finally 
there are relations which have arisen as a result of cash cropping 
between the producers of crops and the buyers. Such buyers are often 
outside the village so these linkages are not important in the recruit­
ment of support. But they may be politically significant in other 
ways as we shall see in later chapters.
Finally in this chapter I show some of the ways in which wealth 
can be achieved, thus introducing the element of change into the picture.
28
As patterns of wealth change so we would expect the patterns of 
political action to change.
Agricultures Mashamba and Mahonde
78$ of Tundwa1 s adult males are occupied in agriculture, the 
major income-producing occupation. There are two kinds of farming 
practised which can be equated with two kinds of rights over land. The
first of these is ownership, the second usage. When a piece of land
is owned outrightly it is called a shamba (plural : mashamba); when 
it is simply used but not owned outrightly it is called a honde (plural : 
mahonEe), Since there are no precise English equivalents I shall use 
the Swahili terms, Mashamba can be bought, sold, given away or in­
herited, Their permanence is indicated by the fact that they are 
mainly used for growing trees - coconut, mango, cashew nut and tamarind. 
Wo such permanent rights are held over mahonde which can neither be sold 
nor inherited and are exclusively used for the cultivation of annual 
crops - maize, millet, cow-peas, cotton and simsim. Mahonde are 
temporary plots cultivated by the techniques of slash and burn. One 
plot is cultivated for two to three years and then abandoned. The dis­
tinction between these two kinds of farming is not merely a technical 
one - it also indicates a basic socio-economic distinction in the 
community since the average income from a honde is only half of that
which can be gained from a shamba (acre for acre).
In Tundwa 87 men (31*5$ all adult males) and 19 women (5*4$ 
of all adult women) own mashamba, and together they own an area of 597 
acres. Some of these mashamba have been inherited, others bought or
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given. Most of the produce from shambas is sold - this applies parti­
cularly to coconuts (which are sold for copra) and to cashew nuts. Coco­
nuts have been a cash crop for as long as anyone can remember, but the 
development of the cashew nut as a cash crop is fairly recent - within 
the last ten years. Some of the tamerind and most of the mangoes are 
kept for household use, whilst others are sold. Shamba produce is 
sold either to Rasini shopkeepers (if the amount is fairly small) or 
to Lamu merchants (if the amount makes this worthwhile).
The profitability of shambas depends on a great many factors -
the fertility of the soil, the age of the shamba (trees take from two
to ten years, depending on the species, before they produce an adequate
harvest), and the variety of trees planted. Usually the major part
of any shamba is planted with coconut or cashew nut trees, with mango
and tamarind trees interspersed. Prom a good and well-established
shamba planted with coconut palms or cashew nut trees one can earn an
annual income of between £62 and £72 gross per acre. Two points must
be made here however. In the first place this is by no means the
average profit since shambas vary considerably in quality. A figure
of about £50 would be more realistic for the average income and it is
this which I have used for later assessments. In the second place
one has to distinguish between gross profit and net profit, since many
expenses are involved in cultivating a shamba. To begin with the
seeds have to be obtained, either from other farmers or from government
1. All these figures were arrived at after discussion with several 
informants as to the normal yield of their shambas. An estimate 
was then made of the value of this produce sold at 1965 prices.
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agents. Then there are all the costs of ’waiting1• Whoever works 
on the shamba must be maintained or maintain himself -until the trees 
start to be productive. Usually this involves only the owner himself. 
Very few men can afford to employ permanent labourers to cultivate their 
land, though quite a few employ temporary labour at times when there is 
extra work (such as harvesting the fruits of the shamba or clearing the 
undergrowth and weeds from between the trees). Wot many men can expect 
automatic help from their sons in this work if the latter have passed 
the age of puberty. They may however make an arrangement with them 
on a shared profits basis. Thus a son may help his father if his 
father agrees to pay his bridewealth or help him in some other way.
On both sides it is a case of, (,if he helps me, then I help him'*.
(This lack of co-operation is related to the frequency of divorce and 
the norm that children stay with their mother after she has been 
divorced by their father). Only fifteen men are helped by their adult 
sons, though five more are helped by other young adult male relatives.
A few more are helped by small children, but the rest (50$) cultivate 
alone. Women shamba owners are in a more difficult position since 
women do not cultivate in this community. They are therefore forced 
to employ labourers to cultivate for them, or to rely on male kinsmen 
to do the work in return for a share in the profits. It is for this 
reason that not many women own shambas. When a shamba owner dies 
women heirs usually sell their shares of the land to male heirs.
The process of starting a shamba from scratch, until it begins
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to be productive, usually takes about five years. Meanwhile some 
annual crops or bananas may be grown in part of the shamba. As a 
result of this expensive waiting some men have land which they cannot 
afford to utilise. Unless a shamba is continually restocked moreover, 
it will revert to bush after about seventy years, There are pieces 
of land around Tundwa almost indistinguishable from the surrounding bush 
and with nothing except for a few ancient coconut palms and the occa- 
sional giant tamarind tree to indicate that they were once shambas. I 
suspect that a good deal of land on the island was at one time planted 
with coconuts but has long since reverted to bush with the depopulation 
of the area as a result of labour migration. This is not the only 
reason for land reverting to bush however. There are three pieces of 
land near the village whose owners died about a decade ago, after a 
lifetime of exploiting their shambas without restocking them. In two 
cases the men left very young children to inherit the land, in the 
other case the man died without heirs. Even in such cases, however, 
a person who inherits land, even if it is only bushland without trees, 
is in a better position than a honde user since if he can find a buyer 
he can sell his land. Such land would fetch from £2 to £10 an acre.
a shamba is well planted however it may fetch as much as £65 per 
acre - or more if the year's harvest is not yet collected.
Out of the 106 persons who own shambas, only a few are wealthy 
in the sense of owning a large amount of good and well-stocked land.
The average holding is 5*6 acres. In this particular case however an
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average figure is deceptive since the holdings range in size from 44*8 
acres to only half an acre. There is thus a wide variation between 
the very rich and the poor shamba owners. The following table will 
show this in more detail.
Table 2. Amounts of land owned by Mashamba owners (A)
Size of shamba Number of Men Number of Women Total
Percentage 
of Total
A1 * over 12 acres 6 - 6 5. %
A2. 9-12 acres 9 1 10 9. %
A3. 6-9 acres 21 2 23 21.5JS
A4. 3-6 acres 28 7 35 33 fo
A5- 1-3 acres 17 7 24 23 $
A6. below 1 acre 6 2 8 7.5$
Total 87 19 106 100 io
As can be seen from the table, the majority of shamba owners 
are to be found in the middle categories in terms of the amount of land 
they own. Only a small percentage are very rich (by local standards 
that is), and a rather larger, but still small percentage are in the 
lowest category. The biggest category of shamba owners has between 
three and six acres of land. This table however indicates only the 
amount of land which is actually owned - it does not indicate the amount 
from which an income is gained. In some cases there are considerable 
discrepancies between the two amounts. There are two reasons for this.
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The first is a reason to which I have already referred - that is that 
some land has fallen into disuse and therefore does not produce a full 
income - and in some cases no income at all. The second reason is 
that the land may he being used by someone else other than the owner - 
in which case the owner may receive no income from it. The pattern of 
income from shamba land is thus not a simple and direct reflection of 
the pattern of land holding. I shall return to the matter of income 
later.
Some shamba owners have additional sources of income in addi­
tion to their land* Fourteen men have a small honde on which they 
grow annual crops to supplement their income from shamba produce.
Hine shamba owners cultivate a shamba belonging to a relative in addi­
tion to cultivating their own* In addition there are a few men who 
earn a small income as Koran school teachers or temporary labourers.
But more importantly there are some shamba owners who are able to re­
invest their profits in other enterprises - in particular those of 
shopkeeping and/or money lending. There are seven shopkeepers in 
Tundwa, three of whom are also money lenders. In addition there are 
seven other shamba owners who lend money. For the most part it is 
the mahonde cultivators who borrow money so I shall return to the role 
of the money lenders later in discussing them. The point I want to 
make here is that by reinvesting profits earned from shambas the rich 
are able to expand their incomes still further. (Conversely a man 
who makes profits in other ways - from labour migration for example -
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is likely to invest his money in a shamba)*
Mashamba owners are a very significant socio-economic category 
in Tundwa. This is mainly "because of the nature of their wealth 
which gives them a degree of security which no other occupational 
category enjoys. This remains true even though some shamba owners 
do not have enough land to do other than eke out a meagre existence.
The majority of shamba owners however are wealthier than others in the 
community. This has certain consequences. To begin with these 
people are not dependent on others for a living - on the contrary 
others, such as agricultural labourers, are dependent on them. It is 
for this reason that we find nearly all Tundwa1s political leaders in 
this category. Such people have a basis on which to recruit political 
support. In addition mashamba owners tend to marry the daughters and 
sisters of other shamba owners - though not necessarily the daughters 
or sisters of men of equivalent wealth. This category thus tends to 
perpetuate itself over the generations as a result of the process of 
inheritance.
Mashamba users
There are some seventeen men in Tundwa in the anomolous position 
of owning no land themselves, but having been given license to use the 
shamba of another person. For most purposes such men may be classed 
with the shamba owners, but they are different in one very important 
respect, that unlike the shamba owners they have no security of tenure. 
These men may not give anything to the owner of the land they work,
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though this depends on the circumstances* For example, a shamha 
owner who has more land than he can manage may allow a kinsman or 
friend (though it is usually the former) to cultivate a part of it and 
take the profits* Alternatively the owner may take a small percentage 
of the profits - if he is old, for example, he may ask for enough to 
feed andclothe himself. Women owners often allow a male kinsman to 
cultivate their land for the price of feeding them. Eight of the 
seventeen shamba users are cultivating the land of a female relative* 
Owners who are away in Mombasa - not many and generally owners of 
small amounts of land - often allow another person to use their land 
without charge whilst they are away. It is a distinct possibility 
that usage may have transformed itself into ownership in some cases if 
the owner never returned, though I do not know of any certain cases 
of this.
As can be seen from Table 3, some mashamba users may cultivate 
quite large amounts of land, and in fact the range of holdings follows 
a very similar pattern to that of the mashamba owners. Again there 
are slight discrepancies here between the amount of land used and the 
amount from which an income is being gained. This is because some of 
the land may have fallen into disuse.
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Table 3* Amounts of land cultivated by Mashamba users (b )
Sise of shamba Humber of men
B1 • over 12 acres 2
B2. 9-12 acres -
B3. 6-9 acres 4
B4. 3-6 acres 5
B5* 1-3 acres 5
B6. below 1 acre 1
Total
--- --..... ......... . '
17
Men who use but do not own land may be well off whilst they 
are using the land. Two of these seventeen men are in fact money 
lenders, though one of these only lends on a small scale. But since 
such men have no security of tenure they can be dispossessed at any 
time. The following case will illustrate this.
Case 1. Time : July 196b 
•]
Sura is a very old Sharif man, the richest man in the village 
(for details of his wealth see below p.55 ). His wife, M, is also 
very old and blind. The couple live with an unmarried son, X, who 
looks after them and sees to all their needs. Another of Sura1s sons, 
Mohamed, is using a large piece of his father*s land, and was giving 
his father a share of the profits. Mohamed has two sons, Ahmad and 
Zein, both young men in their twenties. They were using a shamba of 
6.4 acres belonging to their grandmother M. They had worked in this 
shamba since they were children, and had planted some of the coconut 
palms growing there. In July 1965 however the old lady was forced 
by X and another son, Y, to sell the land* She did not want to sell 
it, but since she was living with X and was completely dependent on 
him she had no alternative but to accept his decision. Mohamed was 
strongly opposed to the idea, but in spite of his opposition the land
1. All names used in case histories are fictitious.
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was sold* This suggests some pre-existing antagonism "between X and 
his brother Mohamed, but on what this was based I am not sure* The 
point I am making here is that the sale of the land left Ahmad and 
Zein without income. Later some of the trees in the shamba were
Mahonde cultivators
If the mashamba users have no security of tenure they at least 
have a reasonable income whilst they are using the land. The mahonde 
cultivators are in a much more precarious position since without land 
of their own they can only cultivate annual crops, which bring in far 
less income for a greater amount of work.
As I explained in the previous chapter Tundwa1s annual crops 
were until recently grown on the mainland opposite Faza island. It 
is only in the last four years that incursions of Shifta insurgents 
from Somalia have made cultivation there practically impossible. During 
1965 six men from Tundwa did cultivate a small area near the tiny main­
land hamlet of Saadani. But most of Tundwa*s mahonde in this year 
were situated on the island. Most of the mahonde are in areas where 
there are no shambas. They lie beyond the belt of mashamba which 
surrounds Tundwa on three sides. Other mahonde are on shambas which 
are not at present being utilised by their owners (the owner's permission 
must be obtained but no rent, either in oash or in kind, is paid).
Most of the crops grown on mahonde are meant for consumption
Sura
Mohamed Y
ZeinAhmad
found to have been destroyed, kerosine hav­
ing been poured on their roots. No culprit 
was discovered, but Ahmad was widely sus­
pected. Following this affair, Mohamed, 
the father of the two boys, announced that 
henceforth he would keep all the profits 
from his father* s shamba for himself.
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rather than sale* Only simsim and cotton are generally grown as cash 
crops, and since the land here is not very fertile crop yields are low. 
Many mahonde users cultivate small amounts of cash crops in addition to 
crops for subsistence - maize, millet, cow-peas etc. Where crops are 
sold they go either to money lenders in lieu of debts (i shall return 
to this later), to Faza shopkeepers, or to government agents, (Cotton 
as a cash crop has been introduced fairly recently and the government 
has a monopoly in its purchase).
The process of cultivation takes several months and is back­
breaking work. A man clearing a new honde first has to select the 
area. There is no chief or overseer who organises the apportionment 
of land, although there was such a man (the fundi wa kulima or agri­
cultural expert) in the past when annual crops were cultivated on the 
mainland. At this point in time there is no shortage of land on the 
island, so a man has a wide choice of where to site his plot. There 
are large areas lying uncultivated, and whilst some of these may be 
required in order that the agricultural technique of shifting cultiva­
tion can operate there is still plenty of room for manoevre. There 
are even two non-Bajunis in the village - a Digo and a Pokomo - who 
cultivate mahonde without any protest being raised. Some of this land 
may in fact belong to men or their heirs at present in Mombasa. I do 
not know how difficult such men would find it to reactivate their 
claims (most people do not possess title deeds for their land), but 
they are often already forgotten in the village and their land is
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considered to be common land, free for any Bajuni to use. This is in 
line with the general view that a disused shamba may be used for annual 
crops with the owner’s permission where he is known.
In theory a man is not supposed to plant permanent trees on 
land which he does not own. In the past when the mahonde cultivators 
were mainly slaves this rule was presumably enforceable, and in any 
case the mahonde were situated on the mainland. To have planted 
permanent trees there would have involved the inconvenience of perman­
ent residence on the mainland. In the last few years, however, since 
mahonde have been situated on the island, the rule may be breaking down. 
In 1965 I found two men who had planted coconut palms and mango trees 
on honde plots. Although this caused some ill-feeling no-one made 
any attempt to prevent the men from continuing and in public it was
denied that the rule had been broken. One of these men was a faction
leader and a Koran school teacher. We shall hear more of him in 
Chapter VIII. The other was a stranger in the village, a Lamu man 
married to a Tundwa woman.
The process of cultivation begins at the end of the year. 
Usually a group of men clear plots adjoining one another, the advantage 
of this being that the whole area can be fired at one time. Such men 
are friends or relatives, and nearly always they are members of the
same social stratum. In December and January, when the weather is at
its hottest, thb dry thorn bush and brush in the plot is cut down and 
laid in piles. A broad path is left around the edge of the plot so
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that when the bush is fired there will not be a general conflagration, 
When the annual crops were cultivated on the mainland the occasion of 
firing the bush was a very special one, made auspicious with a host of 
rituals and recitations. Vast areas were fired on the same day. But 
although some of these rituals were carried out in Saadani in 1965 
they were not carried out on the island.
When the bush has been razed to the ground and reduced to ash, 
the land is hoed and the seeds planted. All the work on the mahonde 
is done with a simple hoe and a knife - indeed there are no other 
agricultural implements. From the time when the seeds begin to sprout 
a careful watch is kept on the land. The main problem is wild pigs 
who come to spoil the crops. When the crops have grown tall, look­
out posts are built and men spend most of their time in the fields, 
coming back to the town only on Fridays for the Friday prayer. In 
late July and August the harvest is gathered in and the seasonal cycle 
comes to an end, A man may cultivate the same plot of land for two 
to three years but he should then abandon it and clear a new plot. X 
was told that the bush should lie fallow for about ten years before 
it is fired again.
As with the shambas, the degree of co-operation is minimal. 
Throughout most of the year a man cultivates alone or with the help of 
small sons. Only two adolescent sons helped their fathers to cultivate 
mahonde in 1965- For the most part young men of this age wish to be 
independent and would sooner cultivate a honde for themselves or work
1• Perhaps the rituals were an attempt to ward off the dangers and 
insecurity of mainland agriculture x*hich I mentioned in Chapter I, 
For more information on the recitations see Chapter VI.
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as temporary labourers for others rather than help their fathers.
Wives do not help their husbands because ttfomen do not cultivate in 
this community. (There was one exception to this rule, a woman cultiva­
ting a honde on her own account. But she was a very poor woman of the 
lowest category of ex-slaves.) Only one honde cultivator was able 
to employ a full-time labourer in 1965* and he planted a large area of 
nine and a half acres. At the time of harvest however some temporary 
labour may be employed and on this occasion the whole family may turn 
out to help.
It is very difficult to assess the profitability of mahonde t 
since many farmers mix their crops and there is variation in the soil 
between one area and another. But roughly speaking, if a person plants 
only cash crops he can earn an annual income of between £15 and £32 per 
acre. Alternatively he needs to plant at least one and a half acres 
of maize or millet in order to feed a family (a man, his wife and two 
children) until the next harvest.
69 Tundwa men and one woman cultivated mahonde on the island in 
1965. (This figure does not include men who also own or use mashamba 
since they are in quite a different position). In addition a further 
six men cultivated mahonde on the mainland. Those on the island culti- 
vated altogether an area of 209 acres (an average of 2.9 acres per 
cultivator). The range of variation in the size of the various mahonde 
is much narrower than in the case of the mashamba. But there is
1. When I asked why women did not cultivate, one woman replied by point­
ing significantly at her genitals. "We women cultivate here. That 
is enough". Strangely enough, however, Bajumwali women do help their 
husbands to cultivate and are not ashamed to be seen doing so.
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nevertheless quite a wide span between the largest honde of just over 
eleven acres and the smallest of .8 of an acre. Table 4 shows the 
distribution in the sizes of mahonde*
In theory a man can cultivate as large an area as he wishes on
the common land. In practice, however, the amount of land he can
cultivate is limited by several factors. A general ceiling is set on 
the size of the honde by the lack of modern agricultural equipment. 
Equipped only with a knife and a hoe a single man can only cultivate a 
certain amount. And as we have already seen the honde cultivator is 
in most cases working by himself. Probably the optimum amount of land 
a man can cultivate alone is six acres. Above this amount he needs 
more help, whether from his children or from temporary labourers. The
area a man cultivates is also related to the number of dependents he
has to feed. This can clearly be seen from Table 4» where it is shown 
that the number of dependents a man supports varies directly with the 
amount of land he cultivates.
Table 4. Amounts of land used by Mahonde Cultivators (C) related to
Number of Dependents 
(Table does not include mainland mahonde, the sizes of which are unknown).
Size of mahonde Number of men Average Number of Dependents
0,1. over 12 acres - -
G2. 9-12 acres 2 4.5
C3. 6-9 acres 5 4
C4. 3-6 acres 22 3.9
C5. 1-3 acres 30 3.4
C6. below 1 acre 10 men, 1 woman 2.6
Total 69 men, 1 woman —
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Another factor that has to he taken into account when con­
sidering mahonde cultivators is the fact that about 80$ of them are 
wholly or partly dependent on money lenders, This is partly because 
in times of difficulty they have no capital or savings on which they 
can fall back. In addition their income is based on a yearly seasonal 
cycle. Whereas the ovmer of a good shamba gets some kind of fruits 
two or three times a year, the honde cultivator gets only one crop a 
year. To put it another way, the cultivation of annual crops requires 
one year*s *waiting* before a crop is produced. If a man has no sav­
ings how does he live for that year? It is this situation which 
creates indebtedness in Tundwa.
There are twelve men in Tundwa who normally lend money, and
there are several others who may lend money from time to time. Such
men are known as mata.jiri (singular ta.jiri, literally rich man). At 
the beginning of the season a man wishing to cultivate goes to a ta.jiri. 
He asks him either for a loan of a specific amount, or simply to pro­
vide for all his wants until the following year when he reaps a harvest* 
For either of these two kinds of loan he has to promise the ta.jiri the 
surety of his harvest. For the first kind of loan he can borrow 307-
in return for the promise of each 100 lb bag of maize or millet.
When the harvest is reaped debtors must repay their mata.jiri in kind - 
the first kind of debtor giving him the promised number of bags of 
produce, the second giving him enough to repay the debt he has incurred. 
The money lender then sells this produce at almost 100$ profit, Thus
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it may be that in order to live a debtor has to buy back his own pro­
duce at nearly twice the original price. Very often a debtor starts
off the new season having been unable to completely repay the debts 
of the previous year. In this way he may be tied to the same ta.jiri 
throughout his life.
Obviously in deciding how much to lend a person, a money lender 
has to weigh up the man's 'credit-worthiness*. Is he strong enough 
to work the proposed amount of land with the help he has available? Is
he a good farmer who can be counted upon to do the work properly? What
is his past record? By taking all these factors into account the money
lender tries to ensure that he does not make a loss on the loan. This
means that the old, the sick and the inexperienced cannot get loans.
But in addition no money lender has unlimited funds so he has to make a 
choice between fairly evenly matched claims. Although it is extremely 
difficult to get precise information on this subject we may assume that 
he does not decide on a purely rationalistic basis who to give loans to, 
but in terms of the existing structure of social relations in the village - 
the pattern of kin and neighbourhood ties and seemingly most important,
the pattern of social stratification.
Connected with the question of credit-worthiness there is also 
the question of whether sanctions can be taken against a man who defaults 
on his debts. As far as I could discover default is very rare. It is 
more usual for a man to simply carry over his debt until the next harvest, 
and for the money-lender to agree to this in the hope of eventually
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recouping his losses, than it is for the money-lender to break off the 
relationship and accuse the debtor of default, I do not in fact know 
of any case of the latter, There is no written agreement between 
debtor and money-lender so it is difficult for the money-lender to take 
someone to court in such a case. If he were to press a man too hard 
for payment public opinion would turn strongly against him. If how­
ever he makes a loss year after year he will simply cut his losses and 
refuse to lend any more money to the man. It may be that the high 
rate of interest charged by money-lenders is an indication of the fre­
quency of such situations. On the whole however it is in the money­
lender^ interest that a man should not completely pay off his debts, 
for if he were to do so it would mean the end of a profitable business. 
The debtor’s point of view is not so very different, since he too wishes 
the relationship to continue - indeed he may depend upon it for his very 
existence. Some men may cheat by selling part of their harvest 
secretly in Rasini before the money-lender gets his hands on it. Others 
may even run off to Mombasa leaving their debts unsettled. But this 
is rare, simply for the reason that such a man would never again be 
able to raise a loan.
Not all those who take loans are wholly dependent on a money­
lender. Some only borrow small amounts of money from time to time and 
such small loans are not subject to such a high rate of interest. And 
about 2C'ifo of the mahonde users take no loans at all. These latter seem 
to be either young men living at home and still being supported by their
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families, or men whose fathers are rich enough to loan them money with- 
out interest*
The mahonde cultivators form an economic category in contrast 
to those who own or use mashamba* Primarily this is a lower income 
category, though the poorest shamba owners overlap with the cultivators 
of the largest amounts of honde land. Some of the honde cultivators 
are, as it were, permanent residents in this category. In order to 
cultivate they have to depend on money-lenders, and as a result of 
this dependence they are inhibited from accumulating either the capital 
or the savings which would enable them to be independent. Other men 
are obviously in this category only temporarily, since when their 
fathers die they will inherit the whole or a part of a shamba from him. 
At any one time however the mahonde users are a category of dependents, 
and we should not be surprised that this is a category which produces 
no political leaders. These men have no economic security and no 
economic power which they could wield over others.
Other occupations
Not all men own or cultivate land for themselves. There are 
a small minority who cultivate for others. Many of these are assist­
ing kinsmen - usually their fathers, whilst others are employed on a 
more formal basis by non-relatives. For the most part these latter are 
young men who no longer wish to assist their fathers but have not yet 
become independent cultivators. In addition there are a few older men, 
some more or less permanently attached to particular employers. The
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usual wage for agricultural labour is 3/~ to 5/~ &ay* depending 
on the work; and the experience of the labourer. For the most part 
agricultural labour is a phase through which many men pass before they 
begin to work on their own account, rather than a permanent condition.
Although agriculture is the mainstay of Tundwa*s economy, 21% 
of the adult male population is engaged in other occupations. Many 
of these are engaged in fishing, which occupies fifteen men. Six of 
these fishermen are employed in one or other of the coastal villages; 
the rest work in Tundwa. Three of the Tundwa fishermen are boat 
owners and the others are their relatives. The fish which these people 
catch is all sold within the village and since meat is rarely available 
they do quite well. This is indicated I think by the fact that one 
of the boat owners is a money-lender (he lends money mainly to other 
fishermen and has bought himself a shamba of one and a half acres in 
size with the profits).
Of the rest of the population, some are engaged in craft pro­
duction, such as basketry, carpentry, or house building. Others are 
donkey porters, mangrove cutters or water carriers. Sixteen men have 
no work and have to rely on others to support them. In general these 
men are old or sick or mentally deficient or have fallen temporarily 
on hard times. A few however are resting labour migrants. Table 5 
(belovr) gives an occupational breakdown of Tundwa*s adult male population. 
As can be seen from the table, the only occupation which is of real 
economic significance in Tundwa is agriculture. Other occupations are 
purely marginal.
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Table 5* Occupational “breakdown of adult male population
Occupation Number of Men % of Total Adult Male Population
A. Mashamba owners 87 31.5/0
B. Mashamba users 17 6.2$,
C. Mahonde cultivators 75 27.1$
D1. Agricultural labour
(a) For kin 22 8 io
(b) For employer 16 5.8/
3)2 • Fishermen 14 5.1/
1)3 • Other occupations 29 10.5/
D4. Unemployed 16 5.8/
Total 276 100 /
Note : The categories in this table are mutually exclusive. Thus a
man who owns a shamba and is also a fisherman is shown under 
the category of shamba owners, not fishermen.
Women1s work
I have said nothing so far about women*s occupations, except for 
those few women who own shambas and the one woman who cultivates a honde. 
The sexual division of labour is very marked in Tundwa and has wider 
social implications. As I have suggested already, a woman will only 
cultivate with her own hands if she is reduced to the lowest economic 
circumstances. She expects to be supported by a male relative - usually 
a husband if she has one, or perhaps a son or a son-in-law if she has no 
husband* On the other hand there are certain minor occupations which 
women can carry out without shame, and which old men and the unemployed 
can resort to in time of need. Nearly every woman plaits strips of
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matting which are sewn together by the children of the Koran schools 
into sacks (magafaa). From this job both the women and the ICoran 
school teachers derive some advantage* Other jobs from which women 
can earn a small income are making the thatching (makuchi) for house 
roofs, removing the seeds from the sticky tamarind fruits and sorting 
out the good cotton from the bad. From all these occupations, if 
carried out full time, a woman can earn about one shilling a day, on 
which (if she were forced) she could just about subsist* But normally 
women use some of this money to contribute to household expenses, and 
the rest is spent on small luxuries for herself and her children. Any 
money she earns in this way is her own to spend as she likes - her 
husband has no control over it*
The important social aspect of womens work is that it keeps 
them in the village all day whereas men go to their farms to cultivate. 
Vlomen work together in small groups of two and three and visit each 
other constantly during the day. This factor contributes to what I 
shall call the * commensality* of women as opposed to the individuality* 
of men. Women are the ones who spread gossip and have an important, 
if not an over-riding influence in the establishment of * accepted 
opinion* on any matter. The commensality of women is shown physically 
on the occasion of life-crises and also in the political sphere, as we 
shall see in Chapter VIII.
In addition to all the forms of income so far mentioned, some 
women earn money as prostitutes (malaya). It is difficult to estimate
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the extent of prostitution in the village. Some people (both men and 
women) assured me that practically every woman was a prostitute (MWote 
wanafanya malaya1*); others said it was only half of the women. One 
woman said, "Tundwa has no more wanawali (unmarried virgin girls) - all 
of them do their 'work1 " • Nor is it possible to assess the amount 
of income that can be gained in this way. Payment is more in the form 
of a *gift* than a ‘price’, and I heard estimates of as high as 5/- 
and as low as five cents (one-fifth of a shilling - some women, it is 
said, would let small boys have intercourse with them for as little as 
this). But more usually the gift is a shilling or so* Prostitutes 
drift in and out of marriages with their lovers so there is no defined 
class of prostitutes. It is only when such a woman leaves Tundwa for 
Mombasa that she becomes a professional prostitute.
Labour migration
That labour migration is an ever-present possibility is an
important factor in Tundwa*s economic situation. More than half as
many Tundwa men and women again are in Mombasa or other urban centres
as are in Tundwa. Or, to put it in another way, more than 6ofo of
Tundwa*s households have relatives away. But many of these are emigrants
rather than labour migrants - in other words some of them were born in
Mombasa or elsewhere and many will never return. But all these people
1
retain some sort of link with Tundwa, however tenuous, either by send­
ing letters or money back, or by visiting occasionally. During 1965*
22f0 of all known Tundwa migrants visited the village - 17% of the men
1• There are Tundwa emigrees - or more likely their children and grand­
children - who do not maintain such links, and whose numbers I cannot 
of course estimate.
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migrants and 26f0 of the women migrants.
The kind of men who leave as migrants are usually young men 
who have no land of their own or men who have small shambas which they 
cannot afford to cultivate. This can be seen from the fact that only 
fourteen out of 172 male migrants own land in Tundwa. They owned a
total of altogether 56*8 acres (a rough average of four acres each) 
of which 14*3 acres has reverted to bush and the rest is being used 
by relatives or friends. There are four men out of this number how­
ever who have large and tfell-established shambas to which they plan to 
retire when they are no longer fit for active work.
The following table shows the number of known adult migrants 
in various Kenya centres as compared with the total adult population in 
Tundwa. As can be seen the vast majority of migrants are in Mombasa 
which is about 250 miles away* In Lamu there is very little work avail­
able and Nairobi is rather far for people to go. Other migrants are 
in places as far apart as Mogadishu in Somalia and Dodoma in Tanzania.
Few of the male migrants have any skills to offer. The largest number 
work as manual labourers, mainly at ICilindini Nocks in Mombasa. Another 
farily large group is self-employed - this group includes petty traders, 
purveyors of Swahili medicine, plasterers and butchers as well as various 
other small scale business occupations. The rest are either more 
skilled - working as machinists, fishermen, goldsmiths etc. - or they 
have some education and can work as Koran school teachers, policemen 
or for government. This latter group is very small however - little
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more than five per cent. A few are students, and the remainder have 
no work.
Table 6. Tundwa migrants away in 1965
Sex of migrants Migrants in Total number of 
migrants
Cf. Adult 
Tundwa Pop­
ulationMombasa Nairobi Lamu Elsewhere
Men 140 10 7 15 172 276
Women 147 9 8 4 168 350
Total 287 19 15 19 340 626
As can be seen from the table the number of women away almost
equals the number of men. Some of these women are married, either to
Tundwa migrants or to men they have met in Mombasa or elsewhere. By 
and large they are married to other Bajunis, even if not from Tundwa.
6yfo of the women are however unmarried, and the vast majority of these 
are divorcees. Most of these women (they may perhaps number one hun­
dred or just over) are prostitutes. Prostitution in Mombasa is a 
highly profitable business if the girl is young and pretty. It is
less so of course as she grows older. A young and pretty girl, I was
told, could earn up to £500 per month! This I imagine was an exaggera­
tion. Others told me £50 to £200 per month. An older woman would 
earn less of course*
22f0 of Tundwa* s resident adult population has had some migra­
tion experience in the past, and a few of these have been away thirty 
or forty years. But labour migrants who return are often in effect 
1 failed* emigrants who have not made good. When they return to Tundwa
Youn" men building a house
„ ^S“  v t> * ^VV V ^  *f 4  ‘
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A Sharif hoeing his shamba.
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therefore they are usually without savings. This applies particularly 
to men migrants* There are a few men however who make enough money 
to buy land in Tundwa on their return, as we shall see from later case 
studies.
In many African societies remittances from labour migrants help 
to support the village economy. This is not really the case for Tundwa 
however. Small scale and very irregular remittances are sent back to 
Tundwa, but the labour migration of men does not really bolster up the 
home economy. Its importance is rather that it ensures that there is 
no pressure on the limited land resources of the Bajunis. The labour 
migration of women to Mombasa as prostitutes is much more Tundwa- 
focused in that prostitutes invest their money in building and repair­
ing houses in Tundwa, houses in which their mothers can live and care 
for any illegitimate children they produce, and to which they can retire 
in their old age. They may also invest their money in buying land, 
though this is rarer. Many of them also buy gold ornaments. Even 
in the case of prostitutes however, many who are successful stay for 
most or all of their lives in Mombasa.
The social implications of economic organisation 
Wealth differentials in Tundwa
Tundwa is by no means a homogeneous community in terras of wealth. 
There are quite wide divergences between the rich and the poor, with 
some very rich men and some very poor men. This much I think will 
have been evident from the figures which I have already given. The
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richest man in the village is an old Sharif, Sura, who is about eighty 
five years old and now unable to move from his house. He originally 
owned 76.8 acres of land, some of it inherited, some bought. Since 
then he has given outright 22.4 acres to his son-in-law, making him 
the second richest man in the village, 4*8 acres to his son and 4*8 
acres to his daughter. Of the remaining 44*8 acres, 12.8 have practi­
cally reverted to bush, 16 are being used by another son (who takes 
most of the profits,- see Case 1, p.36 ) and 16 are used by a third 
son. Profits from this last shamba go mainly to the old man with 
whom the third son (who is middle-aged and divorced) lives. The old
Sharif also owns a house in Hasini and one in Lamu from which he 
receives some rent. He owns land in Lamu too, though I do not know 
how much, and a safe in his Rasini house is said to be stuffed with 
money’1. There are a handful of men in Tundwa, who, though not as rich 
as this man, are nevertheless very well off. Such men are able to re­
invest the money they make from agriculture in other income-producing 
activities - especially shop-keeping and money-lending. The rich thus 
tend to get richer.
At the other extreme we have men who own no land and who are in 
permanent debt. The very poorest are the old and the sick who cannot 
cultivate any longer and who cannot get loans. Such people are depend­
ent on their relatives or in the last resort on begging. Old women
1. The son-in-law already owned 12,8 acres which he had inherited. He 
was married to Sura’s eldest daughter and was probably the first to 
benefit in Sura’s redistribution of property which he could no longer 
exploit adequately himself. (The land was passed over in 1936).
Why Sura gave his son-in-law so much land is not known to me. This 
was the only case of which I know of a man giving land to his son-in- 
law.
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are often in a similarly difficult position, and especially if they have 
no children* One old woman, who died whilst I was in the field, had 
spent many years in Mombasa as a prostitute and had been singularly 
successful* But all her earnings had gone on living a pleasurable 
life in Mombasa. She had not even built a house in Tundwa and she had 
never borne a child. When she grew old and her savings ran out she 
returned to Tundwa, lived alone in a house belonging to another (un­
related) woman, and had to beg for her food.
X have spoken of various kinds of production in Tundwa, each
of which has a different earning potential. In the following table
I have reduced all types of production to the common denominator of
income so that one can get a better idea of the extent of economic
differences. Obviously the table is somewhat rough and ready since
it is not possible to ascertain the exact income of any person. For
the purposes of the table I have assumed that an average acre of shamba
land will produce an income of £50 per annum, and that the average honde
will produce only half this income. I have allowed for the fact that
some shamba land has reverted to bush and produces no income, and that
other land is newly planted and only brings in a small income. But I
have not allowed for differences in the quality of the soil, about which
I am not qualified to speak. I have assigned men carrying out other
occupations (or additional occupations) according to a rough estimate
of probable earnings - for example I have ascribed fishermen to category
five, or category four if they are boat-owners, agricultural labourers
1. Based on figures given earlier of profitability of mashamba and 
mahonde (p. 29 and p. 41 ).
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to category six.
The table shows that the majority of the population falls into 
the two lowest categories. The majority of shamba owners, however,
fall into the first four categories and therefore make up the wealthier 
section of the population. Those in the lower categories are made 
UP of honde cultivators, agricultural labourers and workers in other 
occupations. Since many of these people are debtors their incomes are 
probably even lower than is indicated by the table.
Table 7* Income categories (l) of all adult males
Income category Number of men fo of all adult males
1*1 * over £600 per annum 11 4 $
£2. £450 - £600 per annum 10 3.5$
13* £300 - £450 per annum 29 10.5$
14* £150 - £300 per annum 55 20 $
£5* £50 - £150 per annum 79 28.5$
l£. below £50 per annum 92 33.5$
Total 27 6 100 $
What do these income differentials mean in social terms?
Income in Tundwa comes either from land or from money. The existence 
of common land ensures that any man may cultivate, even if he does not 
own land, so we do not have here a large class of landless agricultural 
labourers exploited by a class of wealthy land owners. As we have seen, 
agricultural labourers account for only 5*&fo of the adult male population
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and. for most of these men this is simply a temporary phase. But as 
I have already made clear, a much larger income is to he gained from 
the ownership of land rather than its use. The mashamba owners thus 
stand as an economic category in contrast to the mahonde cultivators.
This socio-economic distinction is emphasised by the fact that 
most of the mahonde cultivators are in debt to shamba-owning money­
lenders. A man needs more than land in order to live. He also needs 
cash to buy seeds and tools, to pay his taxes andto feed his family 
whilst he waits for a harvest. He is thus forced into dependence on 
a money-lender. We have here some elements of a class situation in 
which the money-lenders own one of the means of production and use their 
monopoly in order to exploit the mahonde cultivators. One must point 
out however that neither money-lenders nor debtors organise themselves 
in terms of their common interests. In addition the number of mahonde 
cultivators who are completely dependent on a money lender for their 
existence is relatively small in relation to the total male population 
(perhaps about 18$). On the other hand there are many other men who 
are partially or temporarily in debt, as we shall see later.
Wealth or income differentials do not create overt status groups 
in Tundwa, graded in terms of the amount of income or prestige that 
their members receive and distinguished by different styles of life.
To some extent different occupations do have a different prestige rank­
ing. Some occupations such as fishing, mangrove cutting or water carry­
ing are considered menial and low, whereas others, such as shamba
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ownership or Koran school teaching give one respectability. But
different occupations do not involve different styles of life*
Nor is wealth in itself used in Tundwa to support different
styles of life. This is not a society where individual conspicuous
consumption, in dress, food or manner of living is tolerated. I quote
from an (unsolicited) essay written by one of my assistants which
corroborates this point. He sees the great economic difference in
Tundwa to lie between the mashamba owners and the mahonde cultivators,
and as we have seen this is largely the case:
,fXn the life of the men of the mashamba and that of the men 
of the mahonde there is no difference whatsoever. If you 
see a rich man or a poor man, both appear the same, they
eat the same food and live in the same kind of houses. You
cannot tell whether a man is rich or poor.'1
When asked to explain why this is so, people say that men fear
the envy of others (or more specifically the ’evil eye*), and that envy
can bring misfortune. On the other hand hiding one’s wealth has
obvious practical advantages in a community where the wealthy are sub­
ject to perpetual demands from others to share their wealth. (Fear 
of the evil eye has to some extent been superceded these days by fear 
of the District Assistant in his role as tax assessor), Envy may even
lead to robbery - three serious cases occurred whilst I was there, and
it is no accident I think that the three victims were money-lenders.
Guriously enough the only people who seem to have no fear of 
the envy of others are the professional prostitutes. In ‘\y6r] when I 
returned to the island for a short visit, two of these girls had recently
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been to visit their mothers. They had each had transported all the 
way from Mombasa a whole suite of modern formica-covered bedroom furni­
ture - double bed, wardrobe, coffee table and chairs. Considering the 
difficulties of this journey even for people it is something of a 
miracle that these goods arrived. The houses of ex-prostitutes or 
their families are full of fancy-framed photographs taken in the photo­
graphic studios of Mombasa. But prostitutes get away with this show 
because they are also prepared to spend their money on public feasts 
to celebrate weddings or circumcision ceremonies. Rich men on the 
other hand rarely do this unless it is for the celebration of the Prophet’s 
birth. Even then it is noticeable that some of the richest men invite 
the fewest guests. In general men would prefer to keep their money 
in order to buy themselves security in the form of land.
Socio-economic relationships
A more useful way of looking at the social implications of 
wealth differentials is not in terms of static economic categories, 
but more dynamically, in terms of the use to which men put their income.
If we do this we can see that each man uses his wealth to create and 
support a network of linkages of which he is the centre. For most 
men this network consists only of his wife and children or a slightly 
larger group of relatives or affines. He is at the centre of what I 
shall call a ’dependency unit1 (since it is not necessarily synonymous 
with the household). The average size of such groups in Tundwa is 3.7 
persons, of whom 1.7 are children. A unit of this size requires about
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£-75 a- year in order that its members should live reasonably well, and 
that the man can pay his tax and buy essential clothes for his depend­
ents, Examination of Table 7 shows that many men are existing at 
below this level. Some of these are exceptionally poor whilst others 
have very small families or are simply youths still living with and 
being partially supported by their families. I shall discuss the 
dependency unit in more detail in the following chapter.
For the wealthy man in the community however, support of such 
a unit does not dispose of all his resources. Since it is considered 
not only thriftless but also dangerous to expend the surplus on con­
spicuous consumption, he reinvests it in order to make more money.
There are two primary methods of doing this, both of which are signifi­
cant because they create a wider set of relationships with people who 
become dependent on, and therefore obliged to the wealthy man. The 
first way of reinvesting money is by buying more land. Up to a point 
this land simply brings in more profit for the landowner which he can 
use to buy yet more land. At a certain stage in this process however 
he has more land than he can profitably work himself. At this stage, 
or even beforehand, he either has to employ permanent labourers or he 
has to begin giving his land away. In either case he will create 
dependency relations. The case of the richest man in the village which 
X described earlier is illustrative of the process of giving land away. 
The wealthy man may give parts of the land away outright, or he may 
allow other persons to use them. The point is that the wealthy man
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usually uses economic resources of this kind to cement wider kinship 
ties - he gives the land to a son or a father, a daughter or a sister*s 
son (see e.g. the case of Sharif Sura). In general these will not he 
people with whom he is residing - it creates links heyond the household. 
A man may or may not get much materially out of this redistribution, 
but he has the security of firm social relations which can be used when 
the need arises - to mobilise political support perhaps or to arrange 
a marriage. He is also more or less assured of help in his old age 
and will gain in social approval for having "helped’* people.
Money-lending is the other main way of reinvesting one’s income, 
and it also creates wider links, though of a more formal and less 
friendly kind. Money-lenders lend money not only to honde cultivators, 
but also to shamba owners, traders, fishermen, donkey porters and women. 
The details of the transaction involved in each case are slightly 
different, but the main contrast between these forms of money-lending 
and that entered into by the honde cultivators is that they do not 
involve complete dependence on the money-lender. Thus shamba owners 
may borroitf money to tide them over the time whilst they are waiting 
for trees to mature. Or they may need money to help them over a 
difficult period such as sickness or life crises when extra expenses 
are incurred. In every case however their shamba acts as surety for 
the loan. About half of the shamba owners take loans from time to 
time, but they do not normally need to borrow as much as the honde 
cultivator, and in any case, because of the higher profitability of
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shambas they are usually able to pay back their loans eventually with­
out being continually in debt. In the last resort they sell the 
shamba which was the surety for the loan. The process involved can be 
seen from the following case which involved a money-lender from Hasini.
Case 2. Time : Circa 1960
Before the 1963 Zanzibar revolution many men from Tundwa used 
to go to the island of Pemba every year to trade amongst the clove 
pickers who gathered there. Around 1960 a Tundwa man called Mzee 
Bwana went to a Hasini money-lender and borrowed £250 in order to buy 
goods for trading in Pemba. He had to go to a Rasini money-lender 
because no Tundwa money-lender could afford to lend an amount of this 
kind. As surety for the loan he pledged the money-lender one of his 
shambas. Unfortunately Mzee made no profits whatsoever in Pemba and 
on his return he was forced to sell his shamba in order to repay the 
loan.
Indebtedness then involves many more men than just the mahonde 
cultivators, and within the category of debtors there are quite con­
siderable differences, from the man who is completely tied to a parti­
cular money-lender and has no capital of his own, to the man who only 
makes occasional small loans in times of difficulty, but otherwise 
lives on his capital. In addition thirty per cent of Tundwa1s adult 
male population neither lend nor borrow money. Such men are either 
so poor or physically weak that they have neither property nor labour 
to offer as surety for a loan, or they are reasonably well-off men who 
do not need to borrow money but who do not wish to lend money. Wot 
all wealthy men lend money - the richest man in the village, mentioned 
above, as well as six others in Income category 1 do not lend money.
By and large this is because of the opprobrium which the money-lender 
inevitably reaps and which the rich man fears. The relationship between
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money-lender and debtor is predictably an ambivalent one. This can 
be seen from the comment made on a rich man who refused to lend money. 
He was said to be afraid of the unpleasantness and quarrels caused by 
money-lending, but also to be *ftoo mean to help people".
Each money-lender in Tundwa must support an average of about 
fourteen debtors - some permanently tied to him, others only partially 
or temporarily dependent on him. These links not only bring him a 
handsome profit but they can also be turned to good use when political 
support is required. At the same time the money-lender is never 
secure, for although he "helps" people, he also exploits them and must 
expect hostility*
Other ways of reinvesting surplus income such as buying a shop 
or a fishing boat may also create linkages, though of a less intensive 
and permanent kind. Shop-keeping is important partly because the more 
successful shopkeepers are money-lenders* But in addition every shop­
keeper gives credit to his trusted customers, and this is another form 
of lending which creates linkages. Boat owners are small-scale 
employers of labour - the three boat owners in Tundwa each provide 
employment for two to three fishermen. We shall see the significance 
of these wider linkages in later chapters.
The changing patterns of wealth
I have described the pattern of wealth differentials which 
existed in Tundwa in 1965* But this is neither an isolated nor a 
static community, and wealth is continually being redistributed within
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the community over time. Part of this redistribution is a result of 
the natural process of death and inheritance. The inheritance system 
in Tundwa follows largely the Islamic law of inheritance - thus a 
person may inherit from either male or female relatives and men inherit 
double the share of women. Those who inherit larger amounts of pro­
perty start off with a built-in advantage. But property may also be 
amassed during a person's lifetime. Savings from labour migration, 
prostitution or other occupations may be spent on buying land or houses. 
Even today however land does not change hands very rapidly. No more 
than five pieces of land belonging to Tundwa men were sold in 19^5- 
About fifteen per cent of the shamba owners have bought all or part 
of their land. Alternatively, property achieved or inherited may be 
lost through misfortune, or it may decline in value due to the lack of 
liquid capital required to sustain it. Through the disintegrating 
process of inheritance, large fortunes may be divided into uneconomic 
units.
Wider economic processes have also had their effects on Tundwa's 
economy. Previous to colonial rule Rasini was one amongst other small 
ports on a trading route between Africa and Arabia. Arabian dhows 
from the Persian Gulf and other areas called there annually, and slaves, 
ivory and mangrove poles were exported to Arabia. This trade began 
to decline when the British colonised the area around the turn of the 
century and slavery was abolished. The British however developed other 
aspects of the economy. A market for copra existed and producers of
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coconuts were encouraged. Cashew nut trees and cotton were introduced 
by the British as new cash crops, and efforts were made to persuade 
the Bajunis to plant them - efforts which were eventually successful.
And over this whole period Kenya*s towns were developing. A new and 
modern port was built at Mombasa and new industries sprang up. Both 
the first and the second World Wars affected East Africa and Mombasa 
was flooded with British and other soldiers. There were thus expanding 
markets both for migrant labour and for prostitution, and Bajunis began 
going to Mombasa in increasing numbers.
The following case histories will illustrate the effects of 
these wider changes on Tundwa*s economy. Both of them show that men 
have been able to take advantage of these changes in order to amass 
wealth within their own lifetimes.
Case 3
Sharif Xdarus is now an old man getting on for ninety years 
old. His father died when he was quite young, leaving him a small 
piece of land and thirteen slaves. When Sharif Idarus was a young 
man a British officer arrived on Faza island, announcing the abolition 
of slavery. The officer announced that up until a certain date any 
slave master could obtain a compensating sum for the manumission of 
his slaves. Sharif Xdarus did not however get the compensatory sum. 
Along with many others he thought the British officer was buying slaves, 
and the * price,* offered (100 rupees) was considered to be too low. Wow 
he says that he could not have *sold* his slaves because "they had 
become like relatives1*. With the end of slavery however Sharif Idarus 
found himself without labour to work his land. Along with others he 
went to Mombasa to look for work. He became a wholesale seller of 
mangrove poles and stayed in Mombasa for about ten years. He found 
this business very profitable - so much so that after ten years he 
returned to Tundwa and bought two shambas, each of six and a half acres. 
Both shambas were well-planted and brought him in considerable profit.
He is now a moderately wealthy man and has enough income to lend money 
out to others, thus increasing his wealth still further.
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This case indicates the effects of the abolition of slavery 
on the slave owners* It also shows that wealth can he built up by 
labour migration and turned to good use at home* The following case 
illustrates the achievement of wealth by a mwungwana man.
Case 4
Haji is now a man of almost seventy, so he was born around 
the turn of the century* When he was almost eight years old he was 
taken to Kismayuu (Somalia) by his father*s sister and he lived with 
her there until he was fifteen. Then his father died and Haji re­
turned to Tundwa. His father had left him no land however, and he 
found that there was, f,no work in Tundwa, so I went to Mombasa with 
some friends to look for work’1. On his first journey he stayed for 
twelve years, then returned for a short while to Tundwa. His second 
visit to Mombasa lasted for seven years* During all this time he 
worked as a labourer in the Port at Kilindini, Mombasa, which was 
just being built when he first arrived there. His wages were £2 a 
month at first, later rising to £3*10.0. All his money was spent 
in Mombasa on maintaining himself. He married and divorced four 
consecutive wives during this period - all Tundwa women, two of whom 
he had met in Mombasa. On the outbreak of war in East Africa in 
1940 he was no better off than he had ever been. He married his fifth 
wife around this time, a woman to whom he is still married. The Port 
of Mombasa was filled with soldiers and sailors at this time, and Haji 
decided to leave his labourer’s job at the port and go into partnership 
with an Indian, selling beer on the black market. Until 1945 when the 
war ended, Haji made big profits from this business and earned enough 
not only to send back remittances to his wife in Tundwa, but also to 
put some by as savings. Vlhen the war ended he returned to Tundwa and 
bought a piece of land of about eight acres, which had completely reverted 
to bush. He began to plant this land very gradually with trees, but 
the work did not progress very fast as he also returned to Mombasa 
periodically in order to trade in dried fish. By 1965 however he was 
becoming too old for these trips and had been ill the previous year.
In 1965 he planted annual cash crops on his shamba as i*ell as more 
trees, in which work he was helped by his eldest son, a boy of about 
fifteen years.
Both these cases show that wealth may be achieved through 
labour migration, even if the men who are able to do this are somewhat 
exceptional. Haji’s first period of migration, before the Second
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World War is far more typical of most Tundwa labour migrants than is 
that of his second period during the war, when he made hig profits. 
Nevertheless, the patterns of wealth in Tundwa are now changing faster 
than ever before, not only because of labour migration, but also because 
of the introduction of new cash crops. The traditionally wealthy 
minority who have inherited their wealth are threatened by a new cate­
gory of men who have achieved their wealth. And behind this second 
category of men are others who will take advantage of the new opportuni­
ties to achieve wealth in the future. The conflict between the old 
wealthy elite and the nouveau riche is expressed in political terms 
as we shall see in Chapter VIII.
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III, THE MEffiWOHK OF KINSHIP
"All Bajunis are one brother’1. Old mwungwana man
Following Barnes I can find no better metaphor for the struc­
ture of Bajuni kinship than * network1• Kinship networks are import­
ant in Tundwa because, amongst other things, it is through them that 
political leaders recruit support, Barnes defines his usage as 
follows:
"The image I have is of a set of points, some of which are 
joined by.lines. The points of the image are people or 
sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people inter­
act with each other".
In discussing the kinship system of Tundwa we are dealing with 
a system which is basically non-unilineal, Lineal descent is of im­
portance here in only one respect - in that through it one establishes 
one's place in the stratification system, and thereby one's place in 
society. Membership of a stratum is ascriptive in the male line.
But it is not necessary to memorise lengthy genealogies in order to 
establish one's claim. This is a small community and it is only 
necessary to know who a person's father was in order to categorise him. 
And even in this matter of stratification there is an exception to the 
rule of patrilineal succession. For if a child is born illegitimately
1.. Barnes, J.A., 1954* p*43.
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he simply takes the stratum status of his mother (i.e. that which she 
had previously inherited from her father).
Beyond the father, descent in itself is not significant and is 
remembered only in so far as a person wishes to trace lateral links. 
Such links may be traced matrilaterally as well as patrilaterally, and 
even through affines. Genealogies remembered are typically short - 
rarely more than two to three generations deep.
Except for the basiG division of the society into the three 
patrilineally ascribed strata (and these are categories rather than 
groups), people in Tundwa are.not divided into mutually exclusive 
groups on the basis of descent or kinship. There are in fact no kin­
ship groups in Tundwa beyond the level of certain domestic units which 
I shall describe shortly. Beyond this level, kinship in Tundwa only 
makes sense if we look at it from the point of view of the individual 
with his personal set of relationships - and this I propose to do.
In contrast to the study of unilineal descent systems, the 
structural implications of which are now fairly well understood, the 
study of non-unilineal systems is as yet in its infancy. It is a 
relatively unchartered field of knowledge, with as yet no generally 
acceptable and precise conceptual language of its own. One is there­
fore inevitably faced with problems of terminology in describing such 
a system. It seems to me that the simplest way to clear these pro­
blems out of the way is to make a preliminary statement as to the terms 
used and their meaning. I shall be mainly using the three following 
concepts:
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1. 'Universe of kin*. X take this term from Firth (1963), and I 
use it to indicate the widest number of people recognised by a person 
as being related to him - what one may call his nominal kin,
2. 'Kinship set'. For this term I am indebted to P»H, Gulliver 
(personal communication), A kinship set is a particular kind of ego- 
centred quasi-group - that is it is made up of a set of related people 
who interact together frequently. These are the effective kin of a 
person who will always be present on occasions when help is required.
The kinship set is recruited from a person's universe of kin,
3. The kinship set must be conceptually distinguished from the 'action
set* which is the set of people who assemble on any particular occasion
'I
in response to the request of ego for assistance. By observing a 
series of action sets one can build up a picture of any person's kin­
ship set - in other words a kinship set is a generalisation from the 
particular action sets of any one individual.
Me need terms like this in a study of non-unilineal kinship 
systems simply because in such a society there are no mutually distinct 
kin groups based on descent which may form the framework for action in 
any particular situation. There are only two kinds of kinship group 
in Tundwa, and these are both groups limited to the household. More­
over they may cut across one another. The first of these groups is 
composed solely of women and is based on mutual help. I call it a 
female kin unit for want of a better term. Its significance will 
become clear shortly, The second kind of kinship group is based on
1. I am following A. Mayer's definition of the concept. (Mayer, 1966, 
p.93 onwards).
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economic ties and is composed of a primary income earner and his or 
her dependents (some of whom may he minor income earners). I call 
this group a dependency unit because ties of economic dependency are 
its main feature. Its members reside under one roof, which they may 
share with one or more similar groups* A few examples of more or 
less typical dependency units will illustrate both the concept and the 
range of types.
Example 1: Bauru is a rich man with nearly thirteen acres of land.
He is the focus of a dependency unit of his wife, one grown-up daughter 
waiting to be married and six younger children. His wife and daughter 
are minor income earners because they do women’s work such as plaiting 
strips of matting.
Example 2; S. is not so well off as Bauru. He has a little less than 
six and a half acres of land which he has bought. He is potentially 
rich however because his father is one of the richest men in the village. 
At present his dependency unit consists of nine people including him­
self, his wife, an adolescent son who helps him on the land, an adoles­
cent daughter of marriageable age, two younger children, his wife’s 
small son by another marriage and his wife’s divorced sister and her 
baby. The wife’s sister was reputed to be a prostitute, and may have 
earned some income in this way, but I doubt if she earned enough to 
keep herself•
Example 3: M. owns just over three acres of land. His dependency
unit consists of himself, his wife, his wife’s mother and his wife’s
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mother’s mother*
Example 4? R* owns just over five and a half acres of land which he 
bought. He supports his mother, and his younger brother who is still 
a child* His father is dead.
Example 5s J* is the owner of a house in which she lives with her 
younger brother, her mother and her mother’s sister. She has been 
twice married and divorced and has never borne a child. She is well 
known in the town to be a prostitute and built her house with the 
proceeds from this. She and the other women in the house also occupy 
themselves with women’s work*
Example 6; A. lives with her five illegitimate children and her adult 
daughter. Both these women spend much of their time in Mombasa, but 
return frequently to Tundwa. Both are divorced women who either are 
or have been successful prostitutes. It is not so easy to say here 
who is the primary income earner - mother or daughter* In Mombasa 
they usually live together.
Example 7s M.K. is an old woman* She supports her young grandson, 
whose mother is in Mombasa. She is the owner of her house and acts 
as a ’housekeeper* for two middle-aged men who have no wives and no 
relatives with whom they can live. Both men are farmers and M.K. 
cooks their food, for them and takes enough for herself and her grandson 
too. She also gets small and irregular remittances from Mombasa - 
both her son and her daughter are there.
These examples show that there are two main types of dependency
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unit - those focused on a male income earner and those focused on a 
female income earner. Statistically speaking the latter are far 
rarer than the former as the following table shows. In addition the 
average number of people they encompass is less* Nevertheless the 
number of female oriented dependency units is high enough to indicate 
that such a possibility is economically viable.
Table 8* Dependency units in Tundwa
Dependency units Number Average size
Male earner as focus 244 3.7
Female earner as focus 42 2.6
Total 286 -
The four examples of male focused dependency units which I 
have given indicate the main types found - the simple nuclear family 
of a man with his wife and children, the nuclear family together with 
female affines of the male income earner, or a nuclear family of a 
man with his mother and younger brothers and sisters.
Within a household one can sometimes find two dependency units 
though the majority have only one. Thus there are in Tundwa 205 
occupied houses, and altogether 286 dependency units. An example 
will make this clear* Bauru*s household (example 1) contained not 
only his own dependency unit but also his married daughter and her 
husband, Hury. These people were not Bauru*s dependents. Eury did
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not help Bauru, "but cultivated his own land and thereby supported his 
wife. Every day he would give her a few shillings for the necessary 
expenses of the day, in the same way as Bauru would give his own wife 
money every day, The women of the household cooked together and some­
times ate together. The men usually ate separately. Thus although 
there was co-operation between the women of the household, there were 
two separate and distinct sources of income here creating two separate 
groups of dependents. When Hury later divorced Bauru1s daughter and 
left the household, the daughter again became part of Bauru*s dependency 
unit and he was again responsible for her needs.
In many societies we should be able to speak of the household 
as one socio-economic group because it would have a leader - the house­
hold head - who would be in control of its affairs and in particular 
of its economic affairs. He would own, or at least be in control of, 
any household property. He would organise the production of the house­
hold and distribute its income. Other members of the household would 
be under his authority - although this might be limited by the authority 
of outside bodies.
In Tundwa this situation is not found. To begin with there 
is no institutionalised role of household head, though in some cases 
a man may be de facto head in the sense I outlined above. If we take 
the example we have been discussing so far however, we find that neither 
Bauru nor Hury is in sole control of the economic affairs of the house­
hold, nor are they in joint control. Put in another way one can say
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that neither controls the affairs of the other or has authority over 
him. Each has his land and there is no co-operation in production.
Each distributes his income to his own dependents as he pleases.
Another factor also complicates this situation. Neither Bauru 
nor Hury own the house in which they all live. The owner is Bauru* s 
wife, Mwarabu. And this is by no means an exceptional case - it is 
in fact the general rule in Tundwa that women should own houses. 86.5$ 
of Tundwa* s houses in fact belong to women. There are three ways in 
which women obtain houses. They may inherit them. Men in this 
community accept that 11 it is important for a woman to have a house”
(the reason why it is important will become clear shortly), and so when 
a woman dies leaving a house to be inherited the male heirs usually 
waive their rights to a share of it, leaving the field clear for female 
heirs to inherit the house. The second way in which a woman may obtain 
a house is by building one. Building requires capital and it is usually 
only prostitutes who are able to build houses. The third way of obtain­
ing a house is by gift - usually from the husband. The husband builds 
a house which he then gives to his wife. In the case we were examining 
it was Bauru who built the house and gave it to Mwarabu. He will 
usually do this only if the marriage seems to be more or less established.
The rule that women rather than men own houses has two effects.
It means that when a man marries he has to move out of his mother*s 
house and into that of his wife or her mother. Many men are living 
therefore with their affinal kin. It also means that when he divorces
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his wife he is the one who has to move out. Normally he goes back 
to live with his mother or his sister. When Hury divorced Bauru1s 
daughter for example he went to his mother*s for a while before going 
to Mombasa to look for a job.
There are thus two itfays of looking at a household such as that 
of Bauru*s. One can look at it as two dependency units each focused 
on a male income earner, as 1 did in the preceding paragraphs. Or 
alternatively one can see it as a core of related and permanently 
settled women (the female kin unit) plus two isolated and temporarily 
settled men. I think there are both these structural tendencies in 
any domestic unit in Tun&wa. In so far as men are the main income 
earners here and women depend on them for support, we can see the main 
focus of kinship networks as dependency units. But in so far as women 
rather than men own houses and are permanently settled, and in so far 
as they can earn an independent income by prostitution or other means, 
it is small groups of related women that form the nodes of the kinship 
network, and men are isolates who attach themselves to one or another 
such groups at various stages in their life.
It is probably easier to understand what I have said so far 
if it is set down in diagramatic form. I take Bauru*s household as 
the example. As Diagram 1 shows, the female kin unit cuts across and 
links the two dependency units. And since Bauru*s wife owns the house 
it is she, rather than Bauru or Hury who is at the centre of this set 
of relationships.
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There are thus as it were two centripetal tendencies acting 
here, and since a slightly different halance of forces is achieved in 
each domestic group we find a wide variety of possible groupings. 
Ideally a man would like to be in firm control of a group consisting 
'of his wife and children, and later his daughters and their husbands.
In such a situation he is not threatened by his wife’s ownership of 
the house and may even give her a house he has built. The symbol of 
this male ideal is ownership of a shamba since it is this which gives 
him the capital to be independent. Women however put their security 
in the close knit group of mother, sisters, grandmother and daughters, 
if possible all residing under one roof. Their argument is that a 
husband cannot be trusted since he is always running after other women 
and will think nothing of divorcing his wife and abandoning his child­
ren on any flimsy excuse. But one’s mother or sister can always be 
relied upon to help in times of need. The symbol of the woman’s 
ideal is therefore a house where the female kin unit can co-reside.
Men and women then pursue different ideals - ideals which in 
practice are irreconcilable. A woman who has neither house nor co- 
residing female relatives will always work towards achieving this end 
because without one and/or the other she has no security. A woman who 
has established a strong female kin unit and who owns her house is 
however in a strong position to manage without men* The female kin 
unit then becomes a woman oriented dependency unit. One or more of 
the women can engage in prostitution whilst a subsistence can be gained
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from women1s work (see Example 5* P-73). However, without extensive 
prostitution or other means (such as a shamba worked by agricultural 
labourers, or remittances from Mombasa) such a household is not 
economically viable for long, and an attempt will be made to inveigle 
a man into marrying one of the female relatives. (One woman in such 
a household described it as "marrying for food"). A man who marries 
into such a household is not likely to stay for long however since he 
finds himself supporting all the women in it.
Even in normal circumstances however, a man marries into a 
house in which he is faced with a strong and united group of female 
affines, the most formidable of which is usually his mother-in-law.
Next to adultery, quarrels vjith in-laws are probably the most frequent 
cause of divorce in Tundwa. The following case will illustrate the 
process.
Case 5* Time : July 1965
Athman ’divorced* his wife Momo. He had been living with his 
wife and three small children in a house belonging to his mother-in-law. 
The couple shared the house with Momo’s mother and father and younger 
brothers and sisters. Athman complained that when he was ill his mother- 
in-law never came to visit him even though they were living in the same 
house. Later, when Momo’s mother herself became ill Athman did not visit 
her. Momo was angry, they quarrelled and Momo demanded a divorce, where­
upon Athman left the house and went home to his mother. People said 
that the couple were divorced. Further unpleasantness was caused when 
Momo’s father brought the three children to Athman and told him they did 
not want them. As Athman pointed out, this is against the custom of 
Tundwa, since children stay with their mother after a divorce.
A few days later however the couple were reconciled. This was 
only achieved however by their removing to another house, an empty and 
almost derelict house belonging to Athman*s FBWM, and situated nearby 
Momo’s mother*s house. Later Athman began to build a new house on the 
outskirts of the town.
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This case not only illustrates the kind of petty quarrels that 
arise as a result of the rule of marriage residence - it also indicates 
the type of solution which men typically seek - that is, they try to 
separate their wives from the female kin unit hy building them a new 
house or occupying an empty house belonging to a relative* Even where 
quarrels do not occur men try to move away from their affines* Out 
of the 186 married men in Tundwa, however, 54*3tfo are living with female 
affines (in addition to their wives) whilst 45-7$ are living independ­
ently with their wives and children.
The strong male-dominated dependency unit is threatened by the 
existence of female kin units and vice-versa. The fact that men strive 
for the former and women for the latter makes for frequency of divorce 
and domestic instability* At any one time there are a high percentage 
of divorced persons in the village, as can be seen from the following 
table.
Table 9« Marital status of adult population in Tundwa : 1965
Marital status Men Women
Total Adults
Humber Percentage
Married persons 186 188 374 59.8fo
Young
Unmarried adults 35
22 57 9.1/0
Divorced persons 55 140 195 31.1/0
Total Adult population 276 350 626 100 %
Note : Any person who has passed puberty is considered adult in the 
sense that he or she may now marry*
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The table also shows that single women are in the vast majority 
as opposed to single men - indeed this necessarily follows since there 
is already an excess of adult women over men in the village* One 
solution to this problem would be polygamous unions, but'Tundwa women 
reject this possibility outright, although they are aware that it is 
allowed by Islam* There are in fact only two polygamously married men 
in the village. This is partly an indication of the strength of itfomen 
in Tundwa. In addition however a man has to be fairly well-off before 
he can afford two wives, both of whom he will have to support, and in 
separate houses, since even a woman who accepts a co-wife will not live 
in the same house with her. Since polygamy is unacceptable to most 
women however, it is inevitable that at any one time many of them will 
be in the divorced state and turn to prostitution. And since prosti­
tution is in many cases more profitable than being married, it allows 
a woman to build up the capital required to build a house where her 
mother or sister can live. It is generally through prostitution that 
female kin units can become woman oriented dependency units.
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Younger members of Bauru*s household
84
Wider kinship linkages
I next want to say something about the linkages which people 
maintain beyond the household. Since in this community kinship links 
may be traced in any direction a person in effect chooses the kin with 
whom he will interact. His choice is not however purely random - it 
is influenced by age and sex, by social status, and to a lesser extent 
by economic standing* This much will emerge from an examination of 
the kinship sets of various individuals. The choice is also influenced 
by geography, in the sense that the limit of most people*s kin universe 
is within the village. This stems from the preference for intra­
village endogamy, which I shall discuss in the following chapter. Some 
people have kinsmen in other villages whom they may visit from time to 
time, but their links with them are rarely as close as those with kins­
men and kinswomen in the same village.
A person recognises many people as being related to him in one 
way or another - matrilaterally, patrilaterally or affinally. But he 
does not generally interact with all these people. A few are selected, 
with whom he maintains regular contact, whilst contact with the others 
is more infrequent. Bajunis refer to all persons within their universe 
of kin as ndugu. At its most precise this term means * brother* or 
* sister*, but it is extended to first include cousins, and then at a 
wider level maternal and paternal kin and even affines. Its precise 
meaning in any situation depends entirely on the context. Occasionally 
it is even used to suggest quasi-kinship, as when it is said, "Ba.juni
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wote ni ndugu mo^a” (literally : All Bajunis are one "brother).
Relations "between ndugu may be activated in many ways - by 
ordinary visits, by attendance and assistance at each other’s life 
crisis rituals (marriage, circumcision, birth, death etc.) or by 
financial assistance in order to give feasts or in times of need. Such 
activities are the oil that prevents a person’s own kinship set from 
breaking down. Where firm links have been established, other consolidat­
ing activities may be tried such as the arrangement of marriages between 
the sons and daughters of kinsmen. Certain property arrangements such 
as X described in the previous chapter are also nearly always based on 
the kinship set. In all these ways a person may attempt to consolidate 
his kinship set.
As we might expect, the kinship sets of male members of a house­
hold are different to those of female members, though they may coincide 
at various points* Since men and women rarely interact publicly - 
that is to say they are segregated in any public ceremony - men’s links 
tend to be with men and women’s links with women. Women are far more 
assiduous than iuen in keeping kinship links alive. It is they who 
visit constantly, who are the core of all life crisis rituals and who 
help each other in small ways day in and day out. The relationships 
of women are intensive because women need each other. Men, on the 
other hand, do not help each other very much, nor do they visit their 
kindred often. They spend their days in their farms and usually work 
alone. At night they may go to pray at the mosque, or they sit at home
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and rest or they visit male friends or relatives. If they are un­
married of course the pattern is slightly different since they spend 
their evenings with other youths, roaming the town looking for girl 
friends, or holding dances. An older man who is at all well-off will 
try and organise a yearly Koran reading and feast (maulidi) for the 
birth of the Prophet. He will invite as many men as his means allow, 
"both close kinsmen and others who may be more distantly related or not 
related at all. Other than this he attends the funeral of any person 
that dies, political meetings if he is interested in politics and the 
marriage ceremonies and maulidi feasts of other men if he is invited.
To illustrate the way in which these wider networks are utilised 
I shall return to the case of Bauru (See Diagram 2), During 19^5 there 
were several occasions on which members of his household made use of 
their kinship networks. Bauru*s daughter bore a child which later 
died. His wife also bore a child. His son was married to his patri- 
lateral parallel cousin. Bauru also held a maulidi feast. On each 
of these occasions the help and support of relatives was required. In 
other words, an action set was recruited on each occasion. By observ­
ing these successive action sets I was able to build up a composite 
picture of the kinship sets of Bauru and his wife. On page 87 I have 
shown these kinship sets in diagrammatic form. They are based on the 
series of action sets which were recruited by Bauru and Mwarabu during
1965.
The female kin unit in this household, consisting of Bauru*s wife
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Mwarabu, and two grown up daughters (one of whom was married) had 
several intensive relations with women in other households* The 
closest of these were with Mwarabu*s mother and sister who owned houses 
next to that of Mwarabu* These two women were in and out of the house
all the time, and were always ready to help when required. The other 
group with which they interacted frequently was a female kin unit con­
sisting of Bauru*s sisters and sister’s daughters. None of these women 
were married at the time* They supported themselves by prostitution.
One of the sisters was the mother of Hury, Mwarabu*s daughter’s husband* 
Together with another of Bauru*s sisters, this group attended the births 
of both children born during the year, the funeral feast of the child 
that died and the marriage of Bauru*s son. When it came to the maulidi 
feast they were unable to attend since they themselves were in mourning 
for the death of a small child of one of Bauru*s sister’s daughters.
For the feast then Mwarabu had to call on other and more distant rela­
tives for help in cooking - and to some of these she was related through 
her husband, to some through her mother (see diagram).
All this help was to some extent reciprocated. Bauru*s married 
daughter attended the mourning for her father’s sister*s daughter’s child. 
When Mwarabu*s father held a maulidi feast Mwarabu and her daughters 
helped Mwarabu*s mother with the cooking. And when Mwarabu*s sister 
was sick (she had tuberculosis) they all visited her and helped her in 
her household tasks.
Bauru had no real need to call on the help of kin during the
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year. When he held his maulidi feast and on the occasion of his son’s 
marriage he invited kinsmen along with others. Those kinsmen that 
attended are shown in the diagram. He in his turn attended the maulidis 
that were given by his father-in-law and his mother’s sister’s son.
In the marriage of Bauru’s son we have an example of an attempt 
to consolidate this kinship set. As we shall see in the following 
chapter, people often try to use the marriages of their children in order 
to consolidate their own kinship linkages. They express this in a 
commonly heard phrase: ”it is good to marry ndugu (relatives)”.
Bauru’s daughter was already married to his sister’s son, Hury, and now 
his son was to marry his brother’s daughter. This son was a youth of 
about seventeen or eighteen when he married. He worked as a labourer 
on his father’s land - in other words it was his father who made it 
possible for him to support a wife, Bauru paid the marriage payment 
to his brother - a sum which is spent mostly on buying new clothes 
for the bride and decorating her bedroom. After the marriage ceremony, 
in which Bauru’s son was ceremonially transported from his father’s 
house to that of his bride, Bauru continued to be helped on his shamba 
by his son, even though the young man now lived with his mother and 
father-in-law. The bride used to visit Mwarabu and her daughters from 
time to time.
Later events however showed how short-lived such consolidations 
can be. As I mentioned earlier Bauru’s daughter was divorced by her 
husband Hury - Bauru’s sister’s son. Hury returned to his mother’s house
1. see p. 104, Chapter IV.
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for a while and then left for Mombasa to look for work, Bauru1 s
daughter stayed at home for a while and then she also went off to 
Mombasa to work as a prostitute. When X returned to Tundwa for a 
short visit in 19&7 she was at home on a visit. She had been very 
successful in Mombasa and was already in the process of constructing 
herself a house in Tundwa situated just behind that of her parents.
She told me that she did not intend to be re-married for at least 
another year,
Bauru1s son had also divorced his cousin by 1967 and had married 
another girl to whom he was also related but so distantly as to make the 
connection insignificant. This marriage he had arranged himself, his 
parents had no hand in it.
The kinship sets of Bauru and his wife overlap with the sets 
of other people, but no two people, except perhaps for the women of one 
female kin unit share exactly the same network. If we were to follow 
out some of these links they would lead us on to other links. If, 
for example, we followed up Mwarabu*s link with her husband*s sisters 
we should find that they in their turn called on other links in time 
of need as well as that with Mwarabu. Their set included people whom 
Mwarabu had little contact with and did not visit or help - as we shall 
see shortly.
It is not always possible to say why certain people are included 
or excluded from a person*s kinship set. Basically however the rule 
seems to be that a person helps those kinsmen who help him. Some people
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are popular and always ready to help others and they can always call 
on help in times of need* Other people are ’mean* or bad-tempered, 
and they do not receive much help in times of need, even from close 
relatives* A good example of the latter was B* A somewhat disagree­
able and miserable woman, always complaining, she had quarrelled with 
her sister and brother over quite minor matters* At the beginning 
of 1965 she had been recently widowed and was therefore in ritual 
seclusion (this seclusion, which is called eda, lasts for four months 
and ten days). In addition her husband had died when she was two 
months* pregnant* According to local custom she had therefore to 
stay in seclusion until the child was born. She had three children, 
the eldest of whom was a boy of only about twelve years* She was thus 
in a very difficult and trying situation. During this whole period 
her sister never visited her and she received very little help indeed 
from any one.
A person’s relationships are not solely confined to his kin, 
but include also friends, acquaintances, and neighbours. This wider 
category is usually referred to as .jamaa - a term which can include 
kin but usually has a wider implication. In Tundwa however the two 
categories - kin and non-kin - are not entirely separate; they merge 
into one another* As a result of extensive intermarriage almost every­
one in Tundwa is related to everyone else, directly or indirectly. But 
since genealogical memory is short not all these links can be traced.
And even where they can be traced they are not always explicitly recognised.
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It would be difficult to say, for example, whether the second girl 
whom Bauru1s son married should be classified as ndugu rather than 
.jamaa (she was Bauru* s MBSD). But sometimes an even more distant link 
is considered significant - as for example when an old woman explained 
to me that she was helping another woman with her sick child because 
the latter was her MMZDSDDl In other words to claim kinship may simply 
be a justification for maintaining useful links, whereas other links, 
equally close, may be neglected*
Wider non-kinship links may be more important for some people 
than for others* Generally they are more important for men than for 
women. Mwarabu, for example, does not have many wider non-kinship 
links since most of her friends and neighbours are also her kindred.
But there are a few other neighbours round about with whom she maintains 
some contact, and whom she would visit if they were ill. One or two 
of these were present when she bore her child. Bauru*s wider links 
are more extensive, but, like his kinship links, not particularly in­
tensive. One of his shambas is worked by a permanent labourer, an 
ex-slave man without relatives. But Bauru does not appear to maintain 
any contact with him after work is done, and the man lives elsewhere 
in the village. Bauru is not active in political affairs, though he 
attends the occasional meetings that are held. When he held his 
maulidi feast however he took care to invite the other wealthy and free- 
born men of the town - that is those of his own social standing. The 
man who led the prayers was a Sharif, a man from the highest social
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stratum* He also invited men to whom he was distantly related as 
well as his neighbours.
Bauru1s household is fairly typical of most in Tundwa in the 
extent of the links which it maintains, and in the intensity of the 
kinship sets of its women members as opposed to those of its men. But 
since kinship sets overlap every person is ultimately linked to every 
other, and hears of the goings-on of others. Women’s sets act as 
channels of communication to pass on gossip arid to form opinions on 
the affairs of the day. They also operate as a form of social security 
as well as being an index of a woman’s popularity. Men’s sets are 
less significant in some ways since men do not rely on other men for 
help in the ordinary course of events. In another sense however they 
may be more significant, since men who are politically active use their 
own and their wife’s links with ndugu and .jamaa as a basis of support.
I shall illustrate this by taking another example of a rather atypical 
household which consists only of a man and his wife. The man, Madi, 
is an active political leader, though not a particularly successful one. 
To some extent Madi’s lack of success can be explained by the fact that 
he has very few kinsmen in Tundwa. His two brothers and a sister were 
in Mombasa.
Madi had been twice married, the first short-lived marriage 
producing a son and a daughter, the second and long-lived one another 
daughter. In addition he had brought up his second wife’s sister’s 
daughter, Aisha, whose mother was dead. Again however all his children,
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except for a daughter by the first wife were in Mombasa. His second 
wife, Madina, was a very distant relative of his - she was his MMFBSSD. 
Madina was very popular in Tundwa and was always ready to help others. 
During the year 1965 there was only one occasion on which she needed 
help from her kin. This was on the marriage of her daughter Kadi.
Two years later however Madi died and Madina had real occasion on which 
to call on her kin for help. The core of this help came from Madina’s 
mother who lived nearby, her two half-sisters (same father, different 
mother), her mother’s sister’s daughter, her husband’s mother’s sister’s 
daughter, and her husband’s daughter by his previous marriage. Also 
included in Madina’s network were a number of women to all of whom she 
was related through her half-brother’s wife, Biti. (She and her 
brother shared the same mother but had a different father). Biti had 
an extensive network of female relatives - the focus of which was her­
self and a sister with whom she lived. In addition she had one other 
sister. All three sisters maintained close links with a strong female 
kin unit consisting of their late mother’s sister’s and sister’s 
daughters. Through her brother’s wife Madina was in close contact 
with all these women. In 1960 she had married Aisha (her sister’s 
daughter) to the MZS of her brother’s wife (see Diagram 3). Aisha 
and her husband left for Mombasa soon afterwards. In 1965 Madina’s 
daughter, Kadi, was married, and all the women mentioned so far came to
1. It is of interest that the female kin unit with which Madina main­
tains a relationship through Biti is the same group of women with 
whom Mwarabu, in our previous.example, maintains contact. But 
Mwarabu and Madina do not maintain links with each other.
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help. Kadi was married to the MBS of Madina* s brother* s wife - thereby- 
creating another affinal linlc with this group of relatives and consolidat­
ing this part of the network, Madina’s daughter and her husband went 
to Mombasa soon after the marriage but Madina’s links with this group 
of women persisted. She repaid their help by attending a circumcision 
ceremony which one of these women organised for her young son, and a 
funeral feast held for the child of another. She also helped in cook­
ing at a maulidi feast organised by her half-brother and his wife.
Madi, Madina’s husband, had as I have said no close kinsmen in 
Tundwa. His father and mother were dead and his siblings were in 
Mombasa. Both his daughter's husband and Aisha*s husband were also in 
Mombasa with their wives. He had of course a general relationship to 
all the women with whom his wife interacted but the only male link 
amongst this group that he could draw upon was his daughter's husband’s 
father. In his attempt to achieve political support therefore, Madi 
had to cultivate other links. One of these was the old headman of 
the village, another a pair of inseparable friends with whom he had a 
somewhat shaky political alliance. Other than this he tried to keep 
in with all the important and wealthy men in the village and he invited 
all these people to his daughter’s wedding. When it came to an election 
however the political alliance he had established had broken down and 
the old headman was forced to stay neutral. He gained only 48 votes 
and over two-thirds of these were from women members of his wife’s 
kinship set and its wider ramifications. His daughter's husband’s
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father voted for him and a few other men hut he gained only eleven 
votes from men.
I shall he returning to Madi's hid for power in a later chapter. 
Here I simply want to point out the importance to him of the support 
hased upon his own and more particularly his wife*s kinship set. Had 
it not heen for this he would have had harely any support at all. Other 
political leaders were more successful for two reasons - firstly because 
their kinship linkages were more extensive and secondly because they 
were also able to gain support from non-kinsmen.
This brief analysis of kin relations in Tundwa by no means 
exhausts the subject, and in fact raises several interesting points 
which might be followed up later. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, I think I have said enough to elucidate the connection of 
kinship with political action in this community. It is not that 
political action here involves the opposition of pre-existing descent 
groups (as it might in the archetypal model of the segmentary lineage 
system). Nor does any political leader have, in his kin group or 
lineage, a ready-made set of supporters. In Tundwa a person must 
build up his own kinship set, and women in particular spend most of 
their lives doing so. Political leaders are in a similar position - 
and they use the links they have established on a kinship basis as a 
platform from which to recruit support.
Both of the examples which I have discussed in detail in this 
chapter involved feungwana men with Waungwana wives. Neither of these
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men have any members of the other two strata in their kinship sets. 
Some Waungwana do have such links where there has been intermarriage 
across the strata. But since the preference is for endogamous 
marriage such links are rare. In the next chapter I shall examine 
the system of social stratification since stratification imposes an 
overall framework on the network of individual linkages which I have 
discussed so far.
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IV. THE ASCRIPTION OP STATUS ; MARRIAGE CHOICES
"Everyone is a Bajuni, But the Bajuni are divided into three strata 
(makabila). There are the Sharifs, then there are the Waungwana and 
then there are the Wachumwa"• A Sharif man
"There are two strata (makabila) here - the Waungwana and the Wachumwa. 
The Wachumwa are bad and inferior people. Also there is another 
stratum, the Masherifu". A mwungwana woman
Everyone in Tundwa can categorise everyone else in terms of 
the stratum to which he or she belongs, and he is able to do this be­
cause he knows how that person*s father was categorised. The people 
see the community as divided into three patrilineally ascriptive strata :
the Masherifu or reputed descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, the
2 3
Waungwana or free men and the Wachumwa or ex-slaves. These three
ascriptive strata are ranked by the people, with the Masherifu at the
top, the Waungwana in the middle and the Wachumwa at the bottom. Demo-
graphically speaking the Waungwana are by far the largest category, as
the following table shows. Nevertheless the other two categories make
up 35*4fo of the population and are certainly not an insignificant
minority which can reasonably be ignored.
1. Singular s Sharif 2. Singular : Mwungwana 3. Singular :
Mchumwa
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Table 10* Stratification in Tundwa
Stratum
Population
Men Women Children Total fo of Total Pop.
I. Masherifu 24 19 39 82 1. %
II» Waungwana 175 219 280 674 64.8$
III. Wachumwa 77 112 97 286 27.3/=
Total 276 350 416 1042 100 $
The strata in Tundwa are not corporate groups. They have no 
leaders or common property interests. There are no occasions on which 
all members of a stratum identify themselves openly by acting corporately, 
and no rituals in which stratification is symbolised. On the contrary, 
superficially the Bajunis appear to be socially undifferentiated. There 
are no sharp differences in the material style of life of members of 
the different strata; all live in the same mean houses, eat the same 
kind of food and wear the same kind of clothes. There is a tendency 
for members of the ex-slave stratum to cluster together in certain loca­
tions of the town, but this is not immediately obvious.
It should not be thought however that the framework of stratifi­
cation exerts no influence on social action. It does in fact exert a 
profound influence, and in particular marriage choices are determined 
by it. The strata are perpetuated because by and large people marry 
within their own stratum, and they justify their marriage choices in 
terms of the prestige ranking of the strata. We must first then under­
stand the basis of this prestige ranking.
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In discussing prestige ranking in Tundwa we are dealing partly 
with differences which have a basis in historical fact and partly with 
the evaluation of the historical facts by the people themselves* It 
is not always easy to disentangle the two* The basic division in the 
community is between those who are free born and those who are the 
descendents of slaves* That the institution of slavery existed is 
not in doubt and we know that slavery was abolished in East Africa 
in 1897* Nor do local accounts of the operation of the institution 
of slavery seem implausible* Slaves were brought from the mainland, 
after having been bought in slave markets or captured. They were 
virtually chattels, the property of their masters. They were employed 
in farming - mainly on the mainland where annual crops were grown.
Women slaves also did some agricultural work, but generally they worked 
in the houses of their masters. Slaves thus freed their masters from 
the drudgery of manual work. Wot all free men were wealthy enough to 
have slaves however, and these men had to work for themselves.
This much seems plausible. Slaves were strangers, the property 
of their masters, virtually outside 1 society1. But the Bajunis go 
further than this. They assert that there is a 1 racial* difference 
between the Waungwana and the slaves. The Waungwana, they say, are 
Arabs, whereas the ex-slaves are said to be Africans. It is clear 
to anyone that the Bajunis are a very racially mixed people, varying at 
one extreme from people who are very dark-skinned and have typically 
negroid features, to people who are quite light-skinned and have narrow
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features. And there is a full range of mixtures of these two extreme 
physical types. But it would not be entirely true to say that colour 
and physical differences coincide with the distinction between the 
Waungwana and the Wachumwa* And there is no proof that the Waungwana 
themselves were ever the descendents of Arabs. Nevertheless the 
Waungwana firmly believe in this myth and evaluate physical differences 
accordingly. Fairness of skin and straightness of hair are highly 
valued; * black1 skin and negroid features are thought of as ugly.
It is in the field of marriage that this argument is typically 
used. Endogamous marriage is justified in terms of racial purity and 
thus the evaluation of history has become more significant than the 
actual historical fact of slavery itself. Today the name mchumwa no 
longer means literally a slave, since slavery as an economic institu­
tion has long since been abolished. It means rather an inferior, low 
and ugly person.
The Masherifu seem to have been late-comers into this situation. 
Some of them have been in the area for seven generations or more (perhaps 
about two hundred years?) whilst others have come more recently. Like 
the Wachumwa then they came as strangers and outsiders, but strangers 
of a completely different character. In the first place they came 
voluntarily, unlike the slaves, who were brought by force. They seem 
to have come mainly from Somalia, but like the Waungwana they claimed 
to be of Arab ancestry. Not only this but they also claimed to be of 
the illustrious line of the Prophet himself. Their proof was in the
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written genealogies which they preserved showing an unbroken male line 
of descent back to the Prophet. On the strength of this they claimed 
a superior status to the other Waungwana. In so far as the Bajunis 
are Muslims they appear to have accepted this claim and some of them 
agreed to marry their daughters to the Masherifu. The Sharifs however 
never allowed their daughters to marry men of lower strata, and in so 
far as this was accepted by the Waungwana, the Masherifu were able to 
establish themselves as the topmost stratum in the social hierarchy.
But the Masherifu were always the smallest category and they were un­
able to translate their high social status into power over others, 
either in the political or the religious field. The Waungwana - or 
at least the wealthy amongst them - kept this power very firmly in 
their.own hands. The Masherifu were however able to gain wealth at 
the expense of the Waungwana and are now the wealthiest category in 
the village.
This then is the background, historical and ideological, to 
the ranking of the three strata in Tundwa. I shall go into its 
economic and political aspects in later chapters. In this chapter I 
want to examine the means by which the strata are perpetuated - that 
is through preferential marriage choices. I shall examine the basis 
for these choices and suggest some reasons why the patterns are chang­
ing. At present however marriage choices perpetuate the strata and 
create discontinuities in the overall pattern of kinship linkages.
This has political consequences as we .shall see in Part II of this thesis.
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Marriage choices
Various factors affect the choice of spouse in Tundwa - Islamic 
prohibitions, geography, kinship, wealth, and most important of all, 
stratification. The pattern of marriage choices which perpetuates 
the three strata makes more sense however if we discuss it in the con­
text of other factors.
According to Muslim law a man is allowed to marry anyone except 
for a small range of very close kin (M, D, Z, FZ, MZ, BD, ZD, SW, GM 
and GD), But other rules, preferences and prohibitions, not stated in 
Muslim law, are significant amongst the Bajunis, First there.is a 
tendency for intra-village endogamy - only 14*3% of Tundwa*s extant 
marriages involved a partner from outside the village* Nearly all 
of these were men married into the village. This marriage pattern is 
more a matter of convenience than specific preference. As I explained 
in the previous chapter, when a man marries he normally goes to reside 
with his wife. If his wife is in another village, whilst his land is 
near his own (and this is the usual pattern) such an arrangement causes 
a lot of inconvenience. Nor is there a great deal of interaction 
between villages such that a man would normally find it easy to marry 
in other than his own village.
Secondly there is an expressed preference for marriage to kin 
(ndugu). This preference is only strongly expressed however in the 
case of the first marriages of girls where the control of parents is 
uppermost. Young girls are to some extent secluded before marriage
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(they are supposed to stay at home and are not allowed to attend public 
ceremonies such as marriages or feasts). In general therefore they 
are subject to the more effective control of parents - or of their 
mothers if their father is at this stage married to someone else - than 
are young men. Young men, if they are already economically independent 
and as we have seen, many of them are - can no longer be controlled by 
their parents. They roam around the village freely, especially at 
nights when they hold dances and visit prostitutes. They generally 
have to find their own marriage payments and they usually choose their 
own wives. It is only where a young manfs father provides some or all 
of these payments that he has any control over the choice of his son’s 
spouse. Young girls are however completely dependent on their parents 
until their first marriage.
When people say, "it is good to marry ndugu" , they do not mean 
marriage into a bounded group of kin. As we have already seen, the 
universe of kin is an unbounded category which includes maternal and 
paternal kin, and even affines. It shades off into an even wider 
category of friends, acquaintances and neighbours (jamaa). When people 
say that it is "good" to marry ndugu they mean that it is better to 
marry one’s daughter to the son of a person who is already known and 
trusted because one already maintains a relationship with him or her. 
Parents in other words use their daughters to consolidate their own set 
of kin and quasi-kin linkages. But marriages may also be used to 
extend a person’s kinship set. The marriage of Madina’s sister’s
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daughter, Aisha, described in the previous chapter, extended Madina1s
kinship set and the new links were later consolidated by the marriage
of Madina*s daughter, Kadi.
Marriages to kin do not appear however to be more stable than
other marriages in the community. Kin marriages are usually first
marriages and when they end in divorce (which is the way nearly two-
*1
thirds of Tundwa*s marriages end) neither men nor women are any longer 
under parental control. At this point a person is building up his 
own set of kin, not working in terms of that of his parents. Later 
marriages are therefore less likely to be to kinsmen. As one woman 
put it: "It is good that one*s first marriage should be within the
ndugu. Later one may marry further afield (mbali)11.
Taking all this into account, what can one say of the incidence 
of marriage to ndugu? One thing seems certain - marriage to close 
kin such as cousins is not so frequent as one might expect. Out of 
Tundwa*s 186 extant marriages in 1965? only nine were cousin marriages.
All except one were first marriages of the woman involved. Beyond the 
range of cousins we cannot sensibly talk of the incidence of marriage 
■b° ndugu, since this term does not represent a bounded group.
There are no financial incentives for arranging marriages to kin
rather than unrelated persons since marriage payments do not vary on 
this principle. Two payments should be made on marriage. The first
1. There is a register of marriages and divorces kept in Faza District 
office. Since 1951 every man has been legally obliged to register 
his marriages and divorces. This rule is not however enforced in 
Faza and only some men register their marriages. The register how­
ever shows that out of 67 marriages contracted and registered by Tundwa 
men between 1951 and 1957> forty (59-7$) had ended in divorce by 1965*
This is probably a reasonable reflection of the divorce rate in Tundwa.
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is mahari ('bridewealth'), and the second is pesa ya harusi (marriage 
payment)# The first is promised on marriage and should he paid either 
immediately or very soon afterwards to the girl herself. In the last 
analysis, if not previously paid, it should he given to the girl upon 
divorcing her (and is thus a kind of insurance against divorce). In
fact in Tundwa, the total payment, though promised, is rarely made at 
all. (in only ahout 16f0 of all registered divorces is it fully paid). 
The reason is that many women voluntarily forfeit the payment hy demand­
ing the divorce. The amount varies from ahout 40/- to ahout 800/- hut
the customary payment is 240/-. It does not vary according to the 
type of marriage (first or later, kin or not kin, within or outside 
the stratum) hut according to the wealth and prestige of hoth sides.
The marriage payment hy contrast goes to the father of the hride in a 
first marriage and to the hride herself in a second marriage. This 
payment is obligatory and is always paid before marriage. It varies 
betweeir 200/- to 700/- for the first marriage and 50/- to 100/- for 
later marriages, the amount varying according to the same criteria as 
those above. It is meant in all cases to provide the girl with new 
clothes, a bed and other household requirements. Both types of 
marriage payment therefore go to the hride or her family hut there is 
no financial advantage or disadvantage to he had from marrying a girl 
to one of her kinsmen.
Economic considerations of another sort do come into the picture 
however since we find a tendency for close kin marriages to occur more
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often where the two families are fairly well-off. Although I never 
heard anyone give inheritance as a motive for marrying a person, such 
marriages would obviously keep whatever property there was itfithin a 
narrower group. And sometimes one finds a pattern of such marriages 
repeated over the generations, creating very tightly-knit groups of 
kindred. Again this process is only marked where the families in­
volved are wealthy. One section of the Masherifu is very closely 
intermarried in this way, as are some of the Waungwana.
The third factor which influences marriage choices is wealth. 
There is a general tendency in Tundwa for intermarriage between people 
of like economic status. There is also a strong tendency for people 
with property (particularly shambas) to marry the daughters and sisters 
of other property owners.
The first and most important consideration in choosing a spouse 
however is not kinship or wealth, but the stratum membership of the 
proposed spouse. The strongest preference is always expressed for 
marriage within the stratum. To some extent we can see the preference 
for stratum endogamy as simply an extension of the preference for 
marriage to kindred. The difference between the stratum and the 
kindred is that the former is a bounded unit whereas the latter is 
potentially unbounded and based on individual egos. The strata are 
bounded because of the rule of patrilineal succession, but it must be 
noted that this does not make them unilineal descent groups. As I 
have already pointed out, the strata are not groups but categories.
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In addition however they have no overall genealogical framework, 
either real or fictitious. Most people remember genealogies of only 
two to three generations. Only the Masherifu keep written genealogies 
and have an eponymous ancestor - the Prophet Mohamed. But even in 
this case the written genealogies are not displayed, recited or memorised, 
and one Sharif clan in Tundwa has even lost its written genealogy. Even 
for the Sharifs then what is important is not the written genealogy but 
the single known link of father to son. As they themselves put it:
"We know £a person's] father and that is enough for us". Neither the 
Waungwana nor the Wachumwa keep written genealogies and their strata 
have no eponymous ancestors.
The term that the Bajuni use for stratum is kabila (plural 
makabila). This term may have many meanings but it always carries 
with it the implication of relationship. At its most general it can 
be applied to any two objects that have something in common, and can 
thus mean 'type* or 'kind'. With reference to social units it usually 
carries the implication of kinship, real or assumed. Thus it is 
applied to units that we would separately describe as 'tribe*, 'people', 
'stratum* or 'clan*. Such kinship may or may not be unilineal, and 
as far as the Bajuni are concerned it is more generally seen as
1. All free-born men (Masherifu and Waungwana) in Tundwa are members 
of clans, but these clans no longer have any social significance 
as groups. Clan names are inherited from the father. It is the 
name rather than anything else which is socially significant these 
dayB, since it establishes one as a free man. There are no Wachumwa 
clans.
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multilateral* I do not think it unreasonable therefore to assert 
that the Bajunis see the stratum as a kind of hounded kin unit. As the 
same time however the strata are ranked categories whose members are con­
cerned to maintain their differential status* And one way of doing 
this is through discriminatory marriage choices.
Marriage and stratification
When a Sharif or mwungwana man wishes to get married he looks 
for a girl who has both good descent (nasab) and a good character (tabia). 
In other words he looks for a girl from a good family within his own 
stratum (one which has no slave descent), which can be trusted to have 
brought her up properly. Only if he can find no suitable girl in his 
own stratum does he begin to look in the next lower stratum. The pre­
ference for endogamy is very strongly expressed - to marry outside the 
stratum is disapproved of because it, “destroys the stratum (kabila)”, 
and hypergamy, though allowed, is not thought of as highly as endoga- 
mous marriage. The following table indicates the extent to which 
these ideal rules are followed.
1• One sometimes gets the impression that at some time in the past
the Bajunis - or perhaps just the Waungwana - saw themselves as
a people with a common patrilineal ancestry and that the strata
and clans were corporate descent groups* One also gets the im­
pression that patrilineal descent meant more in the past than it 
does now. But this may simply be a general tendency on the part 
of people to over-simplify the past and to remember it as a time 
when people always obeyed the rules.
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Table 11. Marriage and stratification in Tundwa ; Analysis of 186
marriages extant in 1965
Stratum Type of marriage partner Total : 
All
PartnersEndogamous Hypergamous Hypogamous
I Masherifu PA(12 men 
(12 women 7 men 1 woman 32
II Waungwana (105 men 
(105 women
16 men 
6 women
1 man 
5 women 238
III Wachumwa 8o(40 men (,40 women 17 women 5 men 102
Total No. of Partners 314 men(23 women
12(6 men 
(6 women 372
Total No. of marriages 157 23 6 186
Percentage of total 84.455 12.4$ 3.2% 100$
Notes Two men married polygamously are counted twice*
Endogamy ; The norm
Table 11 shows that to a large extent endogamy is the statistical 
norm in Tundwa. It would be even more true to say that it is the ideal 
norm for the two higher strata - the Masherifu and the Waungwana* This 
ideal is justified in three ways - first by reference to •racial* purity, 
second by reference to morality, and thirdly by reference to status. As 
I have already indicated, members of each of the two higher strata believe 
themselves to have distinctive physical features which set them apart 
and in particular which distinguish them from the ex-slaves* The 
Masherifu believe themselves to look 11 like Arabs'* but also to have
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certain distinctive physical traits (never clearly specified) which 
set them apart from other free men. The Waungwana too believe them­
selves to look like Arabs, and believe that they have fair skins and 
straight hair. Both these strata are united in their view of the 
physical characteristics of the Wachumwa, who are said to be "black1*, 
and to be Africans rather than Arabs.
Wot only this but moral evaluations are linked to physical 
appearance. The Wachumwa have ascribed to them all the worst moral 
attributes - bad manners, sexual promiscuity and untrustworthiness.
The name Waungwana in itself carries all the values which this category 
attributes to itself. Besides meaning free men as opposed to slaves, 
it also means noble and civilised. The Waungwana believe themselves 
to be the antithesis of all that they describe the Wachumwa to be - 
they think of themselves as morally proper, proud and refined in 
manners. The Masherifu, in addition to claiming all the moral 
characteristics of other free men, speak of themselves as watukufu - 
exalted and pious men. I need hardly add that moral attributes do 
not in fact divide the population in this way.
It is only one step from these essentially *racialistic* 
attitudes to the concept of ’purity* (usafi). Usafi can mean two 
things. It can be applied to one who personifies all the virtues of 
a free born man (i.e. those I outlined above). Or it can mean purity 
of *blood* (damu safi) in which case it is applied to a person whose 
father and mother were both free born. Thus although a person takes
113
the stratum status of his father he is not considered 'pure* unless 
his mother was also free horn. When I asked why the status of one's 
mother should he considered significant in view of the rule of patri­
lineal succession I was told: ''True the name comes from the father,
hut the behaviour and personality (zitendo) are from the mother". The 
two meanings of usafi are in fact two aspects of the same idea. A 
person who is pure in blood is also 'pure* in the moral sense of having 
all the virtues of a free horn man. It is individuals rather than 
groups or families that are labelled 'impure*. If such an individual 
marries into his own stratum and his children similarly the matter is 
forgotten. There are many cases such as this, even amongst people 
who are normally spoken of as Waungwana safi. It is only if the 
marriage pattern is repeated in later generations that a more general 
stigma is attached. In other words one cannot say that the Waungwana 
are divided into those who are 'pure* and those who are not, since 
'purity1 is a matter of degree.
The ideology of racial and moral purity hacks up the strong 
preference for endogamy. Transgression is a matter of shame (aihu). 
"We cannot marry Wachumwa", said one mwungwana adolescent girl. "That 
would he very shameful because they are black. We marry Waungwana.
We can also marry Sharifs - they are Waungwana". The Masherifu, who 
are at the top of the social hierarchy are also concerned to maintain 
their status vis-a-vis the Waungwana. Therefore they argue that: "A
Sharif must marry a Sharif or the stratum will he destroyed".
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The ideal norm then is clear, and by and large the statistics 
show that it is being followed* Me would probably have expected 
however that more than ideal norms were required to uphold such an 
important principle of the community. Endogamy however is not supported 
by any organised sanctions, either negative or positive* As I have 
already explained, the marriage payments do not vary according to whether 
a marriage is within or outside the stratum, but according to quite 
different criteria* Only the Sharifs claim to demand a higher mahari 
(bridewealth) than other strata - 400/- as opposed to the customary 
240/-, but in practice they often offer and accept less. And in any 
case, since mahari is so rarely paid this barrier is purely theoretical.
If there are no positive organised sanctions there are no nega­
tive ones either. No-one actively intervenes to prevent marriages 
taking place across strata lines. All the sanctions are diffuse and 
can be summed up in two kinds of motive - economic self interest and 
concern for public opinion. As we shall see in the next chapter there 
are real economic differences between the three strata, and it is 
generally in any person's economic interest to marry within his own 
stratum rather than marrying into a lower one. Secondly public 
approval is bestowed on those who marry endogamously, whilst those who 
marry out are criticised*
Finally one can say that the on-going pattern of kinship net­
works encourages endogamy, since most people's kin are of the same 
stratum as themselves. Interaction between members of different strata
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is thereby minimised and intermarriage is less likely to take place.
Divergence from the norm : 1♦ Hypergamy
In spite of the strong ideology supporting endogamy, 12.4$ of 
Tundvra1s marriages in 1965 were hypergamous - that is they were marriages 
of men of higher strata to women of lower strata. Such marriages are 
usually justified hy the argument that since a person takes the stratum 
status of his father such a marriage cannot he deleterious to the man's 
children. As we have seen however, concepts of racial purity would 
contradict this argument, since to he pure a person must have hoth 
father and mother from the same stratum. This explains why a mwung- 
wana woman could say; "We could not he married hy so-and-so, even 
though his father is our relative. We should say, 'Your mother was 
a slave1 This ambivalence ahout hypergamous marriage reflects a 
similar ambivalence in the kinship system, which, formally speaking, 
is patrilineal, hut in practice is very far from patrilineal.
We must distinguish here between the attitudes of women towards 
hypergamous marriage as opposed to those of men. On the whole women 
welcome a hypergamous marriage since it means that their children will 
he horn into a higher stratum than themselves. For women it means a 
step upwards. For men however hypergamy is always a second best choice 
to marrying a woman from his own stratum. For him it is a step down­
wards .
We must also distinguish here between hypergamous marriages of 
Masherifu men with Waungwana women, and those of men of either of the
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two higher strata with ex-slave women* Whereas the former type of 
marriages are respectable since they involve two free born persons, 
the latter are considered degrading and are subject to much social dis­
approval •
In contrast to the Waungwana, the Masherifu in Tundwa are such 
a small category that some of them are more or less forced to marry out* 
At present too the Masherifu are the only category which has an excess 
of adult men over women. As a result some Sharif men are forced 
either to marry into Sharif families in other villages (with the con­
sequent inconvenience of this course of action) or to marry hyper- 
gamously. Most of them choose the latter course.
There is I think another reason for Masherifu hypergamy. Were 
they to practise total endogamy they would have no kinship links bind­
ing them to other categories and their descent status relative to these 
other categories would remain undefined. It is only through hyperga­
mous marriage that one can both establish links with other categories 
and at the same time show through action that one is superior to them. 
Since the Masherifu lack political power and are such a small group 
they need some links with other groups to bind them into the community. 
Some of these links may be created through the use of wealth, but kin­
ship links are equally important.
Support for this argument is contained both in ideology and 
in the pattern of Masherifu hypergamous marriages. The proud boast of 
the Sharifs is that, "You can always tell the child of a Sharif, even
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if his mother was not a Sharif*. In other words they are asserting 
that their descent cannot he sullied hy the mother, no matter who she 
is. Non-Sharif women on the whole are prepared to accept the Sharifsf 
claims to he specially favoured in the eyes of Allah. (in this they 
are less critical than men). To hear the child of a Sharif is there­
fore to gain blessings (baraka) both for themselves and the child. 
Waungwana women so honoured will point to their child with pride - 
,fthis one is a Sharif*. Ideology thus supports and justifies Masherifu 
hypergamy.
The pattern of Masherifu hypergamous marriages is also signi­
ficant. There were seven of such marriages extant in 19^5t of which 
all hut one were with Waungwana women. This is not surprising since 
links with the Wachumwa are of little use to a man who is concerned 
about his status. The only Sharif married to a mchumwa woman was an 
old man of the lowest economic category. This marriage moreover was 
of such long standing that I suspect that the woman involved was 
originally a slave concubine. She had no known relatives.
Moreover it is not the case that only poor Masherifu men marry 
hypergamously. Such men come from all economic categories including 
the highest and the lowest. In general they were married to women of 
equivalent economic status to themselves. It seems to be the case
1. On a somewhat rough and ready assessment of the woman*s economic 
status, according to her father*s income, or that of her mother*s 
husband, her sister or her sister*s husband as seemed appropriate - 
these being the people who would support her if she had no husband.
119
then that wealth or lack of wealth is not the cause of Sharif hyper­
gamy, hut rather a shortage of Sharif women together with the desire 
to create links with the Waungwana* Through these seven extant 
marriages, together with similar marriages which have taken place in 
the past, the Sharifs are linked to both of the political factions 
and to the Sheikh of the mosque*
Waungwana hypergamy is a different matter altogether since in 
such marriages Waungwana are linking themselves with the lowest stratum 
of ex-slaves. Such marriages can only diminish the prestige of the 
man within his own stratum. The people contrast this situation with
the past when, they say, hypergamous marriages between free born men
and slave girls were more frequent than they are now. It cost nothing 
and involved no reflection on a man*s status for him to ♦marry1 his 
slave or to make her his concubine (suria). Quite the contrary; 
such a marriage simply asserted his ownership of the slave girl. The 
children of such a marriage do not seem to have suffered. There are 
quite a few cases of this kind which emerge from examination of the 
genealogies of rich Waungwana families - families that is which would
have had slaves in the past. At present however marriage to an ex­
slave woman is similar to marrying a woman of any other stratum - 
marriage payments of equivalent order have to be paid. And in addition 
a man now endangers his own status by marrying an ex-slave woman. Thus 
it would seem likely that hypergamous marriage is less frequent now 
than in the past, and that it would be resorted to mainly by men of low
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status within their own stratum.
This deduction is largely supported hy the evidence. Out 
of the sixteen Waungwana men who are married hypergamously only two 
could he considered at all wealthy, and these two are only in the 
middle income category. The rest are all in the lower income cate­
gories. Three quarters of them own no land and have to cultivate 
mahonde or carry out other less well paid occupations. They are mostly 
married to women of similar or slightly lower economic status. Two 
exceptions are of interest however. One is a man without land who 
cultivates a honde. He is married to a mchumwa woman who owns a small 
shamha inherited from a previous mchumwa husband. The other man is 
also a honde cultivator who was horn in Lamu. He is married to a 
woman whose son is one of Lamu District’s Members of Parliament and 
who receives regular and generous help from him. In these two cases 
then the men were actually raising their economic status by marrying 
down.
None of the Waungwana men married hypergamously hold any 
political or religious office; such men take care to marry endogamously. 
Affinal links in one generation however turn into maternal links in 
the next, and it is certainly true that some links of this sort, cutting 
across the strata may become significant in the context of political 
activity in the next generation.
Two of the Waungwana men who are married hypergamously are 
themselves the sons of Wachumwa women. They are therefore not 'pure1
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Waungwana. By contrast four of the Wachumwa women so married had 
Waungwana mothers and were marrying hack up into the Waungwana stratum.
It seems to he fairly general that one marriage across the strata 
leads to others. Three of the six Sharif men married to Waungwana 
women themselves had Waungwana mothers. The reason seems to he that 
once a kinship network is established which cuts across the strata it 
acts as a kind of bridge for later generations to cross. One of the 
consequences of such a succession of marriages, if they are hy Waungwana 
men to Wachumwa women is that the children may he discriminated against 
in marriage. This does not seem to he very common, hut it does occasion­
ally happen as the following case shows.
Case 6. Time : circa 1960
Aha is the only child of a mchumwa mother, Ilaji, and a mwung- 
wana man Sheebwana (see genealogy). It is of interest that Ilaji*s 
mother, Yumbe, is herself a mwungwana woman, and the sister of Sheebwana1s 
mother. For reasons which I do not know, Yumbe married a mchumwa man,
Said, and bore him Ilaji, her only child. Ilaji was then married to 
her patrilateral parallel cousin Sheebwana. Like her mother she bore 
only one child, Aba. Sheebwana died when Aba was quite young. Aba 
went to Primary school in Rasini, unlike most children in Tundwa,
(until 1966 there was no school in Tundwa) and later he accompanied 
his mother to Mombasa where he attended secondary school. He later 
trained to be a tally clerk in the port of Mombasa. As an educated 
man and with a white collar job he would ordinarily have been a very 
desirable partner. Nevertheless when he made attempts to marry his 
patrilateral parallel cousin, Rizilci, a very fair-skinned girl with
straight hair, he was refused.
The girl*s mother and father 
are both dead and she lives with 
her mother*s sister. It was 
this woman, herself a mwungwana, 
who was most strongly against 
the marriage and effectively 
prevented it from taking place.
She argued that Aba and Rizilci 
were too closely related, and 
that such a marriage would cause 
quarrels. This was obviously a 
II - Mwungwana III - Mchumwa flimsy excuse since such marriages
are normally commended. I was
HI SaidYumbe
Sheebwana Q2EI Ilaji
Riziki H O 1 Aba
ECtO
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told by others that the real reason was that Aba's mother was a mchumwa. 
Aba later married a mwungwana girl from Rasini.
This case is extremely interesting because from it one can 
observe the long term effects of hypergamous and other marriages across 
strata lines. This case represents an extreme example of what may 
happen. More commonly however, the children of a Waungwana - Wachumwa 
hypergamous marriage will be insulted by being called 'slaves' even 
though their father was a mwungwana.
Two other general features of hypergamy are that it may occur
where the woman involved is a prostitute since this allows her to have
contacts with a wide range of men. There are three cases of this kind.
Secondly the percentage of marriages involving a spouse from outside
Tundwa is double the percentage for the village as a whole ( 3 1 . as
opposed to 14*8$). Such stranger spouses are to some extent outside
the local pattern of strata relationships. This explains why Aba,
after having been refused a mwungwana girl in his own village was able
to find a mwungwana spouse in another village. The following case 
the
illustrates/influence of the factors of prostitution and stranger status.
Case 7. Time : 1964-5
Mwanatime is a mchumwa woman. She was first married to a 
mchumwa man, bore him one child and was then divorced. She left for 
Mombasa and spent several years there working as a prostitute. During 
this time she met with an Indian, a Hindu, who wished to marry her. He 
was disowned by his family, became a Muslim and came back with Mwanatime 
to Tundwa. As an Indian he was classed as a mwungwana. I very much 
doubt that he was aware of Mwanatime's status before he married her. He 
worked as a fisherman in Tundwa - an occupation which is usually carried 
out by Wachumwa.
To sum up then we can say that hypergamous marriages are
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contracted out of necessity by some Masherifu men, whereas those of 
Waungwana men are generally associated with low economic status.
Divergence from the norm : 2, Hypogamy
If we are to believe the people themselves, hypogamous marriage 
is a phenomenon of recent years* As one mwungwana woman put it, in 
commenting on one such marriage which took place in "These days
people donft care. In the past they only married endogamously (kufu- 
kufu)*" In this particular instance I think the local version of 
history is probably accurate and is not simply an attempt to glorify 
the past. We must distinguish however between hypogamous marriages 
between Masherifu women and Waungwana men (both free born) and hypo­
gamous marriages between Masherifu or Waungwana women and Wachumwa men.
I have no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any marriages of the 
former type occurred until recent years, but it could be argued that 
the evidence has been conveniently forgotten. As for marriages of 
the second type, I think it most unlikely that any could have occurred 
either prior to the abolition of slavery or in the years immediately 
succeeding abolition. In view of the status of the slaves as chattels, 
no slave man would have been allowed to marry a free born girl. And 
in the years immediately succeeding abolition very few slaves had the 
wealth either to provide the necessary marriage payments or to make it 
worth the while of a mwungwana woman to suffer the public disapproval 
that such a marriage would entail*
1* From the Arabic kaf1 ah (equivalence in status)?
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The very earliest known case of a mwungwana woman marrying 
an ex-slave man is not without significance* It occurred ahout forty 
years ago and involved a mchumwa man who, as a result of labour migra­
tion, had purchased a shamba*
Hypogamous marriages then seem to be an indicator of social 
change* In so far as one can rely on oral accounts and genealogies 
they appear to be increasing* . As can be seen from Table 11, there 
were only six in 19^5 (3.2f0 of all marriages). Two more occurred 
towards the end of that year - of two Sharif women significantly enough.
Of the six marriages extant in 19^5» ail except one were of Waungwana 
women married to Wachumwa men. The exception was a Sharif woman 
married to a mwungwana man. But there has even been a case in the 
recent past of a Sharif woman marrying an ex-slave man (see Case 8, p.126). 
Two general tendencies seem to be at work here, the most important of 
which is the ability of Wachumwa men nowadays to achieve wealth and 
thereby become more eligible as spouses. In line with these changes 
in the distribution of wealth have come other changes - an over-riding 
authority (first Britain and latterly Independent Kenya) which have 
ignored the fact that this is a stratified community, and an increasing 
emancipation of women through prostitution. All these changes, if not 
actually encouraging hypogamy, have at least made it more possible now 
than in the past.
Certain factors emerge from an analysis of cases of hypogamous 
marriages. The most important factor seems to be the wealth of the
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man involved relative to that of the family into which he marries* It 
appears to have been significant in five out of the six extant cases, 
in many of the cases which have occurred in the past and in two cases 
which occurred after I made my Gensus* In so far as the possibility 
of achieving wealth in onefs own life time rather than inheriting it 
is growing, one would expect the number of such marriages to increase* 
Other factors are also significant however. Nearly always the girl 
has been previously married to and divorced from someone of her own 
stratum before contracting this hypogamous marriage (five out of the 
six extant cases were of this kind). As I have indicated, later 
marriages, unlike first marriages, are not subject to parental control. 
Secondly it is often the case that the girl's mother was of a lower 
stratum than her father, and the girl has thus married into her mother's 
stratum (this accounts for half the extant cases). Thirdly the status 
of the girl herself may be low, either because she is illegitimate or 
a prostitute or both (three out of six cases - in only one case neither 
the second nor the third factors are relevant). Fourthly the woman 
may be barren or past child-bearing (again half the cases are of this 
type). This feature is significant because in such cases the woman 
has no need to consider the fact that any children she bears will be of 
a lower stratum than herself. Finally the geographical origin of 
the man may be significant, as it was in hypergamous marriages.
Most of these points will be illustrated in the three following 
cases, the first of a Sharif woman to a mchumwa man (which was not 
extant at the time of my census but is extremely interesting because it
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is the only such case of which I know) and the other two of Waungwana 
women to Vlachumwa men.
Case 8. Time ; 1937 - circa 1961
Mwanakimwenye is a Sharif woman of 35 to 40 years, daughter of 
a Sharif man and a mwungwana woman, now dead. She was first married 
to a Lamu Sharif from the same clan as herself, and bore him a son, 
whom she left behind when she was divorced. Then she was married by 
Bwana Adi, one of the richest shopkeepers in Rasini. Bwana Adi was not 
only not a Sharif but was in fact from the lowest stratum of ex-slaves.
A mahari of 400/- was promised but not paid. Mwanakimwenye bore Bwana 
Adi three children, one girl and two boys, then they quarrelled and 
were divorced. It is said that Mwanakimwenye1s father did not want a 
divorce to take place. During the duration of the marriage Bwana Adi 
had built a large water tank near the house and carried out extensive 
repairs to the house itself. (Mwanakimwenye’s father did not live in 
this house but in one adjoining it. He spent all his days in his 
daughter1s house however, and ate his meals there). In return 
Mwanakimwenye’s father gave Bwana Adi a piece of land, which although 
it belonged to Mwanakimwenye*s father was not being utilised and had 
reverted to bush. It was in the father’s interest that it should be 
utilised and since he is an old man and has only daughters he could 
not do it himself. Bwana Adi spent a great deal of time and money 
planting the land with trees - coconut, mango and cashew nut. Some 
say that the quarrels between Mwanakimwenye and Bwana Adi came to a 
head because Bwana Adi thought he was being used by the old man. When 
Bwana Adi divorced Mwanakimwenye her father demanded back the piece of 
land on which Bwana Adi had spent so much time, and which was just 
beginning to produce. In lieu of the land Bwana Adi gave the old man 
the water tank, from which he now derives a moderate but regular income. 
(The water is rain water, fresher than well water, and is sold for 
drinking).
Relatives of Mwanakimwenye explained her father’s eagerness to 
marry her to a mehumwa by saying it was the man’s wealth which over­
whelmed him. The woman herself, interestingly enough, was the only 
Sharif to ridicule the idea that Sharifs must marry endogamously. "We 
don’t have to marry Sharifs”, she said. ‘’If we like someone we marry 
him”. Mwanakimwenye has since been married to her FFBDS (a Sharif) 
but this marriage, though it produced one child, was short lived*
This, to my knowledge, is the only case which has ever occurred 
in Tundwa of a Sharif woman marrying a mchumwa man. As can be seen,
several of the factors I mentioned above are relevant here. This was
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not a first marriage. Mwanakimwenye was first married to a man from 
her own clan, and after having been divorced from him was free to 
choose her own spouse. But in this case her father actively approved 
of her choice and primarily because of the wealth of Bwana Adi. The 
other feature which is significant here is that Bwana Adi came from 
Rasini, not Tundwa. It seems to be the case that the rules are less 
shamefully and obviously broken if the man is a stranger, rather than 
one who is unequivocally familiar as a member of a lower stratum. It 
is of interest that Bwana Adi subsequently married another Tundwa woman, 
this time of the Waungwana category (i.e. another hypogamous marriage).
He later divorced her too and returned to Rasini.
Case 3* Time : circa 1952 to present
Mwana Amina *K*, a mwungwana woman, has ,!no father” (i.e. she 
is illegitimate) although she uses as her second name the name of what 
she claims to be her ’clan*. It is derided as non-existent by others. 
She is an elderly woman, well past child bearing, and as far as is 
known, has never borne a child. She spent several years in Mombasa 
working as a prostitute and is believed to have earned quite large sums 
of money there. She is also rumoured to have pocketed for herself 
quite large sums of money collected for a dance society which operated 
in the town about fifteen to twenty years ago. She bought a piece of 
land, which though not very large, is fairly profitable. Women in 
Tundwa do not cultivate their own land and have to rely on male help - 
a son, husband or labourer - the latter being the most expensive method. 
Mwana Amina had no sons but she married Bwaheri, a mchumwa man with no 
land. Bwaheri now cultivates her land and they live in a house owned 
by Mwana Amina, situated in a location of the town where wachumwa 
cluster.
In many ways this case contrasts with the previous one, but 
like Mwanakimwenye, Mwana Amina was making her own choice very definitely
here - her mother is dead and she has no father. Bwaheri was not
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wealthy, "but he can provide an income for them both by working Mwana 
Amina* s land, I may of course be jumping to conclusions about the 
reasons why Mwana Amina was prepared to marry a mchumwa, but it is 
certainly true that, once having done so, the arrangement is advantageous 
for both of them. The fact that she was a prostitute is also signifi­
cant, As I have already pointed out, prostitution is fairly common, 
but attitudes of men towards it are somewhat ambivalent. A man who 
is considering marriage is likely to think twice before marrying a 
known prostitute, since such a woman cannot be relied upon not to 
practise her occupation even whilst married. Such a woman therefore 
has a low status as a possible marriage partner, though not necessarily 
in other contexts. In the case of Mwana Amina this may have been one 
reason why she did not marry a mwungwana man. On.the other hand, as 
a prostitute she was likely to have had contacts amongst men of all 
strata and thereby be more easily able to contract a marriage across 
strata lines. But in addition Mwana Amina was well past child-bearing 
and in normal circumstances would no longer be of interest as a spouse. 
Since she has no children or other close relatives to support her, this 
would put her in a difficult position which would worsen as she became 
older. Mwana Amina had other assets however, whether earned lawfully 
or not, and as such was a good proposition. By marrying a man of 
inferior status, who incidentally also had no living close relatives, 
control of the profits from her land was ensured*
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Case 10. Time : 1964?
Buie is the daughter of a mchumwa woman, Javo, and a mwungwana 
man, Yasin. Javo*s sister, Maryam, spent much time in Mombasa as a 
prostitute, returning with a great deal of money. With part of this 
she bought a piece of land. This land was cultivated by her brother 
Ngasho, since Maryam had no sons and no husband at the time. Ngasho 
it is said, later appropriated the land for himself (though he gives 
Maryam some of the produce), making him one of the richest wachumwa 
in the village. He married a woman, Fatima, who had a grown-up son, 
Ali, by a previous marriage. (Both Fatima and her son were wachumwa). 
Ali then helped his step-father to cultivate the land. It is Ali to
providing a bridge for others to cross. Bulefs mother is a mchumwa 
and Buie has close contacts with her mother*s relatives. She is a 
young woman, but must have been previously married (since she is said 
to be a prostitute), but unfortunately I do not have details of her 
previous spouse or spouses. She has no living child as far as I know. 
Here the income of the man appears to be significant in relation to 
that of the woman, who no longer lives with her parents, but with her 
sister in a house belonging to their mother. The fact that she and 
Ali are not actually married raises interesting questions. It means 
that if Buie ever does bear any children to Ali they will not be legally
said that Buie and Ali have 
never been legally married 
i&rid are just living together 
"It is claimed that Buie was 
a prostitute previous to her 
relationship with Ali. If
>IH Javo Iff
Maryam
whom Buie is married - her 
MBWS. The curious feature 
of this case is that it is 
this were true it would be 
the only, case in the village 
of an unmarried couple living 
together.
This case is a good example of one marriage across strata lines
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his, and they will therefore not he wachumwa either, since as I have 
already mentioned illegitimate children take their stratum membership 
from their mother. Whether this is indeed the reason they are not 
married I cannot say, hut it certainly has advantages for the woman, 
whose children in such a marriage normally lose the descent status 
which she herself has.
What is perhaps surprising in this case is the negative in­
fluence of Bule*s father, Yasin, a mwungwana man still married to Buie's 
mother. Yasin moreover has brothers and sisters who have children to 
whom Buie might conceivably have been married. It is probable that 
as a divorced woman and a prostitute she is beyond the control of her 
father, and possibly not a very desirable spouse. It is also possible 
that as the child of a mchumwa woman Buie was unacceptable to her 
cousins. This sometimes happens as we saw from Case 6.
I have devoted more space to the subject of hypogamy than might 
seem necessary considering that hypogamous marriages make up only 3.2$ 
of the total of all marriages. I have done this however because I 
consider such marriages to be indicative of patterns of social change - 
of a restructuring of wealth differentials, and of a movement away 
from status distinctions based on ascription toviards status based solely 
on achievement. These cases of hypogamy also highlight the fact that 
without the compliance of women a discriminatory pattern of marriage 
choices cannot work. Compliance is required because in Tundwa there 
are no sanctions that men can use against women who break the rules.
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Hypogamy is thus an indication of the status of women, and emphasises 
their freedom to make their own choices.
But at present hypogamy is the exception rather than the rule, 
and in so far as the majority of marriages in Tundwa are endogamous, 
the limit of most people*s kin universe is within the stratum. Never­
theless, since hypergamous and hypogamous marriages also occur, many 
people also have some kin who are of lower or higher stratum than them­
selves. This is more true of the Masherifu, whose small numbers have 
necessitated a higher degree of marrying out than for other strata.
25% of all married Sharifs are married outside their stratum as opposed 
to 11.7% of Waungwana and 21.5% of the Wachumwa. This is the situation 
at present. In other words there are no sharp discontinuities between 
the kinship network of one stratum and that of another - it is rather 
that the number of kin linkages across the strata is far less than 
those within it. But these linkages may themselves acquire a special 
significance, as we shall see in Part II of this thesis.
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V. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STRATIFICATION
In the previous chapter I have shown that the vast majority 
of men and women in Tundwa still prefer to marry within their own 
stratum. In this chapter I want to substantiate the argument that 
the on-going pattern of marriage choices indicates more than simply 
a carry-over of old attitudes, however strongly entrenched, I shall 
show that by and large economic realities support the social framework 
of stratification, and that this reflects itself in the power structure 
of the village, I would think that unless this were so the pattern 
of marriage choices would long since have broken down, I shall show 
that wealth differentials in Tundwa today not only reflect the 
differences between the strata, but that these differentials give the 
two higher strata a measure of economic control over the ex-slaves.
The material also shows however that no stratum is an undifferentiated 
economic category, and this reflects itself in political divisions, 
especially amongst the largest category, the Waungwana.
YJealth and stratification
Wealth differentials in Tundwa today have their origins in 
the institution of slavery. Prior to the abolition of slavery no 
slave could own land since he was simply a chattel of his master. He 
had to work either on the mashamba in the island or in the cultivation 
of annual crops on the mainland, A few slaves were also occupied in 
fishing or in mangrove-cutting. Those Waungwana who owned slaves
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were thereby free to engage in other activities * They traded ivory 
and slaves to passing Arabian dhows and they occupied themselves in 
religious learning. The Masherifu, like other free men, were also 
rich in slaves and land* According to some Waungwana the Masherifu 
came to the area in the first place as traders, and this is said to 
be the way in which they built up their wealth.
Little or nothing is known of the intervening period between 
the abolition of slavery and the present* Some ex-slaves left to 
work in Mombasa or other places, and a few made enough money to buy 
land on their return. Others cultivated annual crops on the common 
land or carried out their traditional occupations of fishing and man­
grove—cutting. The present structure of wealth differentials in 
Tundwa should show us the extent to which the Wachumwa have been able 
to rise from their previous status as chattels. It will also indi­
cate the extent to which the Masherifu are in a superior economic 
position to other free men.
The most crucial factor in assessing the economic status of 
the various strata in Tundwa today is the factor of capital - and in 
particular, land. As we saw in Chapter II the shamba owners are not 
only the wealthiest members of the community but they also have economic 
security. Furthermore the wealthiest amongst them are people who can 
turn their wealth into economic power over others. Obviously there­
fore it is important to see how wealth in mashamba is distributed 
throughout the community* I shall ignore here the nineteen women who
1• The Sharifs have their own, quite different explanation of why they 
oame to the area as we shall see in the following chapter.
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own mashamba since they make no significant difference to the pattern 
(three of them are Masherifu, fourteen Waungwana and two Wachumwa)* 
The table below gives the relevant data*
Table 12. Mashamba ownership and strata membership
Column 1 2 I 4 5 6
Social category
Total
Adult
Males
Shamba
Number
Owners
fc O f
Total
Males
Total Acreage 
Land Owned
/  Of
Total
Acreage
Average
acreage
per
owner
I Masherifu 24 10 42/ 122*9 acres 23.4/0 12.3 acres
II Waungwana 175 62 35/ 331.2 acres 62.6/ 5*3 acres
III Wachumwa 77 15 19.59& 74*4 acres 14 fo 4*9 acres
Totals 276 87 - 528.5 acres 100 f
The third column shows that the proportion of men in each strata 
owning land rises as we go up the social hierarchy* The fifth column 
makes sense when we consider that of the 87 shamba owners, the Masherifu 
are only 11*7$ but they own 23*4$ of the land* 7-1*2$ of the owners 
are Waungwana, but they own only 62,6$ of the land. And 17*2$ of the 
owners are Wachumwa, but they own only 14$* This contrast is em­
phasised if we consider the sixth column which shows that the average 
amount of land owned by each man varies according to his stratum and 
that the Masherifu owners are better off than the Waungwana and so on. 
This does not mean however that all Masherifu owners are better off 
than all Waungwana owners, and all Waungwana owners than Wachumwa
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owiers. The range of wealth in land of the owners in each stratum 
is shown in the following table.
Table 13* Range of wealth in land related to strata membership
Size of shamba Masherifu Waungwana
Wachumwa Total
Number * Number d?i° Number 1o Number
A1. over 12 acres 2 2 afo 4 6.5/ — — 6
A2. 9-12 acres — - 6 9*6/ 3 20J6 9
A3. 6-9 acres 5 5dfc 13 21 % 3 20fo 21
M .  3-6 acres 2 20j, 22 4 26.7/o 28
A5. 1-3 acres - - 14 22 .6/ 3 2 afo 17
A6. below 1 acre 1 10/ 3 4.856 2 13.3/ 6
Total 10 100$ 62 100 / 15 100 / 87
As the table shows there are proportionately more Masherifu
owners in the higher categories than there are Waungwana or Wachumwa, 
and fewer in the lower categories. In other words proportionately 
more Sharifs own larger amounts of land and proportionately fewer own 
smaller amounts of land. And there is a similar though not so marked 
difference between the Waungwana and the Wachumwa.
In addition however the two richest men in the village are to 
be found amongst the Masherifu. These two men between them own eighty 
acres of land. There are also four Waungwana owning large amounts of 
land. Between them they own 61.6 acres of land. This is very im­
portant because these men have either surplus land or surplus income 
which they can re-distribute. And as we have seen, such redistribution
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creates ties of economic dependency* There are no Wachumwa in the 
wealthiest category of shamba owners.
Thus we find that the surplus land of the Masherifu and 
Waungwana is redistributed to relatives within the stratum. 17$
(4 men) of Masherifu adult males are cultivating the land of a relative, 
as opposed to 6.3$ (11 men) of the Waungwana and only 2.5$ (2 men) of 
the Wachumwa. We also find that the surplus income derived from land 
by the two higher strata is used for other activities. Thus, out 
of the twelve principal money lenders in Tundwa, two are Masherifu, 
nine are Waungwana and only one is a mchumwa. Six of the seven shop­
keepers are Waungwana and the seventh is a Sharif.
The ownership of capital then varies proportionately with 
stratum membership, the higher categories owning a higher proportion 
than the lower categories. The consequence of this unequal distribu­
tion of wealth is an unequal distribution of economic control over 
others. I shall return to this point shortly.
Mahonde cultivation
If we take the mashamba owners together with the mashamba users 
we find that 59$ of the Masherifu are engaged in mashamba cultivation 
compared with 41$ of the Waungwana and only 22$ of the Wachumwa. The 
Masherifu thus have the highest proportion of men in the greatest 
income producing occupation whilst the Wachumwa have the least. We 
might therefore expect that the Wachumwa, who collectively own the 
least land, would make up for this by cultivating on the common land.
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This however does not seem to he the case since there are proportion­
ately fewer Wachumwa honde cultivators than there are men from other 
strata* Instead the Wachumwa are carrying out other occupations as 
an alternative to mahonde cultivation as can he seen from the following 
tahle.
Tahle 14* Occupational Breakdown of Adult Male Population in relation
to stratum membership
Occupation Masherifu
----------------------------------
Waungwana
1
Wachumwa
I
Totals
Number 1o Number $ Number $ Number $.
Mashamba
owners 10 A2fa 62 35$ 15 19.5$ 87 31.5$
Mashamba
users 4 Mi 11 6.3$ 2 2.5$ 17 6.2$
Mahonde
cultivators 7 29$ 48 28 $ 20 26 $ 75 27.1$
Agricultural
labour
a* Help to kin 
b. For employer
1 Ai 14
8
8 f 
4.5$
7
8
9.1$
10.5$
22
16
I
CO
[ 
*
CO 
LT\
Fishermen - ~ 3 1.7 fo 11 14.2$ 14 5.1 $
Other occupa­
tions or no 
work
2 % 29 16.5$ 14 18.2$ 45 16.3$
Total 24 100$ 175 100 fo 77 100 f 276 100 $
Why is it that there are not more Wachumwa cultivating mahonde,
since after all this was their traditional occupation? As we saw in 
Chapter II, a man needs more than land in order to cultivate* He also 
needs cash, and this may come from one of three sources - from his 
savings, from his father or from a money lender* Very few mahonde
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cultivators have savings so this is the least likely of all sources 
of cash* Some mahonde cultivators are however the sons of shamba 
owners from whom they will eventually inherit. If the fathers of 
such men have a large enough amount of land they may lend their sons 
enough cash in order to cultivate, and such a loan would be without 
interest. It is of considerable importance then that all but one of 
the seven Sharif mahonde cultivators are the sons of shamba owners 
(85-7%)» whereas only 16.6% of the Waungwana (eight men), and only 1C)% 
of the Wachumwa (two men) are in a similar position.
A man whose father cannot or will not lend him money and who 
has no savings, is forced to turn to a money-lender. And as we saw
in Chapter II the dependence of the mahonde cultivator on the money- 
lender is almost complete, since he takes a loan to cover his expenses 
for a whole year and often carries over his debts from one year to the 
next. And whereas only three (32%) of the Masherifu honde cultivators 
are debtors, 85% (41 men) of the Waungwana, and 95% (19 men) of the 
Wachumwa honde cultivators need loans in order to cultivate. Since 
all but one of the money-lenders are Masherifu or Waungwana this means 
that an ex-slave man wishing to cultivate must put himself into debt 
to men who were once his former masters. (The only mchumwa money­
lender is a fisherman who lends money almost exclusively to other fisher­
men). The extent of the interest charged by money-lenders makes this 
form of indebtedness a condition very similar to slavery.
There are then two possible explanations for the fact that not
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many Wachumwa cultivate mahonde» One is that the Wachumwa themselves
do not wish to enter into a relationship of complete dependence on 
Waungwana money-lenders, and instead prefer to carry out other occupa­
tions which provide a ready cash income and do not involve such depend­
ence. Two points must he made here however. The first is that the 
other occupations open to Wachumwa, such as fishing (in which a large 
group of them is occupied), or mangrove-cutting, or agricultural labour 
for an unrelated employer, are all occupations considered to be menial 
and low. In carrying them out the Wachumwa merely confirm the already 
existing Waungwana stereotype of them as inferior people. The second 
point that must be made is that there are many Wachumwa other than 
honde cultivators who go to money-lenders for smaller loans. 49*1$ 
of the other Wachumwa take loans from Waungwana money-lenders from 
time to time, as opposed to 44*3$ of the Waungwana and 29*4$ of the 
Masherifu. Loans of this kind do not however involve complete depend­
ence on a money-lender, since they are either small loans, or they 
are backed by the surety of a shamba.
There is another possible explanation of why more Wachumwa
do not cultivate mahonde. It may be that Waungwana and Masherifu
money-lenders are not prepared to finance them to the extent that
would allow them to cultivate, or to put it in another way, that since
their funds are limited they would prefer to support men of their own
strata. The reason for this may be that the Wachumwa are considered
untrustworthy or that they have fewer links with money-lenders — for
1. It will be noted from Table 3 that there are three Waungwana fisher­
men. It is consequent with the attitudes towards this occupation 
that all three of these men work in other villages, not in Tundwa.
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example through kinship or friendship - by which means the money­
lenders may be persuaded to lend large sums of money. In addition 
the Wachumwa as a category do not have enough capital to provide back­
ing for large loans.
Income distribution
The unequal distribution of capital in Tundwa is reflected in 
an unequal distribution of income between members of the three strata.
The average Sharif earns about £200 a year, whereas the average 
mwungwana earns £135 and the average mchumwa only £95- There are no 
very rich Wachumwa men and very few poor Sharifs. The Waungwana
represent an intermediate group since they have proportionately fewer 
very rich men than the Sharifs, and proportionately fewer very poor men 
than the Wachumwa, This is shown in more detail in the following table.
Table 15* Income Distribution related to strata membership (all adult
males)^
Income Category
Masherifu Waungwana Wachumwa 1 Total
Number 1o Numbei $ Number * Numbei $
It, over £600 p,a. 3 12.5$ 8 4*5$ - - 11 4 $
12. £450-£600 p.a. 2 8.5$ 7 4 $ 1 1.5$ 10 3.5$
13. £300-£450 p.a. 3 12.5$ 18 10.5$ 8 10.5$ 29 10.5$
14* £150-£300 p.a. 6 25 $ , 37 21 $ 12 15.5$ 55 20 $
15* £50“£150 p,a. 6 25 $ 48 27.5$ 25 32.5$ 79 28.5$
16. below £50 p.a. 4 16.5$ 57 32.5$ 31
 ^
; 
o 92 33.5$
Total 24 100 $ 175 '100 $ 77 100 fo 276 100$
1. For the method of construction of this table see Chapter II, p,56 “7*
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In spite of considerable differences between the income distri­
bution patterns of each stratum, it is clear that the strata are not 
homogeneous economic categories. This however we could hardly expect, 
since in discussing the strata we are dealing not with corporate groups 
in which wealth is held jointly, but with social categories whose 
members are individual producers. That wealth and income differentials 
do to some extent coincide with strata differences today is an indica­
tion of the influence of past wealth patterns. It is not an indication 
of corporate sharing of property or income. Nevertheless the 
differences between the strata are distinctive enough first to back up 
the traditional pattern of marriage choices and secondly to underpin 
the ideology of the stratification system. This last factor is 
further heightened by the disposition of occupations, with the Wachumwa 
carrying out the jobs considered menial and low by others. Not only 
this, but it is through marriage and inheritance patterns that these 
wealth differentials are maintained. In so far as endogamy is 
practised by the vast majority, wealth stays within the strata. In 
any marriage across strata lines (whether hypergamous or hypogamous) 
it is the property of women, not that of men, which is inherited 
across strata lines. The property of men always stays within the 
stratum because the rule of patrilineal inheritance ensures that a 
man*s children, his main heirs, belong to the same stratum as himself. 
This fact is significant because a woman inherits only half the share 
of an equivalent male heir, and so the amount of property crossing
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strata lines through marriage and inheritance is minimised*
The significance of these wealth and income differentials is 
mainly that they allow men of the two higher strata t6 exercise 
economic control over men of the ex-slave stratum. It is Masherifu 
and Waungwana rather than Wachumwa who have surplus land which they 
require labour in order to cultivate. Some of this labour may come 
from poor Waungwana men whilst the rest comes from Wachumwa labourers. 
Ties of this sort may not be very long lasting however since many 
labourers are young men who will later begin to cultivate for them­
selves. In addition most of them are not tied to a permanent employer 
but work casually for different employers at different times.
Ties of indebtedness however are more binding, and most Wachumwa 
need to rely on a money-lender at one time or another. If they are 
fishermen they can go to the only mchumwa money-lender. He is not a 
very rich man however and cannot lend very large amounts of money.
Nor does he lend money for cultivation. Wachumwa borrowers are there­
fore forced to go either to Waungwana or Masherifu money-lenders.
Poor Waungwana men are in a similar position. Ties of indebtedness 
thus link rich Masherifu with poor Waungwana and Wachumwa, and they 
link rich Waungwana with poorer members of their own stratum as well 
as with poor Wachumwa.
The difference between the poorer Waungwana and most of the 
Wachumwa is not very great in purely economic terms. They are people
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who either have no capital and are completely dependent on money­
lenders, or they are people who own such small pieces of land that 
they can barely provide a subsistence for themselves and their families* 
What intermarriage there is between the free-born and the ex-slaves 
nearly always involves poor Waungwana families,as we saw in the previous 
chapter. The difference between the two categories is more a matter 
of social status than of economic differences. But it does have 
important political consequences since the ex-slaves will always ally 
themselves with factions of the poorer Waungwana against the rich 
Waungwana. I shall return to this point in Chapter VIII. It seems 
probable that wealth differences within the Waungwana stratum are of 
long standing. I pointed out in an earlier Chapter that men who own 
shambas tend to marry the sisters or daughters of other shamba owners. 
Many of these men were the slave owners of the past, and their exist­
ence as a wealthy minority has been perpetuated by intermarriage. The 
poor Waungwana today are probably those who owned no slaves in the past 
and had to cultivate annual crops for themselves on the mainland along­
side the slaves. Today many of them are tied to Waungwana money­
lenders or employers, and in this way they resemble the ex-slaves who 
are even more dependent on rich Waungwana. But for the poor Waungwana 
these ties do not have implications of a past social system as they do 
for the ex-slaves.
For some older Wachumwa moreover this system is not entirely 
defunct. They still feel themselves fattached1 to their old masters
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and are prepared and willing to help them on various occasions. Such 
help may he limited to small services such as fetching water for those 
who are in mourning, or it may he more extensive as the following 
cases will show.
Case 11. Time : 19&5
Duri is an old woman, perhaps ahout seventy years old. She 
has no known father and is prohahly illegitimate* She has no known 
relatives. Originally she was the slave of an old mwungwana man.
Whilst she was still a slave he married her, hut she never hore any 
children. lie divorced her many years ago. Until now however she 
cooks for him and looks after him, spending half of each day in his 
house. In return she is given food and help in times of need.
After slavery was abolished, most Wachumwa broke off their ties 
with their former masters. As this case indicates however some Wachumwa 
could not afford to break them off. This applied particularly perhaps 
to slave women without relatives who depended on their masters for a 
living. To continue as if slavery were still an on-going institution 
was for them a way of achieving social security. Such attitudes are 
not openly expressed however and some excuse will usually he made to 
explain the behaviour of the ex-slave - that he or she is a 1 friend1, 
a 'relative1 or a neighbour*
Case 12. Time : April-October 1965
Mwajuma was a very old mchumwa woman - some said she was over 
a hundred. One day she fell in her house and hurt her leg. She was 
taken to the house of a mwungwana woman called Mwana Shale. Mwana 
Shale had been brought up by Mwajuma as a child and called her mame 
(mother). Mwana Shale nursed Mwajuma for three and a half months but 
the old lady eventually contracted pneumonia(?) and died in July 1965*
It was only during the course of her funeral, and as a result of several 
unusual occurrences that I eventually discovered that Mwajuma had been 
a slave.
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The funeral took place from Mwana Shale*s house. The number 
of women who turned up was exceptional considering that Mwajuma had 
no known relatives in the village. (i later learnt that her children 
and grandchildren were all in Mkunumbwi, a village on the mainland 
about seventy miles away). It was also exceptional in that Mwajuma 
being very old and having been ill for so long, her death was a surprise 
to no-one. I only once saw more women attend a funeral and that was 
of a young woman who had died suddenly after the birth of twins. The 
reason for these large numbers was partly the popularity of Mwana Shale 
and other persons involved and partly I suspect, the fact that Mwajuma*s 
death represented for Waungwana the symbolic passing of an old order.
Three women were involved in washing the corpse and preparing 
it for burial. These were a Sharif woman, Mwanakimwenye, and two 
Waungwana women, Nase and Tima. Later I discovered that all these 
people were related to Mwana Shale (they were her MED, her MMZD and 
her MEBDD respectively — see genealogy). But more important, two of 
these women were related to her with respect to the original ownership 
of Mwajuma.
During the washing and binding of the corpse, when the whole 
house was full of sobbing women, an old man entered and began to mourn 
loudly for Mwajuma. Now the only men who are supposed to enter a 
house where women are mourning are the two who come to fetch the body 
for burial. Except for this occasion I never saw another man enter 
in this way, and for a man to mourn in this way, like a woman, was 
unheard of. The man was Sharif Idarus, father of the Mwanakimwenye
kHusband 2
6
Nase
4Husband 1
Mkuu Husband 1 ^Shari f d^Hus band2
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mentioned above. He was over eighty and one of the oldest men in 
the village. Normally he never left his house, so the incident was 
also exceptional in this sense.
14 6
Outside the men of the village were gathering to take the 
body for burial, and to read the funeral prayers, led by the Sheikh 
of the village, Mzee, a mwungwana man (see genealogy), was organis­
ing the funeral and I later heard that he had paid for nearly all the 
expenses - at a cost of altogether about 115/“*«
Why were all these Waungwana and Masherifu involved in the 
death of a slave? The reason later emerged* Originally Mwajuma 
was the property of Sharif M. (see genealogy), Sharif M* married a 
mwungwana woman, Mkuu, and as part of the wedding presents he gave 
her Mwajuma, After bearing Sharif M a son - Idarus - Mkuu was left 
a widow. Later she married a second husband (a mwungwana) to whom 
she bore a son - Mzee, Later still she married a third husband, also 
a mwungwana, to whom she bore a daughter - Tiya* Tiya and Mzee are 
now middle-agedf I do not know when Mkuu died, but it was almost 
certainly after the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless I was told 
that her children 1 inherited1 Mwajuma (walimurithi)t who had almost 
certainly helped to bring them up, Tiya later went to Mombasa - 
where she still lives - and there she bore an illegitimate child - 
Mwana Shale, This child she brought back to Tundwa, where, until 
her marriage she was looked after by Mwajuma. When Mwajuma was 
beginning to get old she went to Mzee, son of her previous mistress, 
and pledged her house to him on the understanding that he would meet 
all the expenses of her funeral when she died. This he did, and 
took over her house afterwards. This was a good bargain as far as 
he was concerned, for three months later he sold the house for 400/~ 
to the son-in-law of Mwana Shale. Mwana Slale’s daughter and her hus­
band moved into the house in the following year.
This case is interesting because it shows that the ties which 
used to bind together master and slave are still operative - though 
on a completely different level. In other words Mwajuma*s funeral 
was not that which a slave would have received before abolition - 
when, we are told, the corpses of slaves were simply thrown into the 
waste ground near the village. In particular a striking reversal 
of roles is seen in the fact that whereas traditionally, washing 
corpses was a job done by slaves only, in this case the corpse of an 
ex-slave was washed by three free born women. But nearly all the 
people involved x^ ere involved simply because Mwajuma had been the slave
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of Mkuu, It is interesting however that the actors did not explain 
their "behaviour to me in these terms, Since they could not openly 
state that Mwajuma was a slave (this explanation was given to me secretly 
by others) they said that Mwajuma was one of their jamaa — that is, a 
friend or a distant relative.
This case brings to light several points. Mwajuma became the 
property of a mwungwana woman, Mkuu, as a result of a hypergamous 
marriage. But Mkuu later made two endogamous marriagesr Mkuu's kin­
ship linkages thus cut across the lines of stratification. The set 
of people which was activated on the death of Mwajuma was really Mkuu's 
kinship set, to which Mwajuma was 'attached1 by virtue of being Mkuu's 
slave. That it was Mkuu's set rather than Mwana Shale's is indicated 
by the fact that when, later in the year, Mwana Shale's brother died, 
only a few of these people were involved, and many others were involved 
who were not involved here.
Perhaps the most important point which emerges from this case 
is that Mwajuma*s behaviour - a life-long and loyal service to her 
former masters - was a form of social security which brought dividends.
It ensured her help in times of need and the reassurance that her 
funeral would be properly conducted, What I am suggesting is that 
for some Wachumwa it is advantageous to continue as if the old system, 
in which slaves were totally dependent on their masters, still operated* 
It is advantageous because, in the absence of other forms of social 
security, it provides support in times of need. This is obviously true
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for the old (to whom the system obviously means more, since they were 
horn under it), and for those who have no relatives of their own* 
Waungwana for their part foster such ties. They do not refer to these 
people as their 1 slaves1 and they give them help when necessary. Such 
ties are useful in the recruitment of political support.
Young people in the ex-slave category however are not prepared 
to accept such ties of past subservience. Many Wachumwa living today 
have been born since slavery was abolished, and to them the pattern of 
submissive relations which it suggests is anathema. They will not 
accept to be called Wachumwa, nor will they help their former masters, 
Mwajuma*s death was therefore inevitably seen as symbolic to the 
Waungwana and Masherifu - she represented a system of social relations 
which has almost disappeared.
Mobility and change
Mobility is theoretically impossible in this system of stratifi­
cation since a person’s status is determined solely by reference to 
his descent and not by reference to any other factor* Marriage across 
strata lines may raise or lower the prestige of a person within his own 
stratum (depending on the status of the spouse) but it cannot affect 
his status in the stratification system, A mchumwa man who flouts 
the rules and marries a mwungwana woman does not himself thereby be­
come a mwungwana, Through such a marriage he may raise his prestige 
within the ex-slave stratum, but his children will be ex-slaves like 
himself.
On the other hand stratification is not the only status framework
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in Tundwa* A man can also achieve wealth in an economic system 
which is essentially Based on individual enterprise* I have shown 
in this chapter that wealth differentials today largely reinforce the 
stratification system* But the patterns are Beginning to change.
There are some Wachumwa who have earned enough, from fishing, labour 
migration or some other occupation to Buy land, even though most of 
them are not large land-owners and are a minority compared with other 
Wachumwa* These men have raised their economic status* But economic 
status cannot Be translated into status within the stratification 
system. Nor have the few rich Wachumwa married into Waungwana families 
of equivalent economic status. They are all married to other Wachumwa 
women. Thus not only are wealth differentials in Tundwa weighted 
against the Wachumwa, But even those who achieve wealth cannot use it 
for raising their status in the stratification system*
Alternatively it is open to an ex-slave man to leave Tundwa 
altogether and migrate to MomBasa. But this is not an escape from 
the stratification system. In MomBasa the migrant needs the help 
of fellow Bajunis in order to get a job and to find a place to live.
And if he marries a fellow Bajuni in MomBasa (and the vast majority 
do) he is more or less forced to marry someone of the same stratum as 
himself. 83$ of married migrants are married endogamously.
With this in mind it is of interest to compare the migration 
patterns of men in different strata (see table 16 Below)* As can 
Be seen there are proportionately more Wachumwa men in Tundwa today
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who have had migration experience in the past than there are men from 
other strata*
Table 16. Migration patterns past and present, related to stratum
Social stratum Adult male population of Tundwa
Past migrants 
(in Tundwa now)
Migrants 
away now
Number °/o of total 
adult males
Masherifu 24 8 33* 3% 10
Waungwana 175 45 25.7/0 131
Wachumwa 77 27 35 % 31
Total | 276 80 - 172
This evidence does not necessarily indicate that there x^ rere actually 
more ex-slave men than Sharifs or Waungwana migrating in the past. It 
merely shows how many ex-slave men have returned from Mombasa - and 
this could indicate that Wachumwa men are actually less successful in 
Mombasa than men from other strata - otherwise they would have stayed 
there instead of returning. Figures of migrants away at present seem 
to support this conclusion - the Wachumwa seem to migrate proportionately 
less than men of other strata, not more. The reasons for this are pro­
bably complex - difficulty in getting together the small initial capital 
required for the journey, lack of an effective network in Mombasa for 
getting jobs, and the realisation that even in Mombasa there is no 
escape from their inferior status. On the whole then the Wachumwa 
have not resorted to migration in large numbers. But a few of them 
have returned wealthy enough to buy land. Four of the returned Wachumwa
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migrants are shamba owners and three more have bought fishing boats*
In this context the following case history is of great interest 
because it traces the achievement of wealth by one mchumwa man back 
to the period just after abolition*
Case 13
About forty years ago, Diki, a man of the ex-slave category, 
went to Zanzibar to work as a fisherman* He stayed there for several 
years, eventually returning to Tundwa with a few meagre savings* At 
that period shamba land on Paza island was both plentiful and cheap* 
There were two reasons for this. First was the fact that many men 
were leaving for Mombasa to find work. The other was that at that 
time the market for annual crops such as maize was better than that for 
the fruits of the shambas. This was the time when mainland agriculture 
was possible and the soil there was fertile and gave large yields*
Diki was therefore able to buy cheaply a shamba of seven acres which 
had practically reverted to bush* Diki was married to an ex-slave 
woman called Inyakame, who bore him four sons. When Diki died two 
of his children were still quite young, a third had left for Malindi 
to work as a fisherman there and the fourth was a fisherman in Tundwa. 
None of them wanted the almost derelict shamba which Diki had barely 
begun to plant and which required the patient work of many years in 
order to make it productive. Inyakame could not afford to have it 
cultivated herself, so, keeping one-third of it to be cultivated by 
one of her young sons, she gave away the rest to her younger brother, 
Malcka. Inyakame had helped to bring up Makka after their parents 
had died, and she had maintained him itfhilst he attended Koran school 
for several years. Makka was thus more learned than most Wachumwa 
and he had set up a Koran school, the only ex-slave ever to do so*
With the income he earned from this, together with money which he 
borrowed, he was able to maintain himself whilst he planted the shamba 
with trees. Eventually the shamba began to bring in a small profit 
and with the proceeds Makka bought another shamba of 4*8 acres* As 
a moderately wealthy man and a Koran school teacher Makka is outstand­
ing amongst the ex-slaves and by 19&5 had become a minor political 
leader in Tundwa* He was also one of the only two polygamous men in 
Tundwa, having married concurrently two ex-slave women*
This case is indicative of more than the achievement of wealth 
by one ex-slave. It also shows that although Makka has not been able 
to convert his wealth into status in the stratification system (both 
his wives are ex-slaves) he has been able, as a result of his wealth,
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to achieve a political and religious status irrespective of his 
descent status, The contrast here is between descent status which 
is essentially ascriptive, and wealth or political and religious status 
which are essentially achieved. In general however a person*s ascrip­
tive status tends to delimit his ability to achieve status in any other 
way, and although the patterns are beginning to change, Makka*s case 
is at present rather the exception that proves the rule. In addition 
there is another dimension to Makka*s role as a minor political leader* 
Whilst his wealth and religious learning explain why he, rather than 
another ex-slave, should be playing this role, it is his descent status 
that makes him politically significant in the context of the whole 
village. He is politically important because, with him as an ally, a 
free-born political leader can gain the support of many of the other 
Wachumwa,
Political power is not simply a reflection of wealth differen­
tials in Tundwa - it also has much to do with the people*s awareness 
of belonging to a stratified society, and with the relative numbers of 
the three strata. As we shall see in Chapter VIII all the important 
political and administrative positions in Tundwa are held by Waungwana, 
Although such roles are not intrinsically tied to descent status no 
member of any other stratum has been able to challenge the Waungwana 
monopoly of political leadership in Tundwa. In spite of the wealth 
and superior descent status of the Masherifu, no Sharif has ever been 
able to gain an important political position in the town. Similarly
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no mchumwa - other than Makka, who plays only a minor political role - 
has ever gained such a position. The reasons for the political pre­
dominance of the Waungwana are complex and will be discussed at length 
in Chapter VIII, Here I simply want to make the point that although 
roles of political leadership are achieved, not ascribed, a person*s 
chances of gaining such a role are largely dependent upon his having 
been born into the Waungwana stratum.
One can make a similar point about religious roles, and again 
Makka is the exception that proves the rule, A man who is pious 
and religiously learned is highly respected in the town. Piety and 
religious learning moreover are not something a man is born with; 
they have to be achieved. Thus the pursuit of religious learning 
may enable a man to achieve status irrespective of his ascriptive 
position - as it did Makka, With the exception of Makka however all 
the religious roles in Tundwa are occupied by Waungwana. One might 
have expected the Masherifu, with their superior descent and link with 
the Prophet to have been dominant in the religious field. But the 
Sharifs have been able to play only a minor religious role in Tundwa 
(and this holds true for other Bajuni villages too). And if the 
Sharifs, with their high social status, are unable to control religious 
activity in the town, the Wachumwa are even less influential.
Although everyone in Tundwa is nominally a Muslim, not all 
attend mosque regularly. It is more usual to find men of the Masherifu 
or Waungwana stratum frequenting the mosques than it is to find Wachumwa.
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The siting of Tundwa*s four mosques - the Friday mosque, two other 
old mosques and one new mosque - is in itself significant. The Friday 
mosque is right on the edge of the town in a predominantly Waungwana 
and Masherifu location. The two old mosques are also situated in 
Masherifu/Waungwana locations whilst the new mosque (which was built 
in 1966) is in the very centre of the town, but again in a Waungwana 
location. None of the predominantly Wachumwa locations has a mosque.
Not only are those who regularly attend mosque mainly men 
from the two higher strata, but they are also generally the most wealthy 
amongst them rather than the poor. There is a direct connection 
between wealth and piety (and as we have seen, between wealth and 
status in the stratification system). In order to take an active part 
in religious affairs one has to have a modicum of religious knowledge - 
to be able to read and recite the Koran at least. To get this know­
ledge one has to attend a Koran school for a considerable length of 
time and to pay for one*s attendance. In the past only the slave 
owners could afford this luxury. For the poorer Wachumwa today such 
time and money cannot be spared since it is required in order to make 
a living. Thus it is that religious affairs in Tundwa are dominated 
by men of the two higher strata. But there is more to it than wealth, 
since all the religious roles in the town are held, not by Masherifu, 
but by Waungwana* The most important of such roles is that of Sheikh - 
the man who leads prayers and reads the Friday 1 sermon* (hotuba). The 
Sheikh usually has a deputy who can act for him if he should fall ill
The Mudhari mosque in  Tundwa
C h i l d r e n  o f  one o f  Tundwa*s K o ra n  s c h o o ls  
w i t h  th e  s t r i p s  o f  m a t t i n g  w h ic h  t h e y  
sew to g e th e r
or have to he absent for any reason* To some extent these are lucra­
tive roles, since these are the people who generally solemnise marriages, 
read special prayers and conduct funeral services - and for all of these 
they receive fees. Other more minor religious roles are those of the 
muedhin (the man who calls people to prayer at the stated hours), and 
the Koran and madrasa school teachers. Another role, less specifically 
religious, is also of significance here - this is an informal role of 
mosque 1 patron*. Thus the collection of money and organisation of 
work required to repair the Friday mosque was carried out by an old 
and respected - and rich - mwungwana man. One of the other mosques 
was looked after by the Sheikh (until he was ousted and built the new 
mosque), whilst the third old mosque is looked after by two Waungwana 
cousins, leaders of one of Tundwa*s political factions, and also very 
wealthy men. With one exception - that of Makka, the ex-slave Koran 
school teacher - all these religious roles were held in 1965 by Waung­
wana. Most Wachumwa lack even the minimal religious education that 
would be required in order to perform even such minor religious roles 
as those of Koran school teachers. And to be able to qualify for 
such a post as Sheikh one requires a much longer period of study, 
ability to read and write in Arabic script, and some understanding 
of Arabic itself. As I have suggested the inability of the Wachumwa 
to achieve such an education is related to their poverty. Only the 
wealthy can compete for the post of Sheikh - and the wealthy, by and 
large are Waungwana and Masherifu. On the other hand the Masherifu
are the wealthiest stratum in town and yet in 19^5 they held no 
religious role. Why have the Sharifs not been able to gain control 
of even some of these positions? One reason is that before the 
Sharifs ever arrived in Tundwa the role of Sheikh was the preserve of 
a particular Waungwana clan. Three generations ago however one of 
the Masherifu was 1 taught* to read the sermon by the mwungwana in­
cumbent. Since then this Sharif*s son and grandson have both held 
the post of Sheikh or acted as his deputy, though two Sharifs have 
never held the post concurrently. At the same time clans began to 
lose their political significance and the post was open to anyone 
who could gain support. In order to gain support however one had 
to have the backing of the political leaders of the town — and these 
have always been Waungwana. In early 1965 deputy Sheikh was a 
Sharif, grandson of the first Sharif incumbent. He incurred the dis­
pleasure of the leaders of one of the Waungwana factions of the town
and was ousted from the post together with the Sheikh, a mwungwana man
2
who had supported him. The Masherifu therefore, far from controlling 
religious activity in Tundwa are themselves controlled by the Waungwana. 
The Masherifu, after all, form only 7*9% of the population of the town* 
A Sharif can only hold the post of Sheikh therefore if he is supported 
by the Waungwana. He is, as it were, on sufferance. Thus although 
the pursuit of religious learning allows one to achieve status
1. In the following chapter I discuss traditions of the Sharifs* 
historical role.
2. I shall disciiss this case at more length in Chapter VIII.
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independently of one's ascriptive status, there are greater opportuni-
\
ties for the wealthier Waungwana to do this than for the Wachumwa, 
and the religious activities of the Masherifu are closely controlled.
In this chapter I have tried to show that the division of 
the Tundwa people into three ranked strata has important social con­
sequences* At the present time, heing horn into a particular stratum 
affects not only a person’s status in the community, hut it also affects 
many other aspects of his life* It affects his economic position, 
since a man horn into a higher stratum is more likely to inherit 
wealth than a man horn into a lower stratum. He therefore starts 
off with an advantage, even in a society whose economy is individually 
oriented. A person’s stratum status also delimits his choice of a 
marriage partner, as we saw in the previous chapter. And in addition 
a person’s ability to achieve roles of importance in the community 
(such as political or religious roles) is largely dependent upon him 
heing horn into the largest stratum - the Waungwana. At the present 
time there is thus some coincidence between the various frameworks of 
social action. But the ’fit’ is by no means perfect, and political 
action in Tundwa today is largely a reflection of the contradictions 
arising from this.
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VI. THE IMPORTANCE OP IDEOLOGY
l!God created some people superior and others base and nasty'1.
A mwungwana man
In the previous chapters I have shown that stratification in 
Tundwa imposes an overall framework on kinship linkages through the 
process of marriage and on wealth differentials through the process 
of inheritance. I have also shown that wealth differentials are 
utilised t>y wealthy men in order to maintain some economic control 
over poorer men, and that since wealth differentials largely coincide 
with the lines of stratification this in effect means that men in the 
top two strata have some economic hold over the ex-slaves. Further 
than this I have shown that the difference in numbers and wealth of 
the three strata reflects itself both in political control of the 
village, and in religious control of the mosque. But I have also 
pointed out that patterns of wealth are changing. Not only this but 
there have been many changes, both political and economic, in the 
wider society, beginning with the abolition of slavery by the British 
and ending in 1963 with the coming to power in Kenya of an independent 
government which not only preaches equality but is also African. All 
these changes threaten the power and influence of the top two strata. 
Faced with this situation they look back with increasing nostalgia to 
the old days. Nowadays they say, "many things have been destroyed".
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In this chapter I want to outline the historical and ideological 
arguments which are used by the Waungwana and Masherifu both to explain 
and to justify their present position. My argument will he that this
ideology has a two-fold significance. Firstly it supports the status
quo in the village, and this is its manifest and most important func­
tion. In addition however it is a world view which both affects the 
Bajuni's evaluation of events in the outside world and influences 
their reaction towards them. Ideology is thus an organising frame­
work for social action.
The mythology of stratification
There is no myth of the origin of stratification as it exists 
in Tundwa today; there is only an explanation of why there are Waung­
wana and Wachumwa in the world. The difference between the two is 
said to be divinely inspired and to go back to the time of Noah (Nuhu). 
One account states that Noah was given a black son by God as a punish­
ment, and that this son was the first mchumwa. "God created some
people superior and others base and nasty1', said a mwungwana man in
•\
commenting on this explanation. A slightly different version was
1. I do not know from what source the Bajunis derived this story, but 
it is fairly well known on the East African coast. According to 
the Encyclopedia of Islam it comes from Islamic legends and is a 
distortion of the story of Noah in Old Testament writings. In 
Genesis Chapter IX it is recounted that after the ark came to rest 
on dry land Noah planted himself a vineyard. One day he became 
drunk on the wine and fell down in his tent naked. His son, Ham, 
father of Canaan, came and saw his father in this condition. When 
Noah discovered that his son had looked upon him with such dis­
respect he cursed him saying, "Cursed be Canaan; a servant of 
servants shall he be unto his brethren". Chapter X concludes with 
the words ; "by these /the sons of Noah/ were the nations divided 
in the earth after the flood." The Islamic version is different. 
According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, Islamic legends relate that
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given to me by an old Sharif man. He was trying to explain to me 
why the Bajunis are also sometimes called Watikuu. Watikuu he said 
was a name given hy Noah to denote free noble persons with straight 
hair, as opposed to Wachumwa, enslaved persons with frizzy hair. The 
implications of "both these stories is clear - first that God is "being 
enlisted in support of social discrimination and second that social 
differences are heing equated with physical differences. The strati­
fication system is in fact heing given a racial connotation. The 
system was in fact first explained to me in the following terms : "ho 
you not see people here who look like Africans? They are Africans'1.
And whereas the Wachumwa are labelled 'Africans1, the Waungwana claim 
to he 'Arabs'.
One would perhaps expect then that the Waungwana would have 
myths to support an Arabian origin, but this is not entirely the case. 
'History* in fact speaks with many voices and tends to be contradictory. 
One must emphasise however that not all Bajunis are interested in history. 
Some knowledge of traditions is shared by most adults, but as in many 
other societies, it is old men who are most interested in the past 
since in a changing society they have very little stake in the present. 
But in Tundwa, history is also intimately connected with stratification
"Huh /Noah/ also took Adam's body with him /in the Ark/ which was 
used to separate the women from the men. For in the Ark contin­
ence was ordered, for man and for beast. Only Ham transgressed 
and for this was punished with a black skin", (Vol.Ill, Part 2, 
p.948).
1. The literal meaning of Watikuu (equals Wa iti kuu) is '/Peo v±s/ of 
the big country*, but which big country is being referred to is 
uncertain unless it is the land of the eight clans described below. 
The Bajuni dialect is always called Kitikuu.
162
and since it is only the Waungwana and Masherifu who have any stake 
in the continuation of the system, it is only they who 1 remember1 
history and care to recall it.
There is no written history of the Bajunis, only traditions 
which have been handed down by word of mouth from generation to genera­
tion. One source of history is enshrined in what are known as the 
Yave. These are connected series of verses on Bajuni history, 
originally recited annually on the occasion of firing bushland on the 
mainland in preparation for a new season1s cultivation. Three points 
concerning the Yave must be made. First is the fact that they appear 
to be very ancient, being couched in language the meaning of which is 
not always evident even to the Bajuni themselves. Secondly they are 
known by very few people - in Tundwa only one man knew them properly 
and he was a Rasini man married into the village* Nevertheless 
although they themselves are not well known, certain information in 
them is well known. Thirdly, and most important to us here, is the 
fact that they ignore completely the division of the Bajuni into three
1. To some extent this always appears to have been the case since they 
were recited by Waungwana specialists of particular clans who took 
it upon themselves to teach a successor. My Tundwa informant had 
learnt the verses from his father’s brother (Bini Ahmed), a Rasini 
man. An attempt is now being made by Professor Wilfred Whitely to 
collect and translate the Yave. They have been written down by a 
Mombasa man, Yahya Omar, at Bini Ahmed’s dictation, but they have 
not yet been published. The possibility is that the Yave will 
eventually be lost to oral tradition since the annual ceremony at 
which they were recited is no longer held - the reason for this 
being that mainland agriculture is no longer possible (see Chapter II).
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strata and are in fact an account of Waungwana rather than Bajuni 
history# Basically the Vave relate that the Bajuni are descended 
from a man called Juni and a woman called Mwana Talaya. They 
originated it is said, in a town called Shungwaya, in the district1 
of Miuli# Shungwaya was in Somalia. There were ten clans of the 
Bajuni at that time ("the ten of Miuli1')# Eventually they were 
driven out of Shungwaya hy a marauding tribe, the Gallas. They pro­
gressed southwards, where they were joined hy eight other clans ("the
■]
eight of the coast")# When they reached what is now Kenya they 
crossed over onto the island of Faza, God having parted the waters in 
answer to their prayers so that they could cross over safely. Once 
on the island they huilt the various villages, the first heing Tundwa,
In general circulation this story has become somewhat distorted, 
Miuli is indeed often stated to he the Bajunis* original homeland, hut 
it is said to he situated near Madina ("in the Yemen")I Yet other 
people assert that certain Waungwana clans originated in Egypt or 
Syria (Misri and Sham). One clan for example - the Rasmali - are
said to he descendents of the Prophet Solomon (Rasuli Suleiman). Old
men say that the ancestors of these clans journeyed from Arabia and 
came to Africa where they intermarried with local people and became 
many# In particular, no-one asserts, as the Vave state, that the
Bajunis have one origin; the story is rather that they have several.
1. The land cultivated hy the Bajunis on the mainland opposite the 
island is known as "the land of the eight" (iti za nane). The 
Vave begin with the lines : "In the name of Allah let us tell/ To 
God let us pray/ The Creator of beings/ And the land of the 
eight*.#" (Bismillahi tuambe/ Mungu tumwombe/ Mvumba zivumbe/ Na 
iti za nane..#)
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It should he pointed out that the ten clans of Miuli and the 
eight of the coast are all Waungwana clans. Neither Sharifs nor 
slaves are mentioned as amongst them* And yet everyone whom I asked 
claimed that the Bajunis were already divided into three strata on 
their arrival in the island. The Masherifu however have their own 
myths of origin. Some say they came from Hinati "near Madina” in 
Arabia, whilst others say that Madina itself was their origin. Some 
say they came from Tarim, also in Arabia, whilst yet others say that 
Hinati and Tarim are the same place. More important for them however 
is the claim to be the descendents of the Prophet Mohamed, through his 
daughter Fatima and her son Hussein,
The Masherifu are notable in being the only stratum which keeps 
written genealogies (nasabu), I have seen three of these - all of 
which were versions of the genealogy of one of the two Sharif clans
•'j
in Tundwa - the Ahli Nadhir. The other clan (the smaller one) has 
lost its genealogy. The three genealogies which I saw were practically 
identical, and showed an unbroken line of male descent back to Fatima, 
the Prophet*s daughter, and thence to the Prophet himself,through 38 
generations. From the Prophet the line goes back a further 21 
generations to Adnaan, ancestor of all the Northern Arabs. One of 
these genealogies had been written in this generation, one in the 
previous generation and one three generations ago. It seems probable 
that the earliest was copied from a yet earlier one. If one asks a 
Sharif for his genealogy he will always reply, "it is written".
1. All written in Arabic script.
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Sharifs do not memorise these genealogies however and are even loth 
to show them. In their heads they remember only a few generations 
back in the same way as do other members of the community. To claim 
that a genealogy is written hovfever emphasises that the Masherifu are 
a literate group - and literacy here means literacy in Arabic script, 
which means ability to read and recite the Koran. This in its turn 
denotes piety and piety carries implications of status and wealth, 
as we saw in the previous chapter.
In general this claim to be descendents of the Prophet 
Mohamed is accepted in the community, but there are, even here, some 
sceptics. t!Some people in Tundwa say that there are no Sharifs and 
that everyone is equal. They say all the descendents of the Prophet 
were killed11, so a young Sharif man explained it to me. This is an 
argument which is occasionally heard all along the East African coast 
(where there are other groups of Masherifu), as it is heard in Arabia. 
It is said that when Hussein, grandson of the Prophet, was killed at 
the battle of Karbala1 he left no sons and that therefore there are 
no Sharifs. The Masherifu however claim that Hussein left a son,
Ali Zein A1 Abidin, and that the line from him to themselves is un­
broken. My impression however was that scepticism of the Masherifu1s 
claim did not centre very strongly on this point.
Sharifs in Tundwa say that long ago their ancestors left 
Arabia and came to Africa. Some say they came directly to Faza, but 
most say that they settled on the Benadir coast in Somalia, where they
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joined up with the Bajunis, intermarried with them and "Became 
Bajunis"* It must "be admitted however that there is some ambivalence 
about this claim on all sides. The Sharifs often add that they are 
Arabs and not really Bajunis, Similarly Waungwana, if asked 
specifically, will sometimes say that the Masherifu are "not our tribe", 
"not Bajunis", Nevertheless most people commonly speak of the Sharifs 
as Bajunis, as the Sharifs also speak of themselves. The fact that 
the Masherifu claim to be Arabs does not distinguish them from the 
Waungwana, who have always made the same claim.
It is perhaps interesting to examine the history of one parti­
cular Sharif family, as remembered by an old man of that family (Sharif 
Idarus - see genealogy). The ancestor of the family, Ahmed bin Ali, 
came to Tundwa from Barawa (in Somalia) seven generations ago.
According to the old man there was much disagreement amongst the
Waungwana of Tundwa and other places at that time and they asked
Sharif Ahmed to come and make peace between them. So he came and
settled down amongst them and married a mwungwana girl, "In the
old days", said my informant, "the Sharifs had supernatural powers 
(karama) and could do anything". The son of Sharif Ahmed (Omar)
built three mosques - one in Tundwa, still called "moskichi wa Mwenye 
1
Omar", but now fallen into disuse, one in Bajumwali, and one in 
Nyabogi. According to my informant, Sharif Omarfs karama was so great 
that he built these mosques almost single-handed, with only the help 
of one slave and one donkey, "Now", the old man added sadly, "there
1• The mosque of Sharif Omar - "Mwenye" is a title by which the Sharifs 
are usually addressed. It means, literally, 'having1.
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is no more karama - and where are the Sharifs today?”
This kind of story fits in with the role Sharifs are always
1
supposed to play - i.e. that of holy men, ritual peacemakers. How 
many Waungwana would accept this story is difficult to say, hut there 
are certainly some who do not accept it. ”A lieI” said one. "They 
came as traders. Of course they did reconcile some disputants hy 
reciting the fatiha”. This is a prayer which is said when hoth 
parties in a dispute have agreed to forget their differences - it sets 
a ritual seal as it were on the agreement* But it is not always the 
mediator (if there he one) who says the fatiha, and neither mediator 
nor recitor need he a Sharif.
There are obviously some contradictions in the various versions 
of the SharifsT traditional role - hoth between the Sharif version and 
that of some Waungwana, and it may he added, even amongst the Sharifs 
themselves. My old Sharif informant for example admitted that the 
Masherifu, in spite of their karama, were not given the job of reading 
the Friday sermon. ”They were strangers”, he pointed out. It was 
only later that one Sharif Omar Zein (see genealogy) was taught to 
read the sermon hy the existing incumbent. Later Sharif Omar's son, 
Sura, held the post, and later still his grandson, Mohamed Sura,took 
the job for some time. (Waungwana confirm this story). Other 
Sharifs however somewhat exaggerated the position, describing the
1. See for example the role played hy the Sanusi of Cyrenaica (the
Grand Sanusi was a Sharif), or that played hy the Seyyids (Masherifu) 
of the Swat Pathan, or, nearer home, that played hy the Seyyids of 
Hadhramant, Southern Arabia from whence the Bajuni Sharifs claim to 
have come. (E. Evans-Pritchard, 1949# F* Barth, 1959» A.S. Bujra,
1967).
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Sharifs of the past as very learned men who were able to teach others, 
and who have always read the Friday sermon.
I have never heard any claim however that the Masherifu had 
been political rulers in Tundwa. Everyone knows that it was the 
Wachandaa clan of the Waungwana who supplied the first rulers (wafalme) 
of the village, and it was also they who monopolised the post of 
Sheikh of the mosque, thereby controlling an important institution 
and forum of communication in the town. Later the Zitindini clan 
(also Waungwana) assumed control, and in spite of attempts by another 
group, led by a man of a third Waungwana clan (the Mui wa Mote) to 
oust them, they remained in power until the British arrived at the end 
of the nineteenth century.
Of the Waungwana*s traditional position other than this, one 
is told very little. Their life is usually contrasted with that of 
the slaves. That the freeing of the slaves was a regrettable reversal 
of affairs for many Waungwana is obvious from the glowing accounts they 
tell of the past. In the old days they say, the Waungwana did not 
work. Their lives were very pleasant, eating, sleeping, and taking 
the air occasionally. They were rich, with land and slaves, and they 
were pious and learned men, able to read and recite the Koran and to 
teach others the elements of religious knowledge. In those days they 
say, the island was noted for the learned men it produced. Waungwana 
xtfomen were modest and proper in the old days; they did not go out, 
but spent their time indoors plaiting each other*s hair.
1. These events will be described in more detail in Chapter VIII.
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Aboiit the conditions in which the slaves lived we know a 
1
little more* They worked in the shambas of their masters on the 
island, or on the mainland opposite, where the annual crops were grown. 
They were the fishermen of the island, and all menial tasks such as 
fetching water and washing corpses fell to the lot of the slaves.
Women slaves also worked in the shambas, but their main work was in 
the house, to do the cooking and to clean and wash clothes* Stories 
of slaves being walled in alive for misdemeanours, and of slave 
children being roasted alive in front of their parents as a punishment 
for spoilt food are common - though told with some horror* It is 
also said that slaves were not burned like free men, but that their 
bodies were simply thrown into the waste land, "like donkeys".
There are old men alive now who can recall the system of 
slavery as it operated in the closing years of the nineteenth century. 
Their accounts are more detailed and less sweeping than those of the 
younger generation. True, they say, about half of the Waungwana 
were wealthy and had ten or so slaves apiece, but there were also 
poorer Waungwana who had to work for themselves and were helped by 
their richer brethren* Such old men are also able to fill in the
1. I should perhaps add that none of the following stories came from the
Wachumwa themselves, who, even after I had been able to identify them,
were notably uncommunicative on such matters. None of my historical
or ideological material was collected by direct questioning, but only 
by taking advantage of the opportunity to ask further questions if a 
person raised the matter himself* No ex-slave ever mentioned the 
past to me and it would have been extremely difficult to frame a 
question on the subject without indirectly implying that one was 
aware of his status as a mchumwa.
171
details of the institution of slavery. Slaves, they say, used to 
worlc for their masters every day except Friday. On this day they 
were allowed to cultivate annual crops for themselves on the common 
land. Their work was organised by overseers (wasimamizi) who were 
also slaves but who were given preferential treatment. Slaves were 
fed by their masters, the main item of their diet being a small red- 
brown grain called wimbi. (One often hears people bemoaning the 
fact that these days they have fallen on such hard times that they 
are forced to eat wimbi, "the food of slaves"). Slaves did not as 
a rule live with their masters. They lived in separate locations 
of their own, building their houses from materials freely available 
in the area. Slave women could be ’married1 by their masters (really 
a form of concubinage) or by other slaves on the payment of a fowl 
to the slave girl’s master. The girl remained the property of her 
master however, and any children she bore were his also. When 
questioned as to where the slaves came from in the first place, such 
old men will say that they were bought from Dar es Salaam or Kilwa, 
but that some men used to seize people by force to be their slaves. 
Sometimes it is said, slaves were sold to passing dhows from Arabia.
Slavery was abolished in East Africa in 1897 j and the British 
sent officials to see that the order was carried out. The Bajunis 
remember that about the turn of the century, a man whom they call 
"Honi" arrived in Rasini and announced that up until a certain date 
any slave master could obtain a compensatory sum for the manumission
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of his slaves. After that date no more compensation would he paid, 
hut all slavery would cease forthwith. Many slave owners in Tundwa 
it is said, did not take advantage of this offer, ITo doubt they mis­
understood its intent, for even now they talk of "Honi" having come 
to "buy" the slaves. One man, who had inherited thirteen slaves from 
his father explained to me that he could not sell them, "because they 
had become like relatives". It may he, in addition, that most slave 
owners thought that the price offered hy Eoni (one hundred rupees it 
is said) was too low. In any case with slavery no longer legal, 
slave owners either had to begin working for themselves or had to 
pay wages to their former slaves. How this difficult transitional 
period worked out it is now impossible to tell. The story, as told 
to outsiders, always ends: "and now everyone is equal", or "and now
everyone wants to he a mwungwana".
I have tried to present this account in the Bajunis1 own
words, specifying the various sources from which the account comes.
Certain deductions can he made from the traditions - unfortunately not
deductions about the * true1 history of the Bajunis, since no other
evidence exists at present — hut deductions concerning the social
2significance of history in this community. One prominent feature I
1• There is some mention of the Bajunis in the Pate Chronicle, trans­
lated and published hy A. Werner, 1915* an unsatisfactory 
article hy J.A.Cr. Elliott (1925) gives some traditions of Somali 
Bajunis. Other than this there is very little indeed that I 
know of.
2, What evidence I have suggests that the following comments would he
equally true for the other Bajuni villages on Faza island. There 
is a common body of traditions more or less equally shared hy 
people in all villages, though obviously there are local variations.
d o r i e s  o f  th e  p a s t
I h e  r u i n s  o f  an o ld  house in  Tundwa , 
s a id  t o  have been th e  r e s id e n c e  o f  one 
o f  t h e  k in g s  o f  Tundwa. A d j o i n i n g  th e s e  
r u i n s  t h e r e  i s  th e  w a l l  o f  h i s  ' f o r t * .
174
have already mentioned is that memory of and interest in the past is 
not spread evenly throughout the community "but is related firstly to 
age and secondly to social stratum. We would not expect the Wachumwa 
to he interested in traditions which laud the deeds of men who once 
exploited and maltreated them. Secondly there is in the telling of 
the traditions a strong element of regret for the lost wonders of the 
past. The old Sharif man bemoaning the fact that the Masherifu of 
today are nothing, that their supernatural powers have failed them.
A young Sharif man complaining bitterly that nowadays hardly anyone 
gives the Sharifs their traditional sign of respect — the kissing of 
their hands, "Many things have been destroyed these days”, Waung­
wana commenting on their present impoverished state, and on how in 
the past they were pious and learned people* One middle-aged mwung­
wana woman telling with wonder how her father walked all the way to 
Mecca, ’’Many things have changed these days” •
This kind of regret for the "good old days" is found in the 
traditions of many societies. Here I think it indicates an aware­
ness on the part of Waungwana and Masherifu as to the pace of social 
change, and the extent to which it has undermined their position.
And it could be that the horror now expressed at the treatment meted 
out to slaves, and the assertions that the slaves had become "like 
relatives" are attempts to readjust to the change in the status of 
slaves, from chattels, to people who have to be contended with. There 
is an element of this too in the argument that, "and now everyone is 
equal"•
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This brings us on to another point - the inconsistencies in 
the traditions with regard to the Sharifs. For if the status of 
the Wachumwa is at present ambiguous that of the Masherifu seems 
always to have been so* We see here very clearly an illustration of 
Leach1s argument that myth, "is a language of argument, not a chorus 
of harmony"* There is considerable discrepancy between the 
Waungwana and the Sharif version of the latter1s role. Whereas the 
former argue that the Sharifs were traders who came to cash in on 
the wealth of the Waungwana, the latter say they were invited to come 
because of their supernatural powers and ability to settle disputes.
There is a clear indication here of the present ambiguous position 
whereby the Sharifs claim the topmost place in the social hierarchy 
and are the wealthiest stratum but have no political power or dominant 
religious role. The attempt by some Waungwana to belittle the Sharifs 
and even to suggest that there are in fact no Sharifs, shows that they 
resent the wealth and arrogance of the Sharifs, Sometimes this is 
put more directly, as when people speak of the Sharifs as "mean"
(meaning that they are wealthy, but not prepared to give or lend their 
money to others) or when they accuse them (behind their backs) of 
pocketing for themselves funds entrusted to them for charitable purposes.
Finally it is clear from the traditions that each category is 
considered separate and of a different origin. Both the Waungwana 
and the Masharifu concur in the view that the Wachumwa came from 
African hinterland. And not only do the Waungwana and the Masharifu
1. E. Leach, 1954, p.279*
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have their own versions of history, hut they claim to have originated 
from different places - the Masharifu mainly from ’Hinati1 and the 
Waungwana from ,Miuli** If I am right in my supposition that the 
Vave are very ancient, it appears that the Waungwana originally 
claimed to have come from Somalia and the argument that Miuli is in 
Arabia is a later gloss on the Vave myths, Hinati is definitely 
said to he in Arabia, as are the other towns from which the Sharifs 
are said to come# Whatever the truth of the matter may he, and it 
is probably impossible to tell now, the claim of the Waungwana and 
the Masharifu to be Arabs is an extremely important part of their 
ideology. This claim is not restricted to them - it is a myth of 
origin that is widespread on the East African coast. There have 
undoubtedly been Arab settlers in East Africa from early times, but 
whether all those who claim to be their descendants in fact are so 
seems unlikely. A more likely interpretation is that an identifica­
tion was made with the Arab invaders, some of whom established 
Sultanates and began to extend their power over* wider areas. The 
Arabs were also traders and they brought a modicum of prosperity to
the whole coast. It was Arabs from Oman who are said to have
2
established Pate town on Faaa island in 1204 A.D* The Bajunis 
claim that the Pate people were already living on the island when 
they arrived* For about two hundred years, from 1300 to 1500 A.3).
1. It is probably a corrupted version of the name fAinat, a Sayyid
(Sharif) town in Hadhramaut, Southern Arabia.
2. According to the Pate Chronicle that is, (See A. Werner, 1915)-
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the Sultans of Pate ruled over much of the northern coast of Kenya, 
including Faza island. Later they were overthrown by the Portuguese, 
though never completely defeated. Later still the Busaidi Arabs of 
Zanzibar were the powerful force on the coast and the Bajunis came 
under their nominal sovereignty. I suspect then that the Bajunis1 
claim to be Arabs was as much a political identification as anything 
else. The Arabs were powerful, rich and cultured (the word for 
civilisation in Swahili is in fact ustaarabu) and thus a people whom 
one did well to emulate. In addition the Arabs were fairer-skinned 
than the people they settled amongst and they were also slave traders. 
It does not seem too wild a speculation then to assume that fairness 
and Arabness became associated with high status, whereas blackness 
was associated with slave status. The myth of Noah which is pre­
served by the Bajunis is a charter for this latter association. In 
Tundwa this myth justifies discriminatory marriage rules, and through 
these rules the stratification system, and with it the status quo 
in Tundwa are maintained.
At a wider level however the physical and racial connotations 
which are given to the stratification system are an attempt by the 
Waungwana to size up the world around them and to understand it in 
their terms. At this level the stratification system becomes a 
world view, it is the spectacles through which they view happenings 
in the wider environment. Sometimes this merely means the evaluation 
of other peoples in terms they can understand, thereby dictating the
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appropriate behaviour to adopt towards them. This is particularly 
important in the context of labour migration when Bajunis must mix 
with other peoples. It is of interest then that Bajuni women have 
extended the marriage rules of stratification to include other ethnic 
.groups, "We can marry Indians and Europeans and Arabs'1, said one 
woman. '’It is only Africans we feel shame to marry. A slave is 
a slave 111 And when a mwungwana woman declared that: "The English
are equal with us; we are Waungwana", she was making a judgement 
about relations with other peoples. Anyone who is fair-skinned 
must be a mwungwana, a free and noble person, "like us".
The implications of these views may also be political. They 
have deeply affected the Bajunis* understanding of the political 
changes which have come about in the area and to some extent their 
reaction towards these changes. We shall see in the following 
chapter what these changes have been and how the Bajunis have adjusted 
to them.
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PART 2. PACTIONS
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VII. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE
11 If only the British would oome hack. They never behaved like this - 
they are Waungwana” • Old mwungwana man
As a political unit Tundwa has two aspects. In the first 
place there is an administrative framework of posts created by the 
Kenya Central Government. In addition there is an unofficial political 
structure of factional oppositions. Obviously the two can only be 
analytically divided, since the second exists by virtue of the first. 
Again, looking at the situation analytically we can distinguish two 
important areas of confrontation in terms of which the structure of 
political action in Tundwa is evolved. These are the relationship 
between the Central Government and the people, and secondly the relation­
ship between the political leaders of the village and other members of 
the village. In this chapter I shall examine the first area of con­
frontation — that between the Central Government and the people.
The pre-colonial period
For about five hundred years the Bajunis have been subject to 
some external control. Before the 16th century the most important 
centre of power on the north Kenya coast was at Pate on Faza island 
where the Nabahani ruling family had been established since the 13th 
century. The Nabahanis claim to have fled from Oman in 1204* Between 
1587 and 1740 the Portuguese exerted control over Faza island, but the
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rulers of Pate were in almost continual rebellion against them.
Around the mid-seventeenth century a phase of active Omani interven­
tion in East African affairs began which culminated in the removal 
of the capital of the Omani ruler, Seyyid Said, to Zanzibar in the 
mid-nineteenth century. By the time Seyyid Said died in 1856, the
-j
whole coast, including Faza island, was under his control. In all
these moves the Bajunis played no major part except to acknowledge
each successive suzerain and to provide soldiers occasionally. In
addition they were always careful to keep on the winning side in any
conflict. This is aptly illustrated in the Pate Chronicle where the
Bajunis are described in 1843 as acknowledging the Sultan of Pate,
but sometime later "by much cunning and many words", they transferred
their support to the Sultan of Zanzibar (this at a time when the
2
Sultan*s forces were winning). At the end of the nineteenth century 
the coastal strip of Kenya became a British Protectorate leased from 
the Sultans of Zanzibar.
The physical conditions of Paza island are such that external 
control can never have been fully effective and for most of this period
1. The basic outlines of coastal history have been fairly well estab­
lished by historians, and I may refer the reader to any general 
history such as Coupland, R. (1938) or Ingham, K. (1962) for the 
basic account. The Bajunis are not mentioned by name in any of 
these accounts - though *Faza* (almost certainly Rasini town is 
meant, not the island) is mentioned several times* In 1587 for 
example it was sacked by the Portuguese (Coupland, p.58-60). Arab 
domination seems to have been more effective in Rasini than in other 
villages. The Pate Chronicle (a summary of oral traditions of the 
Pate kingdom written down by a Pate man around the turn of the cen­
tury, and translated by Werner, A., 1915) mentions the Bajunis - 
there called Watikuu - two or three times. The oral traditions of 
the Bajunis themselves concerning this period are meagre. They can 
practically be summed up in the statement of one old man : "The 
Portuguese came here and then the Arabs. The Arabs ruled for many 
years"•
2. cf. p.401 and p.403 (Werner, 1915)*
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was probably merely nominal* Each Bajuni town was ruled by its own 
king and was virtually an independent city-state. Nevertheless the 
existence of external suzerains had one important effect — it estab­
lished a pattern of Bajuni political manoeuvring which we may des­
cribe as expediency, a policy based on the recognition that the Bajunis 
were not strong enough or united enough to effectively question the 
power of their overlords,
British rule
The entry of the British into the area around the turn of the 
century was more serious than the activities of previous overlords 
because the British imposed a more effective administrative system.
The independent kings of each village were put in their place by 
being demoted to the post of village headman. The village was made 
the basic unit in the administrative system. In Rasini, the main 
village of Paza island, there was a Mudir, a local man appointed by 
the colonial government. Paza island was made part of Lamu District 
with its headquarters in Lamu town. Here were stationed a District 
Commissioner (D.C.) and a Liwali. The former was a European and the 
latter a Muslim from the coast who was appointed by the British to 
deal with matters affecting the administration of Muslims. The 
existence of such an official was necessitated by the Protectorate 
status of the coastal strip of Kenya (the rest of Kenya was a Colony). 
Other changes took place as a result of British administration. The 
most significant, which I have mentioned in earlier chapters, was the
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abolition of slavery* But in addition taxes were imposed and 
royalties charged on the cutting of mangroves and on the procuring 
of ivory. Criminals were punished, serious disputes settled and 
certain minimal public health measures insisted upon. The B.C. 
visited all the villages in his area from time to time and controlled 
the appointment of village headmen. In the early fifties a Primary 
school was set up in Rasini, and a small dispensary was also built 
there. Ten government tanks were built for collecting rainwater, 
agriculture - and in particular cotton - was encouraged, and the boat­
building industry of Rasini was helped by the setting up of a training 
centre.
During this whole period the relationship between colonial 
officials and people was pervaded by paternalism on the one side and 
dependence on the other. This much is indicated by the comments
•i
made in the Visitors* Book of Faza Mudirate (as it was known before 
1983). Officials made brief entries here on each of their visits.
The period covered by the book is from September 1957 to April 1964* 
The very first entry records that the people had asked for Famine 
Relief, but that the B.C. had decided that they were just wanting "to 
save themselves work". Continuous demands were made by the people on 
the government officials, for assistance in farming, and for amenities 
of all kinds. In 1959 cm® B.C. commented that, "they will not get 
anything if they do not behave better". There were some attempts to 
initiate a spirit of self help, but the tone was always patronising.
1. Available in the District Office in Rasini.
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In 1959 the people complained that the path from Faza to Siyu was 
"becoming very overgrown and they wanted it cleared, "This is really 
a matter which should he fixed up locally", commented the D.C, "I 
made it clear that government cannot do such jobs and they must revert 
to the admirable old custom of everyone turning out when necessary*,*" 
(Unfortunately it never has been the custom on Faza island for co­
operation in such matters). On the other hand the people contributed 
over £35 in 1958 "to the building of an extension to the dispensary*
(The amount is not particularly large however when one considers that 
prostitutes have been known to spend more on giving a feast for all 
the men of their village)*
It is paradoxical that the Bajunis now look back on this 
period as a golden age in which they were left to their own ways*
"The British never interferred in our lives". This kind of comment 
can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly there has definitely been 
an increase in government intervention in the lives of the people since 
the Independence of Kenya in 1963 - and I  shall return to this point 
shortly* More significantly however this kind of comment relates 
to the status of the Bajunis under British rule. As I suggested in 
the previous chapter, the centuries-long over-rule of this area by 
Arab suzerains led to a political identification by the Bajunis with 
their overlords. Being an *Arab* had advantages in this period, and 
it continued to do so under British rule when 1Arabs* were given 
certain privileges, in jobs for example, from which *Africans* were
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excluded. fArabs* were also on a special tax roll. The British 
recognised many individual Bajunis as *Arabs* when identity cards were 
issued to them from 1952 onwards, and the Primary school in Rasini was 
designated as an *Arab* school. The British therefore bolstered up 
the Bajunis* own image of themselves. In addition the British were 
classed by the people as Waungwana, noble and free born. The comment
of one old and respected mwungwana man makes this clear. "If only
the British would come back", he said to another mwungwana man. "They 
never behaved like this - they are Waungwana. Even though they are 
not Muslims they are good people and pity the sick and the poor and 
try to help them*1. In other words then the Bajunis tended to see 
British rule as an extension of their previous historical experience.
The Independence of Kenya in December 1963 brought about a 
radical change in this situation. As independence drew near, many 
Bajunis at first supported the cause of coastal autonomy, and some 
of those in Mombasa formed political parties to further this end.
As I have indicated the coastal strip of Kenya had Protectorate status, 
unlike the rest of Kenya, which was a Colony. Sovereignty was 
nominally held by the Sultan of Zanzibar and his flag was flown on 
public buildings* There were many on the coast, including Bajunis, 
who wanted the coastal strip to remain independent of Kenya and either 
to be allied to Zanzibar or to form an independent State. The cause 
of coastal autonomy (Mwambao) was intimately linked with the idea of 
*Arabness*.
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It soon ‘became clear however that this cause was doomed to 
failure and that the coastal strip would he integrated into Kenya.
At this point there was a sudden reversal of attitudes on the coast. 
Many people who had been recognised as *Arabs' under the British and 
who had thought of themselves as superior to the Africans now realised 
that the latter were going to rule them and that they must come to 
terms with the new situation. The Bajunis were in a similar position. 
I have pointed out that the Bajuni stratification system is justified 
in terms of an ideology of racial differences in which the Waungwana 
and Masherifu claim to he 'Arabs* whilst they despise the Wachumwa 
as 'Africans'. The reverse proposition is also held by them to be 
equally true. Wot only are the Bajuni ex-slaves called 'Africans', 
but any African is also referred to as a 'slave'. Obviously however 
such comments could no longer be expressed openly if the Bajunis were 
to achieve any political ends in the new situation. Some time before 
Independence the Bajunis in Mombasa formed a united political party of 
their own - at first it was called the National Union of Bajunist but 
later its name was changed to the Shungwaya Freedom Party (S.F.P.).
The name is significant since it refers back to the supposed origin of 
all Bajunis (and incidentally of some other African coastal tribes such 
as the Giriama) in Shungwaya, Somalia, thus putting the Bajunis firmly 
in Africa. This party allied itself with the Kenya African Democratic 
Union (KADU), the Federalist party made up of minority tribes like the 
Bajunis. SFP branches were set up in Rasini and other Faza villages.
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In the General Election prior to Independence, the Tana-Lamu con­
stituency (of which Paza island is a part) had two SPP candidates - 
one putting up for the lower House, and one for the Senate. Since 
the Bajunis form a large proportion of the electorate in the con­
stituency, "both SPP candidates were elected. But in the country at 
large it was not KADU, "but the other major party in Kenya, the Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) which won most seats and therefore formed 
the government after Independence.
Even prior to Independence however the Bajunis were attempting 
to adjust to the new situation. When the Liwali visited Paza island 
in March 1963 he was surprised to discover that many men were refusing 
to pay the special Arah and Asian tax and were asking to he taxed at 
the African rate. "They say they are Bajunis, and not Arahs or 
Asians!" (Visitors* Book). After Independence the Bajunis as a whole 
were recognised as an * indigenous African tribe*, and it was now in 
their interests to foster this interpretation, since all the privileges 
now went to Africans, not Arahs. As one man put it, "Nowadays no-one 
says he is an Arah. He can*t get a job in Mombasa if he does. But 
if he says he is a Bajuni he will he given". It is significant that 
many Arahs who fled from Zanzibar after the Revolution there, and who 
are now living in Mombasa, call themselves *Bajunis*.
Post-Independence period
Independence brought many changes to this area, both in the
1. Bennett, G. and Rosberg, K. (1961) give an account of the political 
history of Kenya from early colonial times up to 19&1, including 
full details of the 1961 election.
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sphere of administration, and that of ideology* The whole administrar- 
tive system was reorganised* The posts of Mudir and Liwali were 
abolished, and instead there is now a District Assistant (D*A*) in 
Rasini whose superior is the District Commissioner (D*C*) in Lamu.
The main point about both these officials is that they are Africans, 
not local people. Whereas the Mudir was himself a Bajuni and a 
Muslim, the D.A. is an outsider appointed to cari'y out government 
policies in the area. He may be a coastal African, or an African 
from up-country, and he may or may not be a Muslim (two out of the 
four D.A.s who served in Faza during 1965 were Muslims). A new 
post, that of Chief, was set up intermediary between the D.A. and the 
village headmen. The Chief was appointed by the D.A. and was 
salaried according to the qualifications (e.g. literacy) which he 
possessed. In 1965 Faza's Chief was a Kisingitini man. The village 
with its headman remained the basic unit in the system, though the 
headman was expected to perform more duties than in the past. In 
addition a system of elective local government posts was set up - which 
as far as the Bajunis are concerned are fairly ineffective. Each 
village elects a Councillor and this man sits on a Faza Area Council, 
which in its turn elects members to sit on the Lamu County Council, and 
so on. These Councillors are supposed to look after the interests 
of the people in their own villages and to make useful suggestions 
as to how progress may be achieved. Although they do not play this 
role very effectively as yet, the introduction of an elective system
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is important since it introduces the element of numbers into a system
which was previously based on influence,
Lamu District also has political representation at national
level, as I have already indicated. Two members of parliament are
elected, and curiously enough both the two men standing in 19^5 were
originally from Tundwa, (One has since been defeated). Diagram 4
is a simplified version of the existing administrative system in
Kenya, and will help to make clear what I have said so far.
In order to understand the attitudes of the Bajunis towards
the post-Independence administration we may profitably look more
closely at the functions and powers of the District Assistant* We
have to understand that, in local terms, the D.A, is quite a powerful
man. He has a small force of police at his disposal and may use
them to arrest men for tax offences or for failure to carry out
government orders. He acts as an informal ’court of first hearing1
in civil cases, and it is he who decides whether a case should be
transferred to Lamu (where there is a formal court) or whether the
two disputants must accept some form of reconciliation. In criminal
cases it is he who has the responsibility of arresting the suspects
and sending them to Lamu for trial. It is the D.A. too who has the
responsibility for appointing the Chief and the headmen - though he
must also have formal approval from his superiors for any candidate
he selects. All matters of government concerning the people in the 
Division are dealt with by the D.A. Apart from a Medical Assistant
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and the teachers at Faza Primary school there are no other specialist 
officers in the island. Thus it is the D.A. who sees that public 
health measures are enforced and that educational and economic schemes 
are running properly. More importantly it is the D.A. who assesses 
and collects taxes, though a person may complain to the authorities 
in Lamu if he thinks he has been assessed at too high a rate. The 
D.A.’s power is enhanced by the fact that Faza is an island and 
communications are poor. The D.G. visits very rarely and never stays 
more than a few hours. Occasionally there are visits from Community 
Development officials, agricultural experts and the like, but other­
wise the D.A. is free from surveillance from above. On the other 
hand the D.A.fs power is limited in one very important respect. All 
taxes collected in Faza are sent to Lamu and it is the D.G. and Lamu 
County Council which decides how the money should be spent. Con­
sequently it is difficult to get money for schemes of development in 
the island or for loans to farmers and traders. The D.A. thus has 
many sanctions at his disposal, but few incentives to offer. And he 
has to carry out government policies which may make him very unpopular.
Since Independence taxes have been raised and there is much 
more government intervention in the lives of the people than there 
was under the British. It is this which makes the Bajunis look back 
nostalgically to the old days. "Ever since the Europeans left” , said 
one to another, "this government has been playing games with us". 
Villagers are exhorted to begin self-help schemes, to build schools,
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dispensaries and bridges, to fasten their animals, to clear paths, 
to clear villages of certain trees etc, etc* - and all this in the 
name of "African socialism" (ujamaa wa Kiafrica), and of "nation- 
building" (ku.jenga taifa),
In some ways the new Administration has simply taken up where 
the British left off. In particular the relationship between people 
and government is still cast in a paternalistic mould* But the 
ideology of the new era is completely different. It is an ideology 
of African-ness, of equality, of 'socialism* and of fharambee* (pull­
ing together)* "African socialism expects the citizens of this new 
country to help voluntarily and whole-heartedly (bila uchoyo) in the 
building of the nation.,*" "African socialism means complete
-j
democracy and equality (demokrasi iliyo kamili, na usawa kabisa)." 
Bajunis do not of course fully understand the language of this 
ideology, but they are aware that it gives no support whatsoever to 
the concepts on itfhich their own stratifications system is based.
The contrast could not in fact be greater. The ideology of the 
stratification system is one which preaches inequality and which 
claims Arabness as the highest value. In addition self-interest is 
closer to the Bajunis* way of thinking, than 1 pulling together1*
Thus there are two conflicting ideologies operating here - that of the 
Central Government and that of the village. The first is backed up 
by the united strength of the Administration with its panoply of
1. These quotations are taken from Pamphlet Ilo. 28 - "Teach Yourself 
Citizenship" ("Jifunze Uraia") put out by the Kenya Government 
Information Service "(April 19^5)*
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officials, police and courts. The second is hacked up by the status 
quo in the village where the Waungwana are pre-eminent. In order 
to gain power any Bajuni political leader must manipulate these two 
value systems successfully. Thus it is that men who commonly refer 
to themselves as 'Arabs* in the village situation say that they are 
'Africans* in their relations with the Central Government. Public 
protestations of, "We are all Africans", are a common feature of 
political meetings, as are dutiful calls for the rallying cry : 
"Haraaaaaambeeee1" And although most Waungwana view the present 
government as serikali ,ya wachumwa (a government of slaves) and 
interpret most of its activities in terms of this ideology, they must 
disguise these attitudes if they are to achieve any political or 
economic ends in the new situation. In the following chapter we 
shall see the influence of this conflict of ideologies on factional 
disputes in Tundwa.
The framewozWc of Tundwa political action is provided by the 
structure of administrative roles in the village, which I shall now 
discuss in more detail as an introduction to the analysis of factions 
in the following chapter.
Administration in the village
At the village level the official representative of the 
government is the head man. His duties are imprecise to say the 
least* There is, as far as I know, no written statement which assigns 
special tasks to him. Each D.A. therefore has slightly different
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expectations of the role. It is obvious however that all of them 
understand this as an administrative role - the headman is a govern­
ment servant (he is paid a salary every six months to sustain him in 
the position) and he should help them in carrying out government 
policy* He was supposed to inform villagers of government decisions 
affecting them and see that these were carried out* He should inform 
people of meetings to he held and see that they attended. He was 
supposed to inform the D.A. of any unrest in the village and help 
him with investigations into any disputes which were taking place.
In disputes over land or other quarrels, the disputants had to go 
first to the headman who would try and settle the matter. If he 
was unable to do so then the D.A. was called in. Finally the headman 
\tfas supposed to help the D.A. in assessing villagers for tax and to 
provide the names of tax offenders*
Most D.A.s soon realise that their village headmen are not 
fulfilling these expectations fully. One reason is that the headmen 
have no sanctions whatsoever. It should be remembered that communica­
tions within Fasa island are on a very primitive level - there are no 
roads and no motorised vehicles of any sort, and needless to say, 
no telephone links between the villages. All communication is by 
foot or by donkey. It is hardly surprising then that the D.A* keeps 
all of the handful of police assigned to him in Rasini, The headman 
then cannot be easily backed up in unpopular actions. Nor do the 
headmen have I'ights to fine or imprison people. Thus when the D.A.s
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refer to their headmen, as they often do, as "uncooperative" we can 
understand the reasons behind the headmen*s lack of eagerness. In 
addition however the headmen are not particularly sympathetic to the 
government, for reasons which I have already suggested.
The other * official* in the village is the Councillor. His 
role is even less precise than that of the headman, since the idea 
of local government by discussion is such a new idea. It is not at 
all clear what such persons are supposed to do. They certainly do 
not have any real power. The Councillor is paid 5/-* every meet­
ing of the Area Council which he attends. In theory he is an In­
dependent representative of the villagers, but in practise he does 
not play this role, and any attempt to do so is regarded by the D.A. 
as trouble-making. As we shall see the Councillor in Tundwa used 
to curry favour with the government by helping the D.A. to make tax 
assessments.
One should make the point that in a system like this, ad­
ministration and politics are inseparable. No role is purely ad­
ministrative. Since 1964 Kenya has had a one party system of govern­
ment and the D.A. and other administrators must be members of KANU. 
They are empowered to exhort the people in their areas to join KANU 
and to form party branches. Since the M.P.s are also supposed to 
carry out this task there is inevitably competition between them and 
the D.A., each trying to gain credit for whatever achievements the 
people make. Looked at from the village level there is also a
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"bliirring of the distinctions between the administrative and the 
political sphere* Thus the Councillor, who in theory plays a 
political role, is occasionally treated as an administrative function­
ary by the D.A* The headman, in theory a government servant, is 
regarded as a political figure in the village since he is usually a 
member of a particular faction. lie can rarely be neutral*
This is the system as it existed in Tundwa at the beginning 
of 1965. During that year there were some changes made, as we shall 
see in the next chapter in which I analyse the factional conflicts 
in Tundwa.
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VIII. FACTIONALISM IN TUNDWA
"There is no unity or cooperation here in Tundwa1*... Deputy headman
of Tundwa, privately.
"Everyone here in Tundwa gets on well"... Deputy headman in Tundwa,
in answer to question from visiting 
official.
All major political roles in Tundwa are held "by the Waungwana, 
and it is they who thereby control all channels of communication with 
the Central government. At the same time it is they who feel most 
strongly about stratification and believe most firmly in its ideology 
of physical and moral differences. Paradoxically therefore this has 
led to a situation in which the Central Government backs up that stratum 
in Tundwa which most strongly opposes it.
But the Waungwana in Tundwa are not united, and never have 
been. In pre-colonial times they competed for the role of ’king1 
(mfalme) and the basis of power was in physical strength and wealth.
In 1965 there were two political factions in Tundwa and towards the 
end of that year three, all led by Waungwana and all competing for 
power in the village. But now the basis of power lies in ability to 
control the politico-administrative posts which govern the peoplefs 
relations with the Central government. As I shall show, this reinter­
pretation of the basis of power led to a shift within the Waungwana 
stratum, away from the kind of men who would or could have been leaders
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in the pre-colonial period, to men who could never have aspired to 
such power. During 19&5 however a faction composed of more tradi­
tional type leaders emerged and finally took over control.
The factions had wider implications in that they allied them­
selves with larger-scale opposing groups outside the village, and to 
some extent used these to further their own hattles, I shall indi­
cate some of these wider alliances where necessary, but shall not go 
into them more fully*
The main theme of this chapter then will be the development 
of political factionalism in Tundwa. I shall show that political 
leaders are concerned with control of the channels of communication 
between villagers and Central government, and that in order to achieve 
this end they compete for posts set up by the government. The reasons 
why faction leaders seek to control these posts are various. They 
may wish to ensure that they and their supporters are taxed at a rate 
lower than that consonant with their property holdings. Alterna­
tively they may wish to engineer tax rises for their opponents. They 
may wish to prevent or hinder active intervention in the affairs of 
the village, or they may wish to use the power of the government to 
engineer changes against the wishes of their opponents. A man who 
has links with the government can use these links against others, but 
in so doing he creates enemies and will be opposed by others who would 
prefer these links to be used to their own benefit. Men do not seem 
to seek such positions simply for prestige or for monetary considerations,
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though there is also an element of this in the competition for power. 
Competition for control of the channels of communication with 
the government is the main theme in Tundwa politics then. But there 
is also another theme in the development of factional conflicts in 
Tundwa, Political leaders are also concerned about the control of 
activity within the village itself, and in particular with religious 
activity. To achieve this end they try to ensure that only a candi­
date of their own choice holds the post of Sheikh of the Friday mosque. 
The mosque is important partly because it acts as a forum for communi­
cation - public notices relevant to the townspeople are made there as 
well as the prayers and the sermons, and men often meet informally 
outside to discuss the affairs of the town. Secondly the position 
of Sheikh, as I pointed out in Chapter V, is quite a lucrative one.
More importantly however, the role of Sheikh can be an influential one. 
The Sheikh is a leader whose word is usually respected, and he may act 
as mediator in serious disputes where the relations between two groups 
have become estranged. The political factions therefore try to con­
trol this important post, and their conflicts over it form a * sub-plot1 
to the general theme of political conflict. At the same time there 
is some distinction, both of personnel and of interest, in disputes 
over religious matters as opposed to those over political matters, 
and this I shall try to indicate.
In order to understand the present stage of political factional­
ism in Tundwa it is necessary first to sketch in the historical back­
ground to present day political conflicts.
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The historical development of the role of village headman
In pre-colonial times political action in Tundwa revolved 
around the patri-clans. When the British arrived in Tundwa around 
the turn of the century they found a man of the Zitindini clan of 
the Waungwana holding the office of king and this office had been in 
his family for three generations. Before that his clan had seized 
it from another Waungwana clan, the Wachandaa, who according to 
tradition had been the rulers of Tundwa since the Bajunis had arrived 
on the island. They had also traditionally provided the Sheikh for 
the Friday mosque and continued to do so for some time. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century the Zitindini had to defend their 
position from attack by a third Waungwana clan, the Mui wa Mote clan. 
Slave and Waungwana soldiers were used by both sides, and a fort 
built from which the Zitindini could protect their position. In the 
end the Zitindini won, though only after many years fighting and the 
natural deaths of the two rivals for the office of king. It seems 
quite clear then that in the nineteenth century at least the position 
of king went to the man with most power - and power in this situation 
can be defined as Waungwana support together with enough slaves to 
defend one against attack from rivals. Secondly it is the clans 
which are remembered as holding political power; succession to the 
post of king was within the clan - usually passing from father to 
son, or occasionally from elder brother to younger brother. Thirdly 
control of the mosque seems traditionally to have gone hand in hand 
with control of the town, though this situation was less clear cut 
after the Zitindini assumed power. Finally it is clear that although
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there were dissensions amongst the Waungwana during the nineteenth 
century, all the contestants for the post of king were from that 
stratum - in other words political action was an internal affair of 
the Waungwana stratum. The Wachumwa were mere slave chattels at 
the time, and there is no evidence in oral tradition that the 
Masherifu played an influential role in this period. With the arrival 
of the British certain fundamental changes took place.
The last Zitindini king of Tundwa was recognised hy the 
British as headman. When he died the British ignored the claims 
of the Zitindini to the succession and merely appointed someone on 
whose loyalty they could rely. The man appointed was Shauri, a 
man of the Maukachwa clan. At one time he had acted as Sheikh 
in the Friday mosque. He seems to have Been an old man already when 
he took over the post, for hy 1930 he had Become too old and Blind 
to continue in the job. More is known aBout this period than aBout 
the period when Shauri Became headman. The B.C. at the time kept 
a small notebook in the house of the headman of Tundwa in x^ hich he 
recorded a few observations in English on each of his visits. This 
notebook, very tattered, is still preserved By the man who succeeded 
Shauri - ABoud. He cannot read it since not only does he not speak 
English But he is also practically illiterate. The notebook contains 
entries covering the pei'iod from January 1929 to May 1933T after which 
it was never used again. This period however was exactly that in 
which ABoud took over from Shauri. In 1929 the first entry records
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the B.C.’s dissatisfaction with Shauri : ’’Boubtful if any successor 
will make a more satisfactory job of the headmanship. The trouble 
appears to "be in the Tundwa people themselves”. It seems obvious 
from this notebook and from other evidence that Aboud manipulated 
the situation in order to get the job. He was the son of a pious
and learned man of the ICiwayuu clan who was at one time Sheikh of
the Friday mosque, but Aboud himself was more known for seducing
women than for his religious learning, Pie spent a lot of time
cultivating annual crops on the mainland as he had no land of his own. 
Before becoming headman he had gone almost every year as a sailor to 
Mombasa, Bar es Salaam or Mogadishu. He had been helping the old 
headman for some time and the latter believed him to be his friend 
and referred to him affectionately as mtoto wangu (my child). Being 
blind he was not aware that Aboud was having an affair with his wife 
behind his back. Aboud suitably impressed the various D.C.s who came 
to the village (one of whom described him as a ’’capable fellow”) and 
encouraged their belief that he was a relative of the headman’s.
From 1929 do 1931 he is referred to as Shauri!s "son”. In 1932 when 
Aboud finally took over the post of headman, the entry reads : "Mzee
/the old man - i.e. the headmar^ absolutely past work, blind^and work 
all done by Aboud, his nephew /"*sic 7 » Village clean as II,M. knew of 
my arrival beforehand. Mzee Shauri given Head Tax Exemption Certifi­
cate and Aboud will receive wages”.
Certain points emerge from examination of this process. Support
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in the village and wealth in money or slaves ceased to he of import­
ance in achieving political position, as did'clan membership. What 
was important was ability to ingratiate oneself with the British 
officers who visited the village from time to time. Wot everyone 
would want to do this since the post of village headman held few 
rewards* The salary was small (even in 19^5 Aboud was receiving 
only 75/- every six months) and the headman had to carry out unpopular 
government decisions. In 1930 for example Aboud had to take a man 
suspected of involvement in a stabbing incident to Lamu where he was 
imprisoned for several months. He had to see that the village was 
kept clean - an almost impossible task. (The last entry in 1933
reads : "Town clean in parts, particularly where B.C. was expected to 
walk"). He had no power or sanctions of his own and was at one time 
fined by the D.G. for failing to see that the town was kept clean.
The post of king had been completely transformed. The only similarity 
between the past and. the present was that, in the past, only Waungwana 
were competing for the post.
In 1965 Aboud was still headman of Tundwa, but he was about 
75 years old and becoming blind and deaf, and the processes of 1930 
were repeating themselves all over again. For several years he had 
been helped by a man called Madi, a mwungwana of the Losii clan.
Madi was acting in an unpaid and unofficial capacity and his stated 
aim was to succeed to the post of headman when Aboud became too old.
He was thus following almost the same tactics which Aboud himself had
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followed some 35 years "before# He and Aboud were good friends and 
Madi used to visit Aboud nearly every day to discuss the affairs of 
the village and to write any letters that had to be written. In 
spite of the fact that the position of deputy to the headman was quite 
unofficial, the D.A. in fact treated Madi most of the time as if he 
were already headman. Recognising this, people had begun to call 
Madi "the nowadays headman" (hediman wa lcisasa), and when disputes 
arose they took them more often to Madi than to Aboud,
The life-history of Madi helps us to some extent to understand 
his present activities. He attended Koran school for one year in 
Tundwa when a young boy. He cultivated for some time on the mainland 
opposite Faza island and then went to Mombasa. His father was at 
that time a butcher in Machakos (an up-country town in Kenya) and Madi 
soon went to join him there. He worked as a butcher there himself 
for seventeen years, returning to marry in Tundwa. He took his wife 
back with him and she bore him a daughter there who attended school in 
Machakos. Madi himself attended an Adult education class there for 
one year, and in this way became literate and knowledgeable of a few 
English words. His butcher1s shop was at first a success, but due 
to a series of misfortunes and illness (he was a diabetic) he began 
to make losses, and eventually returned to Tundwa. There he culti­
vated a small shamba which he had inherited on his father1s death.
In 1965 he was about 50 years old. He was an able and ambitious 
man, and more committed than most in the village to a belief in 1modern1
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progressive* ideas - for example he was strongly in favour of build­
ing a school in Tundwa and urged the people to form a farmers* co­
operative. As such he was the kind of man likely to be acceptable 
to government officials. He was not the kind of man who would have 
been traditionally acceptable as a political leader. Like the head­
man he was relatively poor - his shamba was only one and a half acres 
in size and he had no savings. Like Aboud too he had been a labour 
migrant for many years, and this experience had given him a degree of 
familiarity with the ideas and standards of the outside world which 
most others lack. Another similarity with Aboud was his minimal 
religious education - though Madi could cope here better than Aboud, 
who was openly ridiculed when he tried to recite the Koran.
The other * official* in the village at the beginning of 19^5 
was the Councillor, Hobein, who had been elected to the post some 
time before Independence. Why this particular man was chosen is not 
at all clear now. He faced no opposition and no-one seemed to be 
aware of the significance of the post at the time. Hobein is a 
member of the Kiunga clan of the Waungwana. He has no land of his 
own but cultivates a shamba of about four and a half acres belonging 
to his mother which had almost reverted to bush before he took it over. 
Before the Zanzibar revolution he had gone three years in succession 
to Pemba to trade amongst the clove pickers there. Hobein is said 
to have never uttered a word in Area Council meetings and did not 
report back on them to the villagers. He was a colourless man whom
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most people regarded as merely a front for another man, an insepar­
able friend of his called Muhaji. It was Muhaji who was the real 
power behind the role of Councillor, Muhaji was a Koran school 
teacher. He had no land of his own, but had violated local rules 
by appropriating for himself a piece of common land and planting 
permanent trees there. Although this created some ill-feeling against 
him no-one did anything to stop him because there is no land shortage 
at present in Tundwa. Muhaji was a mwungwana of the Mazumi clan - 
a very small clan. More importantly however his mother was an ex­
slave, and he was therefore looked down upon by most ^ure1 Waungwana. 
As such it was difficult for him personally to pursue political 
ambitions, so he pursued them through Hobein. His status was signi­
ficant in another respect as we shall see shortly. But both Hobein 
and Muhaji were more like traditional leaders than was Madi or the 
headman. They were both men with a veneer of religious piety, which 
gave them some status. It is of some interest too that neither had 
been labour migrants in the normal sense of the word. Muhaji had 
visited other places such as Mombasa but had never worked there.
But like Madi and the headman neither were wealthy men.
1
Factional conflicts
At the beginning of 1965 Hobein, Muhaji and Madi were the 
leaders of a faction group which they themselves described as "on the 
side of the government” (i shall call it Faction 1). Aboud, the
1. This part of the Chapter will be clearer if reference is made to 
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headman, was also loosely associated with this group, but his age 
made him irrelevant. When this faction described itself as "govern­
ment men" they had some cause* They were the core of a small 
minority in the village which had supported their M*P*fs crossing of 
the floor in Parliament* Originally both Lamu M.P.s had belonged to 
the Shungwaya Freedom Party* After Independence however one of the 
Bajuni M.P.s (whom I shall call M.P.1) was persuaded to cross the floor 
and join KANU (the government party) as a political move. Later 
Kenya became a one-party state and KADU and its constituent parties 
were voluntarily dissolved. M.P.1fs crossing of the floor lost him 
much support amongst the Bajunis, though he continued to have some 
supporters, of which this faction was one. It is not altogether 
clear that in supporting him they were concerned about national 
politics. But KANU was obviously a powerful force and had its local 
representative in the D.A., a man on whom the headman and his deputy 
depended for their positions. Although this did not in theory apply 
to the Councillor, in practice he had very little room for manoeuvre, 
even had he wanted it, because it was the D.A. who had power in Faza 
Division, not the Area Council.
There were other reasons why this Tundwa faction supported 
M.P.1. M.P.1*s mother belonged to the mchumwa category like Muhaji*s
mother, though on his father*s side M.P.1 was a mwungwana of the 
Rasmali clan. The two men were in fact related - though very distantly. 
More important than the actual relationship however was the fact that
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this put both men into the nether world “between the Waungwana and 
the Wachumwa. Although they were formally speaking Waungwana, the 
accusation that ’’your mother was a slave” was liable to be levelled 
against them at any time.
Faction 1 thus depended for its position mainly on its 
relationship with the D.A., at that time an African Muslim from one 
of the coastal tribes. In order to win his approval and continued 
backing they were forced into assisting him with tax assessments.
This was nominally the headman’s job but he was too old and too deaf 
to be an effective help. As far as both the D.A. and the villagers 
were concerned the headman was largely irrelevant and was ignored 
for most of the time.
Hobein and Muhaji also helped the headman or his deputy in 
the settlement of disputes, though it was usually the deputy headman, 
Madi, who took the main part in such affairs.
It was mainly their role in tax assessments which created ill- 
feeling against Faction 1 in the town, and predictably it came from 
wealthy men who were in danger of being taxed at a high rate. As I 
understand it, previous to Independence every adult male was taxed 
at the same rate (12/- per annum). After Independence however taxes 
were raised and a new scheme of graduated personal tax came into being. 
The basic minimum rate under this scheme was 48/- per year, the maxi­
mum £30* Most adult men in Tundwa were paying at the rate of 48/- per 
year which should have meant that they were earning not more than £96
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per year. (Many of them were probably not earning as much as this - 
see Chapter II). When a man was stated by the deputy headman or the 
Councillor to have a shop or a large shamba however he was usually 
asked to pay at the next rate - 7^/- (for men earning between £96 and 
£144 pe:r year). The tax of the richest man in the village (Sharif 
Sura whom I mentioned in Chapter II) was assessed at 480/-- in 1965 
(for men earning between £516 and £600 per year). Two points must 
be made here. First is that none of these three men helping the 
government were liable to more than 48/- on the strength of their 
earnings, so they had nothing to fear personally. Second is the 
fact that there has been no government assessment of property owner­
ship in Tundwa - no D.A. knows how much land is under cultivation or 
how much any person owns or uses. He thus has to rely entirely on 
the advice of such men as these. And whereas I do not think they 
ever claimed that some persons had property which they did not have, 
it seems very likely that they did not mention the property holdings 
of others.
Wealthy men in the village were resentful on two accounts.
In the first place they did not think it fair that they should pay 
more tax than other people, and secondly they were angry that certain 
men should inform on them to the government. "The leaders (wa.jumbe) 
of this place are very bad1’, said one. "They tell the D.A. we have 
property we donft have and the D.A. doesnft know and has to believe 
them". The problem of those who opposed Faction 1 was that the only
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way to remove its leaders was to discredit them in the eyes of the 
government and this could not "be done in terms of tax assessment.
On the other hand Madi in particular was well aware that he could not 
go too far and that his relationship with the government depended 
also on him not entirely losing his support in the village. This 
was particularly shown on the first occasion when the leadership of 
the other faction (which I shall call Faction 2) began to show itself.
Political action : Phase 1
An order had been issued by the Chief stating that huts must 
be built on the outskirts of the village in which animals (goats and 
donkeys mainly) should be fastened at night. Normally they were 
left to roam freely about the village and this was one of the reasons 
why the town was so dirty. An anonymous letter was sent by some 
Tundwa men to the D.C. in Lamu complaining about the order and saying 
that the animals would catch diseases from mosquitoes if they were 
treated in this way. It was signed; “We, your subjects”. When 
the D.C. sent this letter back to the D.A. demanding that the authors 
be discovered and reprimanded, the D.A. inquired from both the headman 
and his deputy as to who had written this letter. Both claimed to be 
quite unable to discover who the culprits were, although everyone in 
the town was well aware that the leaders of Faction 2 had written it. 
Eventually Mudathir, the main leader of Faction 2, voluntarily confessed 
to having written the letter and was reprimanded. The first move of 
this faction had therefore failed whilst Madi had not endangered his 
standing in the village.
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Before examining the process whereby Faction 2 usurped the 
power of Faction 1 it is of interest to examine its leadership and 
compare it with that of the other faction. Its two main leaders 
were Mudathir and his father’s Brother’s son ShahiBu. ShahiBu was 
also married to Mudathir*s sister, making them Brothers-in-law. Both 
these men were Waungwana of the Kiunga clan like HoBein - they were in 
fact HoBein’s patrilateral parallel cousins., all three Being descend- 
ents of a common grandfather. Why they were in different factions is 
very difficult to explain since no-one would admit that the men had 
any personal differences (i do not rule this possibility out however). 
It is of interest however that the descendents of their grandfather 
fall into two groups - one which is wealthy and greatly intermarried 
(five intermarriages within two generations) and to which Mudathir 
and ShahiBu Belong, and the other which is much poorer and within 
which no intermarriages have taken place and to which HoBein Belongs. 
When asked to explain this situation Mudathir said, ”1 like to Be on 
the side where all my relatives and friends (.jamaa) are; HoBein has 
no .jamaa on his side, he is all alone” . Although not strictly true, 
this explanation is significant as we shall see.
Mudathir owned a large piece of land aBout eleven acres in 
size, so he has never needed to migrate, although he has visited Lamu 
and MomBasa. Together with his cousin ShahiBu he is the ’patron’ 
of a mosque in a location of the town where Both live. Both men are 
learned in the traditional sense of Being aBle to read and recite the
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Koran and thereby to play a respected role in maulidis or funeral 
prayer readings. Shahibu was even more wealthy than his cousin since 
in addition to owning eleven acres of better planted land than Mudathir 
he also owns a shop and lends money. Both these men are strong and 
forceful in character, and like the leaders of Faction 1, were occasion­
ally called to mediate in land disputes.
Behind these two were other minor leaders such as Baishe and 
Nassibu, both shopkeepers like Shahibu, though by no means as wealthy 
as him. But equally important were two Sharifs, who could more aptly 
be described as ‘influential backers* rather than leaders since they 
rarely came out into the open. One of these, Sharif Hassan, was 
again a shopkeeper and a money lender who owned six and a half acres 
of land newly planted. The other was Sharif Hussein, the son-in-law 
of Sharif Sura and the second richest man in the village. None of 
these people had been labour migrants.
Thus all these men were wealthy and learned in the traditional 
manner, respected men of the town who came from fgood* families (i.e. 
ones with no slave ancestry). They were the kind of men who might 
well have been leaders in the past. The faction which they formed 
was at first ‘anti-government* in a sense. They were supporters of 
the other Lamu member of Parliament, M.P.2, whose mother was Shahibu*s 
sister.
Control of the mosque : Episode 1
Even before 1965 Mudathir and Shahibu had shown themselves to
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be powerful men in the town, as is shown in the following case study 
of their clash with the Sheikh of the mosque.
Ahout fifteen years previously the Sheikh of the mosque, who 
was a mwungwana and father of the present headman of the village, 
died. His deputy, Sharif Sura (the richest man in the village) was 
also very old and soon relinquished the post to his son, Sharif 
Mohamed. Sharif Mohamed was married to a mwungwana woman whose 
"brother was a man I shall call Sheikh Luki. At this time Sheikh 
Luki used to go to P em b a every year, trading amongst the clove pickers 
who congregate there during the season. He also traded in Mombasa 
and paid labourers to cultivate for him on the mainland opposite Faza 
island. He was thus quite wealthy, although he owned no land. (His 
father was however a very rich man, owning almost thirteen acres of 
land, which Sheikh Luki will eventually inherit). He was able to 
go to Mecca on pilgrimage and to visit Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia 
on the way. He also studied religion in Zanzibar. It was after 
he came back from Zanzibar that people began to call him sheikh ~ 
which in this more general sense means a religiously learned man.
He began to act as Sharif Mohamed1s deputy in the mosque. He still 
visited Pemba every year however and was thus unable to read the 
sermon all the time.
About this time two events occurred which affected the position 
of both men. Firstly Sharif Mohamed became engaged in a scandal which 
invoked the wrath of Mudathir and Shahibu, leaders of Faction 2. He
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was at the time a money lender, lending money mainly to women. He 
is said to have drawn up agreements stating that if the money was not 
repaid within a certain time, the woman would forfeit her house. Most 
women who "borrowed from him did not realise what they were letting 
themselves in for. What is not clear is how many houses he actually 
confiscated in this way. Some people said several "but I only know 
certainly of this one case, Sharif Mohamed lent 200/- to a very old 
woman who was practically senile. Her house was the surety, though 
whether or not she understood this is not clear. The old lady did 
not repay the money and she died soon afterwards. When the period 
of mourning was finishing Sharif Mohamed came along to take possession 
of the house. Unfortunately for him, the old lady was a relative of 
Shahibii's. Shahibu and Mudathir refused to let Sharif Mohamed take 
over the house, claiming that the certificate of ownership was in the 
name of the old ladyfs daughter. This daughter was Shahibu1s sister. 
There was a quarrel and the case was taken to court, Sharif Mohamed 
was defeated and from this time onwards this faction worked to get 
Sharif Mohamed removed from the post of Sheikh, by rousing up feeling 
against him in the town. They eventually succeeded at the beginning 
of 1965.
Meanwhile the revolution in Zanzibar (1963) prevented Sheikh
Luki from trading in Pemba and the Shifta incursions prevented further
large-scale cultivation on the mainland. He was therefore free to
oF SheiKh
take over the post/and this he did. At the beginning of 19^5 he was
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doing all the work of Sheikh and Sharif Mohamed had completely stopped 
reading* Sheikh Luki was thus without a deputy. After a while he 
hegan to suggest that Sharif Mohamed should come hack and he his deputy. 
He complained that he could not he in the mosque every Friday and 
needed someone to help him. But feeling against Sharif Mohamed was 
still running high and no—one wanted him to return.
In early 1965 therefore Faction 2 had not only secured the 
dismissal of Sharif Mohamed, hut had also put Sheikh Luki in the 
position of supporting an unpopular man. At this period however Luki 
was acceptable to Faction 2 as Sheikh of the mosque since he was the 
son of a rich man who was one of their supporters. In addition he 
stood head and shoulders ahove anyone else in the town in terms of the 
extent of his religious learning, and he was greatly respected for this. 
Someone told me at the beginning of 1965 that, 11 if Sheikh Luki says a 
thing, people follow'1. This was an exaggeration, even at that time, 
hut it does give some indication of Sheikh Luki*s standing in the town. 
Faction 2 therefore looked upon him as a useful supporter.
At the same time however there were also links between Sheikh. 
Luki and Faction 1. He was linked to this faction first through Madi, 
or rather, Madifs wife, Madina. If reference is made to Chapter III 
it will he noted that Madina maintained contact with several women 
through her brother*s wife, Biti. Sheikh Luki was Biti*s brother. 
(Sharif Mohamed was also linked to Faction 1 in this way since he was 
married to Biti*s sister). Faction 1 was also indirectly associated
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with Sheikh Luki through Muhaji, the Koran school teacher and co­
leader of Paction 1 with Madi and Hobein. Both Muhaji and Lulti. ' 
were supporters of an Islamic 1missionary’ called Ibrahim* This man 
had arrived in the island about ten years previously from Lamu. He 
had come specifically to teach religion and had been sent by a power­
ful group of Lamu Sharifs who control the largest Friday moscjue there 
and are believed to have supernatural powers* They belong to the 
Jamallylel clan of the Masherifu, a clan which came from the Cormoro 
islands at the beginning of this century. They are not related to 
the Bajuni Sharifs therefore except by ultimate descent from the Prophet. 
It is said that "the people of Kisingitini" (probably just a section of 
them) went to the Lamu Sharifs and requested them to send a religious 
teacher to Kisingitini. Ibrahim - who was not himself a Sharif, but 
who had been taught by the Lamu Sharifs - was sent. He set up a 
madrasa (a kind of Islamic secondary school) in Kisingitini and after 
a few years had gathered around him a band of dedicated and energetic 
followers who set up madrasas in most of the other villages on the 
island. One was set up in Tundwa, with Sheikh Luki as one of its 
main backers.
Ibrahim is an extremely clever man and a born politician^who 
manages to be all things to all men. It is not at all easy then to 
assess his true position on any matter. But two facets of his teach­
ing are of relevance to us here. The first is that at an early stage
1• P. Lienhardt has written an account of the history and religious 
role of the Lamu Sharifs (Lienhardt, 1959)*
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in his stay at Kisingitini he turned against his mentors, the Lamu 
Sharifs. (The reason for this change need not concern us here). He 
hegan to preach against them, arguing that they were against 1progress*. 
He put forward this point of view as specifically concerning the Lamu 
Sharifs, not Sharifs in general. In this way he managed not to 
antagonise the Bajuni Sharifs, many of whom supported him. But there 
were some Sharifs and Waungwana, who, whilst supporting Ibrahim*s 
teaching work, did not follow him in the matter of the Lamu Sharifs. 
Sheikh Luki was amongst these, as we shall see.
The second facet of Ibrahim’s teaching which concerns us here 
is that concerning ’Western* education. Ibrahim and his followers 
were believers in Islamic education, and some of them even argued that 
Western education was forbidden by their religion. The heart of both 
these controversies was in Kisingitini, but they had their echo in 
other villages too, since Ibrahim had followers almost everywhere.
This then is the background to Sheikh Luki*s structural position 
in Tundwa at the beginning of 19^5* He had links with both factions 
and was an important man in the town. The issue of who should control 
the mosque had been temporarily settled and did not arise again until 
July. In the meantime however Paction 2 was beginning to assert 
itself as a political force in the town and was challenging the position 
of Paction 1.
Political Action : Phase 2
Paction 2 first tried to separate the old headman from the other
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faction* They told him he should have nothing to do with Madi and 
the others, and that he should assert himself* Faction 1 countered 
this hy visiting Ahoud constantly and 11 consulting” him ahout village 
affairs* Faction 2 also complained to the D*A. that Madi and Muhaji 
were going around looking into people*s houses at their wives and 
threatening them that their husbands would he imprisoned. The D.A* 
took no notice of these complaints.
It was just ahout this time that the D.A. was transferred and 
was replaced hy a Kikuyu (i.e. an African from up-country Kenya). The 
attitude of the majority of the people in the town to this man is 
perhaps predictahle, "How is it that a slave is given a hig jib 
like this?” asked one man. "Why, he can*t even speak Swahili". It 
was at this time that I was first told the story of Noah*s punishment, 
which I recounted in Chapter VI. In addition however the new man 
took such a tough line ahout tax: assessments and the prompt payment 
of tax that the divisions in the village were obscured hy a temporary 
unity. The new D.A. also expressed annoyance at the lack of progress 
achieved hy the Bajuni in self-help projects. Village Committees 
should he set up to forward this end he announced. Madi obediently 
set ahout forming such a committee in Tundwa, and although no-one was 
particularly enthusiastic to take part in it, he was able to take a 
list of twelve names to the D.A. next day. He had been careful to 
see that whilst his own supporters were all on the committee, the other 
side was also represented. In this way he was able to assure the D.A.
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of the support of the whole village for the scheme and thereby to 
gain his approval* The Committee never met or carried out any 
activities; it was a committee in name only.
Around the end of May the D.A. began to demand that everyone 
pay his tax immediately. Since the harvest had not yet been gathered 
in many men had no ready cash with which to pay and resentment grew.
Other men complained that they had been assessed at too high a rate.
The resentment was carefully fostered by Faction 2, which eventually 
sent a deputation of three of its supporters to see the D.C. in Lamu. 
They did this at the suggestion of M.P.2. The main leaders did not 
go - it seems probable that they were unwilling to show themselves 
openly at this point. Two of the men who went probably had a fair 
complaint about their tax assessments, but the third, Sharif Hussein, 
the second richest man in the village, certainly had none. All three 
appear to have tried to deceive the D.C. regarding the extent of their 
property holdings. They came back reporting that the D.C. had pro­
mised to look into their cases and to visit Tundwa, but he did not
come and nothing further came of the affair.
By now however feeling was running high and soon many men in 
Tundwa were refusing to pay tax and the ’boycott* began to spread to 
other villages. At this point the D.A. was transferred to another 
area. Faction 2 claimed this as a victory achieved by them and many 
people argued that the D.A. had been removed, "because he insulted 
the people of Tundwa". The new D.A. was a temporary man - he stayed
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for only three weeks, during which time he arrested twelve Tundwa 
men and some men from other villages who were in arrears with their 
tax, and the tax "boycott spluttered to an end* The D.A. was careful 
to arrest men who were weak and without political power in the town, 
thus avoiding the possibility of a dangerous confrontation with the 
real leaders of the affair.
At the end of June the temporary D*A. left and his successor 
arrived. This man was a Muslim from Mombasa and therefore in a 
different category altogether as far as the Bajuni were concerned. 
Nevertheless he was still a representative of the Central government, 
an African government. After he had been in his post for about a 
month the D.A. came to Tundwa to hold a meeting at which he gave a 
speech# One of his biggest complaints was that the Tundwa Village 
Committee had done nothing since its formation, and that it should 
now start to be active. But his main aim in holding the meeting was 
to set up a branch of KANU in Tundwa. He argued that the people in 
this area had got nothing so far out of Independence because they had 
no party members and did not speak with one voice. But all were en­
titled to the benefits from Independence since everyone had fought for 
it. (As an afterthought he added, "Did you not fight against the 
Arabs and the Portuguese?") A KANU branch should therefore be set 
up immediately. There was some attempt by Paction 1 to prevent this 
happening - particularly from Muhaji. At first it was not clear why 
they were doing this, but eventually Madi admitted that they were waiting
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for the arrival of M.P.1 with whom they had agreed to discuss the 
formation of such a party branch* M*P*1 did not have much support 
in the town at that time since he was said not to "help people" (i.e. 
to get their taxes reduced), so Paction 1*s objections were pushed 
aside, and the D.A. retired whilst the branch officers were being 
1 elected*, Madi took control immediately, calling out names and 
asking if people were willing to participate. As on the previous 
occasion (of the formation of the Village Committee) he managed to 
get his own men, including himself, into the group, whilst at the 
same time organising the other faction into participating. The 
membership of the Village Committee and that of the KANU branch turned 
out in fact to be almost identical. Madi nominated himself as Secretary, 
with Mudathir, leader of Paction 2 as his deputy. He also nominated 
Hobein, Muhaji and another supporter of this faction, Makka, a mchumwa 
Koran school teacher. The other seven members of the committee were 
all supporters of the opposing faction. They included Shahibu, three 
young Sharifs, two shopkeepers and another man. Nassibu, one of the 
shopkeepers, was made Chairman.
The meeting was also notable for the fact that the election 
for a new Councillor was announced. Madi stood up and said that 
Hobein would stand again, and arguing that unity was important in the 
town he suggested that it would be better if there was no opposition. 
Throughout the meeting then Madi attempted to display his authority in 
the town to the D.A. whilst the other faction remained largely apathetic.
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Me have to remember that the leaders of Paction 2 were by no means 
supporters of KANU. They had originally been supporters of the 
S.P.P., but the S.P.P. had been voluntarily dissolved when Kenya be­
came a one-party state. But to have refused to serve on the KANU 
branch would not have improved their standing with the D.A., so they 
raised no protest. The composition of the KANU branch was signifi­
cant in that superficially it showed that there was no discord in 
the town. But why did Madi not put more of his own supporters on 
the committee? The reason was simply that amongst the important 
and reputed men of the town (the watu mashuhuri) — the kind of men 
who typically attend such meetings - Paction 1 had little support.
Most of these men are wealthy and they particularly resented the role 
of the leaders of Paction 1 in the tax assessments. Madi therefore 
appointed Makka, the mchumwa Koran school teacher to the committee.
This move was very important. As we have seen in earlier chapters, 
Makka was one of the richest men amongst the Wachumwa and their only 
Koran school teacher. As such he had to some extent achieved a status 
higher than that with which he was born. But as a man of the ex­
slave category Makka had many relatives in this category - M.P.1 and 
Muhaji were both very distant relatives of his on their mother*s side. 
He was also an exceptionally passive man, somewhat similar to Hobein 
in character, never speaking in public meetings. He could thus be 
relied upon to bring in support for Paction 1 whilst at the same time 
not questioning its leadership.
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As can be seen, the Sharifs were all on the side of Mudathir. 
The real Sharif support for this faction was not on the committee 
however - the two men involved, Sharif Hassan and Sharif Hussein, 
always kept in the background. The Sharifs on the committee were 
not particularly well off, hut they were the son, the nephew and the 
brother respectively of the two men mentioned above.
The KANU branch, like the Village Committee, never held any 
activities. After this meeting Madi made some half-hearted attempts 
to reactivate the Village Committee and Makka was made its Chairman.
He did not have much success and soon his activities were diverted 
into canvassing support for Hobein in the forthcoming election.
M.P.1 put forward the money for Hobein*s nomination fee. Meanwhile 
the other faction met secretly and announced its intention of putting 
up Mudathir for the post of Councillor. Those who attended this 
meeting were the main leaders of Faction 2 - Mudathir, Shahibu, Baishe, 
Nassibu, and Sharif Hussein, and a few other supporters. Sheikh 
Luki was one of those invited. Mudathir*s nomination fee was paid 
by himself and Shahibu. There were rumours that the meeting had
decided to ask the D.A. to remove the headman and put Shahibu in his 
place - rumours which were later verified. This move was directed 
mainly against Madi. Faction 2 even went so far as to write a peti­
tion asking the D.A. to appoint Shahibu as headman. I was told by 
one man that this petition received 190 signatures, though this was 
probably an exaggeration. He said he had signed the petition because,
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"it is "better to follow". Some men who were supporters of faction 1 
refused to sign it however. from this point onwards the Village 
Committee ceased to exist again as it was now too sharply split.
With the appearance of Mudathir as a candidate, Madi*s support 
for Hohein ceased to he an affirmation of his belief in village unity 
and became a political position. The D.A. called him and warned him 
that he must be impartial in the intrigues that were going on in the 
town. He also called Mudathir and told him that he would not stand 
for any attempts to undermine the position of his headman. Nothing 
more was heard of the move to remove the headman and the petition was 
never delivered. Madi took good note of the D.A.*s advice and be- 
came more non-committal in his public comments on the election.
Control of the moscrue ; Episode 2
In the month before the election however Tundwa had been 
split on another issue. At the beginning of July Sheikh Luki began 
to make arrangements for the townfs maulidi (annual Koran recital to 
celebrate the Prophet*s birth). It has been customary for many years 
for certain villages on the island to invite the Lamu Sharifs for 
this occasion to read the maulidi, and Sheikh Luki decided to invite 
them to Tundwa. Unfortunately for him however, this created a great 
controversy in the town, very few people wanting the Sharifs to come. 
This was partly a result of Ibrahim*s activities (in Kisingitini how­
ever the controversy was much more serious than in Tundwa) and partly 
the result of a pre-existing antagonism which Ibrahim had merely
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fostered. It is said that in the past the Lamu Sharifs used to take 
advantage of their supposed supernatural powers and superior status 
in order to ’marry1 and seduce women secretly for the two nights or 
so of their visit, divorcing the women when they left. The women 
seemed to rather enjoy these visits and were in favour of the Sharifs 
being invited, but understandably most of the men did not, and they 
described the Sharifs as "women snatchers11 (wal ipokortya wanawake tu)»
In this particular conflict the leaders of Faction 2 were 
united against Sheikh Luki’s move to invite the Lamu Sharifs, though 
one or two of their supporters were in favour of inviting them.
Faction 1 was however completely divided, Madi was not particularly 
averse to the visit of the Sharifs, and even allowed his wife to head 
a women’s ’committee’ to help Sheikh Luki organise the affair, Muhaji 
however, as a strong supporter of Ibrahim, the missionary, bitterly 
opposed the visit, and Hobein tagged along with him, A curious 
feature of the conflict was that the Tundwa Sharifs were themselves 
divided on the issue - some of them strongly opposed the visit of 
the Lamu Sharifs whilst others supported Sheikh Luki, (Sharif 
Mohamed was in this latter category, though he kept very quiet through 
this period. So too were two Sharif supporters of Faction 2), The 
complaints about the invitation increased in volume until Sheikh Luki 
was forced ignominiously to retract it. He then went to Lamu, leaving 
one of his Sharif supporters to organise Tundwa’s maulidi. The 
maulidi was notable in that one Tundwa follower of Ibrahim used the 
occasion to make a speech severely critising the religious learning
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of the Lamu Sharifs* Sheikh Luki did not return until after the 
maulidi was over and the dissension had died down*
The Sharif*s lack of unity in relation to this issue is 
significant. Earlier, when Sharif Mohamed had alienated support hy 
his money lending activities the Masherifu as a whole did not rally 
to his support — he had some Sharif supporters, hut very few. As a 
minority group, such action would not have gained them anything.
But in addition, most of the Masherifu were already supporters of 
Faction 2 and they would have had to renounce this position in order 
to support Mohamed. On the issue of whether or not to invite the 
Lamu Sharifs their loyalties were more sharply divided. As Sharifs 
they were necessarily sympathetic to the Lamu Sharifs, even though 
the latter were of a different clan and origin to themselves. But 
the Sharifs in Tundwa also claim to he Bajunis, and as Bajunis they 
are well aware of the activities of the Lamu Sharifs. Moreover they 
themselves have never had the power to sustain a role amongst the 
Bajunis similar to that of the Lamu Sharifs, and they are well aware 
that they are unlikely to gain such power. Support of the Lamu 
Sharifs would have alienated them from other Bajunis.
Political Action ; Phase 3
This issue had practically simmered down however hy August, 
when the election for a new Councillor was held. The results were 
as follows:
Hohein.................. 68 votes (42f0 of the votes)
Mudathir.......... .91 votes (58$ of the votes)
228
The election was hy secret hallot so it is not possible to say cer­
tainly from where the support of each side came. Some points can 
be made however. Out of the total adult population of Tundwa of 
626 persons, only 264 were registered voters and of these 159 voted 
(i.e. about 60$). 58$ of those who voted were women. Half of the
Sharif women came to vote, a little more than a quarter of the 
Waungwana women, and a third of the Wachumwa women. Of the 42$ of 
the men who voted less than a quarter of the Sharifs and Wachumwa men 
voted and only a third of the Waungwana men. When I asked privately 
why Hobein had received so many votes when he was not generally liked 
in the town, I was told that many Wachumwa women, relatives of Muhaji*s 
mother, had voted for him. This would certainly explain the relatively 
high proportion of Wachumwa women who voted, and others must have been 
recruited by Maltka. The contrast between the small number of men 
voting compared with those of women is more difficult to explain 
though it was a feature also of a later election. Generally when it 
comes to it, men are very reluctant to commit themselves since to 
commit oneself is to accept certain obligations and to reject the 
other side. Whereas for women it is generally only kinship ties 
which determine voting habits, for men other ties are relevant as 
well - ties of indebtedness or economic dependency for example, and 
more directly political sympathies. Men in general however prefer 
to keep on the side that is winning, as the Bajuni themselves do in 
a wider context. Where it is not clear which side will win, many
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prefer to stay neutral — as they did here. In addition however the 
number of Wachumwa men who voted was exceptionally small - only four­
teen men. Wachumwa men are notably passive in political affairs.
They rarely attend public political meetings and never speak at such 
meetings. I shall return to this point later* Sharif men too did 
not come in large numbers to vote.
For a short period after the election there was a complete 
transformation in the town. Mudathir held a victory meeting and 
announced that, "I am ready to work for you and for the government 
to end the hardships of our life". He and his main supporters 
promised that a school and a dispensary would be built and other 
projects started. Mudathir went to see the D.A., who told him that 
he had found Madi a very useful man and that Mudathir should give him 
every respect and co-operate with him. Mudathir agreed to do this - 
Madifs attempt at neutrality before the election had been noted all 
round - with approval by Faction 2 and with anger by Muhaji and Hobein. 
The ill—feeling between Faction 2 and M.P.1 was dissipated at a meet­
ing organised by the D.A. to arrange a reconciliation, and at a later 
meeting Muhaji and Hobein were superficially reconciled with the 
leaders of Faction 2. The Village Committee suddenly became active 
again and organised mass cleaning operations in the town and parties 
to clear the path to Basini. The only men who actively refused to 
take part in these activities were Muhaji and Hobein. Madi took part, 
as did Makka.
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In all these activities Mudathir was making a determined 
attempt "both to impress the D*A. and to unite the town behind his 
leadership. He appears to have succeeded in the former, and he also 
succeeded in the latter for a short while.
Control of the mosque : Episode 3
Meanwhile it was not long after the election that a fresh 
storm blew up in the village concerning Sharif Mohamed. At the end 
of Aiigust Sharif Mohamed went to Lamu and reported to the police that 
certain men in Tundwa had guns and were purchasing bullets without a 
licence. The police came to Tundwa to search the houses of the men 
named by Sharif Mohamed, but the weapons were quickly hidden and were 
not found by the police. The main point is that two of the men 
whose houses were searched were Mudathir and Shahibu, with whom Sharif 
Mohamed had earlier come into conflict over the house. One can only 
assume that Mohamed was in this way trying to revenge himself on the 
two men. Unfortunately they heard of his involvement in the police 
search and Mohamed found the whole town against him. Sheikh Luki 
stepped in at this point and tried to effect a reconciliation between 
Sharif Mohamed and Mudathir and Shahibu, but was unsuccessful. At 
this time then Sheikh Luki had not only reaped opprobrium by his action 
in inviting the Lamu Sharifs, but also by trying to effect this un­
successful reconciliation.
Sheikh Luki went on reading the sermon, but Faction 2 began to 
work against him from this time on, and his support in the town began
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to dwindle. Sheikh Luki at this point shifted his allegiance to 
Faction 1•
The main point about this episode was that Sharif Mohamed*s 
action was directly related to the political factions in Tundwa. 
Mudathir having won the election it became clear to everyone that 
Faction 2 had gained power in the village, and that they would now be 
able to exert more effective control over the mosque* Their power 
in the village was however directly related to their standing with 
the government. Sharif Mohamed was trying to destroy the good im­
pression which Mudathir had succeeded in making on the D.A., and to 
discredit all the leaders of Faction 2. It is perhaps of relevance 
here that one of the names mentioned by Sharif Mohamed to the Lamu 
police was that of another Sharif - Sharif Hussein. Hussein was 
Mohamed*s brother-in-law. As we have seen earlier however Sharif 
Hussein was also an important backer of Faction 2. Sharif Mohamed*s 
bid to discredit Faction 2 failed however and he became very unpopular 
in the town.
The other significant feature of this case was Sheikh Luki*s 
unsuccessful attempt to mediate between Sharif Mohamed and the leaders 
of Faction 2. This failure was an index of Sheikh Luki*s lack of 
popular support at that time - and this in its turn was related to 
his move in inviting the Lamu Sharifs. I said eai'lier that the role 
of Sheikh could be an Influential one, in that he might mediate in 
certain kinds of disputes* But it would be inaccurate to suggest
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that the Sheikh has any ’authority* to settle disputes - he has in­
fluence rather than authority, and he is only allowed to exert as 
much of it as the two disputants are prepared to accept* At a public 
meeting much earlier in the year Sheikh Luki had stepped in to prevent 
a dispute between M*P.1 and another man breaking into violence* On 
this occasion he had been successful, firstly because at that period 
he was greatly respected in the town, and secondly because public 
opinion was behind him* By August however Sheikh Luki’s popularity 
had declined and in addition his support of Sharif Mohamed went com­
pletely against public opinion. Therefore he could not achieve a 
reconciliation. A mediator can only be successful moreover if he 
is genuinely neutral. And not only was Sheikh Luki obviously pre­
judiced in this case, but in addition, since the post of Sheikh is 
itself a subject of political factionalism it is almost impossible 
for its holder to be neutral.
Political Action : Phase 4
Having successfully foiled Sharif Mohamed*s scheme to dis­
credit them, Paction 2 was even more in control in the village than 
they had been after the election. In early October a further 
opportunity arose for them to demonstrate their pre-eminence. The 
D.A. announced that the government wished to appoint four sub-chiefs 
for the Faza Division, one for Tundwa, one for ICisingitini and Bajumwali, 
one for Siyu and one for Pate. The sub-chiefs were to assist the 
Chief, and the posts were to be salaried and permanent. The selection
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procedure was to take the form of an interview with the D.A. to 
assess the candidates1 literacy and knowledge, an election to assess 
the candidates1 local support and finally on recommendation Toy the 
D.A* himself (which of course was to count for the most). The idea 
was that eventually the sub-chiefs would replace the headman.
In Tundwa three candidates stood for election, all three of 
whom were members of the Village Committee and the now defunct KANU 
branch. One was Baishe, the other Madi and the third Muhaji. At 
this point then it became clear that Paction 1 had split in half.
Madi argued that he should stand because for two years he had suffered 
”all the insults and difficulties of being the Deputy Headman” , and 
he had received no salary. Now he felt he deserved the job. Obviously 
however Muhaji and Hobein had refused to stand behind him and had 
insisted on Muhaji standing as well. There were two reasons for 
this. Firstly Madi had withdrawn his active support for Hobein in 
the election for Councillor after being warned by the D.A. that he 
must be neutral* Not only this but he had joined in wholeheartedly 
with the projects sponsored by Paction 2 after the election. Madi 
was basically an opportunist. He knew that the basis of his power 
lay in his relationship with the D.A., and that since he was disliked 
in the village for his role in tax assessments the only course of 
action open to him was to latch on to those who had power in the 
village. I suspect that Madi*s alliance with Muhaji and Hobein had 
always been an uneasy one, and he stayed in this alliance only so long
The D .A . ( l o o k i n g  b a c k ) ,  th e  C h ie f  
( w i t h  u m b e r e l la )  and a p o l ic e m a n  a t  
a m e e t in g  i n  Tundwa
S h a h ib u ,  one o f  th e  le a d e r s  o f  P a c t io n  2
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as Hobein was Councillor* The more immediate reason for the split 
in Faction 1 however had been the divergence of opinion concerning 
the visit of the Lamu Sharifs*
Baishe was a shopkeeper and a strong supporter of Faction 2.
He had also been a money lender in the past. He was a member of 
the Zitindini clan, that is those who originally ruled the town, but 
as far as I know this did not help him to gain support. One of Madi's 
supporters claimed that Mudathir and Shahibu had put up Baishe for 
the post of sub-chief because they thought that if he got the job they 
would be able to control him, and persuade him, amongst other things, 
not to report tax defaulters.
All three men went around canvassing support, and set their 
wives on doing the same. In view of the number of votes cast by 
women as opposed to those cast by men in the election, the canvassing 
of the women seems to have been more effective than that of the men. 
Baishe used to canvass support from the customers in his shop. Later 
he told me that many of the women had told him they were very sorry 
that they could not vote for him, since they must vote for their 
jamaa (in this case they meant the relatives of women with whom they 
maintained contact).
The entry of Muhaji into the electoral arena also introduced 
the factor of social status more directly. Muhaji appealed to the 
Wachumwa for support, though without directly referring to the matter 
of their lowly status. They for their part said amongst themselves:
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"Better if we vote for Muhaji* Didn't those Waungwana maltreat us 
in the past?”
Interest in this election was greater than that in the 
election for Councillor* In the first place all the people of Tundwa 
were eligible to vote, not just the registered voters. Before the 
election began women supporters of the three candidates gathered in 
three groups - those of Madi in his house which was nearby, those of 
Baishe in the house of Mudathir's sister which was also nearby, and 
those of Muhaji, the Koran school teacher, by the madrasa (Tundwa*s 
Koranic 'secondary school*). The men did not pre-group themselves 
in this way. The three candidates were asked by the D.A. to stand 
whilst their supporters, first men, then women, lined up behind them, 
and were counted. This time then I was able to see more clearly who 
was supporting which candidates, though in the time available I could 
get only some of the names down. Altogether 325 people voted, more 
than half the adult population of the town. 60$ of the voters were 
women, only 40$ men. The results of the election showed more clearly 
than before the relative strength of the three factions and from 
whence it came. Baishe won, securing 181 votes. Muhaji came next 
with 96 votes, whilst Madi secured only 48.
Whereas Baishe*s supporters were more or less ecjually divided 
between men and women, with a slight excess of men, 77$ both 
Muhaji's and Madi's support came from women. This can partly be 
explained by the fact that both these men were disliked in the town
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■because of their role in the tax assessments. Women however pay no 
tax, so this issue did not really concern them. But in addition 
almost all the powerful and rich men of the town - the shopkeepers and 
the money lenders and the big landowners - were on the side of Faction 
2, and these men had many male economic dependents of one sort or 
another who might be recruited as supporters. Afterwards Baishe 
claimed that all the men in the town were behind him and that ,fmen 
know what is right and sensible. Women are weak-willed and can easily 
be swayed and misled. They vote for a person only because he is 
their relative” . The men from whom both Muhaji and Madi might have 
expected support - i.e. the poorer men and in particular the Wachumwa 
men, are as I suggested earlier, those most apathetic about taking 
part in political activities. The election showed clearly however 
that the Wachumwa who voted were behind Muhaji and not Madi. Practically 
all Ma&i's support came from relatives - mainly members of his wife's 
kinship set - all Waungwana. Most of the Wachumwa who voted, including 
Makka, voted for Muhaji. A few however voted for Baishe. The 
Sharifs almost all voted for Baishe. Two exceptions were a Sharif 
woman and a Sharif man who voted for Muhaji. The man was Sharif 
Mohamed1s son, who in this way registered his protest against the 
leaders of Faction 2. But neither he nor Sheikh Luki turned up them­
selves for the election.
In the test Madi did better than the others and the D.A. 
seemed to be most sympathetic towards him. For this reason he was not
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too downcast after the vote, informing me that it was really up to 
the government and not the people to decide. The D.A. later des­
cribed Muhaji privately as "a cunning Koran school teacher, using 
religion as a tool to oppose progress'*.
But like so many other things, the activity to find a sub­
chief came to nothing. After several months, in which the candidates 
waited patiently, the government for some reason dropped the scheme. 
Nevertheless Paction 2 had clearly established itself in the town as 
the party of the Waungwana and Masherifu, and Paction 1 had split into 
a small dissident Waungwana group led by Madi and a Wachumwa-Waungwana * 
group led by Muhaji and Hobein.
Having established itself, Paction 2 sat back and the town 
reverted to its usual dirty state. The D.A. worked steadily for 
three months to persuade the people to build a school in Tundwa by 
self-help, but although on the surface everyone claimed to be en­
thusiastic, nothing was done. The real opponents of the school were 
Sheikh Luki and Muhaji, and all the other followers of Ibrahim, the 
Kisingitini missionary. Their antagonism to the school was based 
on religious arguments. A distinction is always made in Tundwa and 
other Bajuni villages between Islamic scholarship (elimu) and 'western* 
ediication (which is usually referred to as masomo ya dunia - 1 study of 
this world*). Elimu has great prestige, and possession of it gains 
a man much respect in the eyes of others. Such a man is not only 
learned; he is also by definition pious. A western education carries
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no such prestige, though many people are aware that knowledge of this 
kind can earn one jobs and status in the wider economy. Some people 
argue that western education is forbidden by Islam, whilst others are 
ambivalent. Some people, such as Koran school teachers, have a vested 
interest in opposing schools, whilst others are afraid that their 
children will forget their religion if they are sent to school.
At the beginning of 19^5 there was only one school on the 
island - a Primary school in Rasini. A few Tundwa men (such as M.P.1
for example) had been educated there, but even in 19^5 only nine boys 
from Tundwa attended. The journey every day (two and a half miles 
each way) put some off, whilst others could not afford to pay the 
fees (which were moderate by town standards, only fourteen shillings 
per term). But it was the prejudice against the education offered 
by the school that prevented most people from sending their children.
Ibrahim, the Kisingitini missionary, had always encouraged 
these prejudices, and his followers in every village were even more 
opposed to schools than he was himself. It was undeniable however 
that since Independence the mood was beginning to change. When 
Tundwa*s madrasa teacher left the village at the beginning of 19^5 
no-one took his place. And from Independence onwards every govern­
ment officer who visited the village made it plain that the government 
expected the people to build a school for themselves. Government 
officials looked with approval on those village leaders who supported 
this idea. It is not surprising then that Madi was a strong supporter
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of schools - though in his case, as a self-taught man, his support 
was probably genuine.
After the election of Mudathir as Councillor Faction 2 
presented itself as being in support of the idea of building a school 
in Tundwa. The issue first arose however just before the election. 
Madi was called to Rasini by the D.A. With the D.A. were some of 
the Lamu Sharifs who had come to read maulidi in some of the other 
villages on the island. They suggested to Madi that he put forward 
the idea in Tundwa of using the madrasa building as a school (this 
move was of course directed against Ibrahim and his followers, whom 
both the D.A. and the Lamu Sharifs found to be troublesome, though 
for different reasons). When Madi returned to Tundwa he did suggest 
the idea, but no-one took much notice. In the ’Victory meeting* held 
for Mudathir after the election however, Shahibu raised the matter of 
the school, and asked if all those present were in favour of sending 
their children. The meeting’s response was a unanimous, wYesJM This 
was all part of Mudathir*s attempt to gain government approval and 
no-one took it very seriously. Sheikh Luki was however disturbed 
by the idea. He hastily found a teacher and reopened the madrasa, 
and on the following Friday he preached in the mosque against the 
idea that the madrasa be used as a school. As we know however Sheikh 
Luki was not popular with Faction 2 at this period as he had tried to 
effect an unsuccessful reconciliation between Sharif Mohamed and the 
leaders of Faction 2 in the matter concerning the Lamu police. That
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very afternoon the Village Committee, with its majority of Faction 2 
members, passed a resolution in favour of the madrasa being used as 
a school. They suggested that the madrasa could still be used for 
religious teaching early in the morning. The motives of the leaders 
of Faction 2 in taking this stand was partly to gain the approval of 
the D.A., but more importantly to spite Sheikh Luki. One of their 
Sharif supporters justified their stand by saying that if the madrasa 
building was used as a school it would have to be equipped by the 
government with blackboards, chairs, pencils etc. - and that this 
equipment could then be used also for religious education. But 
Sheikh Luki was extremely offended by the Committeefs decision and 
he appealed to M.P.1. As we have seen M.P.1 was a supporter of 
Faction 1 rather than Paction 2. He agreed with Sheikh Luki and 
intervened with the D.A. to suggest that it might be better to have the 
school in a separate building. The D.A. accepted this argument - 
apparently he too had had second thoughts on the advisability of using 
^ ie madrasa building as a school, since to do so would put the govern­
ment in the apparent position of being anti-religion. Eventually 
everyone else also agreed upon this idea and a piece of land was set 
aside for the school. Then months went by before work began, show­
ing clearly I think that the enthusiasm for the school had been more 
a matter of expediency than anything else. The leaders of Faction 2 
claimed that before they could begin work on the school they must first 
repair the Friday mosque. Eventually however, at the very end of 19^5
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the building "began, and a one-class primary school was opened in 
the middle of the following year, whilst the building was still in­
complete. When 1 visited the village again in 19&7 ihe school was 
still -unfinished.
Mudathir, like his predecessor, did not report on Council
meetings or appear to take much active part in them. The Village
Committee again became inactive and when the Chief called upon it to 
help in searching out tax offenders only the old headman, his deputy 
Madi, Makka and Shahibu turned out. On the Chief’s next visit even 
Shahibu did not come, and the other three men made a pretence of help­
ing the Chief. On the other hand land disputes were now more commonly 
taken to the leaders of Faction 2, although some were still taken to 
Madi. Hobein and Muhaji no longer played any political role in the 
village.
At the end of the year then things were back to normal except 
that there had been a shift of power within the Waungwana category. 
Eighteen months later this was made complete when Madi died and the 
old headman had' to go into hospital in Mombasa. The D.A. made Baishe 
headman in his stead. There is at present no deputy.
Control of the mosque ; Episode 4
The end of the year also saw the final overthrow of Sheikh 
Luki. In December there was again discussion about finding a deputy 
Sheikh. Sheikh Luki again suggested Sharif Mohamed. Why he per­
sisted in demanding the return of the unpopular Mohamed is not entirely 
clear to me. Two factors would seem to be relevant however. One is
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that Sheikh Luki and Sharif Mohamed were friends and "brothers— in-law. 
The other factor is that Sharif Mohamed was a man of some religious 
learning and was undoubtedly the "best ’qualified* man for the office. 
The leaders of Faction 2 however refused adamantly to accept Sharif 
Mohamed, They suggested Abakari, a middle-aged mwungwana man, brother 
of the headman and thereby son of the man who used to read the sermon 
with Sharif Mohamed’s father. Reluctantly Sheikh Luki was forced 
to accept Abakari* The following Friday, when Sheikh Luki went to 
the mosque to read the sermon he found Abakari already there, acting 
in his place. Sheikh Luki was extremely angry and offended, and pro­
testing that he had not been informed that Abakari would begin to read 
that Friday he left the mosque. After he had left pandemonium broke 
out in the mosque, insults were hurled and men got out their sticks 
and knives. But eventually order was restored, though some men left.
After this Sheikh Luki refused to enter the mosque and prayed 
at home, Abakari went on reading the sermon with the support of 
Faction 2. At the end of the following year a young man was appointed 
as his deputy, the son of one of the members of this faction.
As a result of this quarrel Sheikh Luki set about the work of 
collecting money to build a new mosque. Much of the money came from 
Bajuni women in Mombasa, and the mosque was eventually opened in early 
1967* The opening ceremony was performed by two of the Lamu Sharifs.
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In this chapter I have described the main events which 
characterised the development of factional conflict in Tundwa during 
1965» I have perforce had to describe these events in terms of the 
leading personalities who took part in them and I have sketched in 
the social background only where this seemed necessary for the under­
standing of the * story1. In the Conclusion to this thesis I shall 
analyse the sociological significance of these events and I shall do 
this in terms of the outline of socia.1 structure which I gave in 
Part 1•
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CONCLUSION : AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ACTION IN TUNDWA
In the first part of this thesis my aim was to separate out 
the various contextual frameworks in terms of which social action in 
Tundwa takes place* In the second part of the thesis, and in 
Chapter VIII in particular, my aim was to describe a dynamic process 
of political conflict* In this Conclusion I shall first make an 
analysis of political action in Tundwa in terms of the existing pattern 
of social relations in the community* Following this I shall attempt 
to relate my particular research to other work on factionalism being 
carried out by social anthropologists.
Political action in Tundwa
Everyone in Tundwa was directly or indirectly involved in the 
political struggles which took place in the village in 1965* Political 
action creates crisis situations, and in such situations people align 
themselves, not randomly, according to the whims of the moment, but in 
accordance with the pre-existing pattern of social relationships in 
the community. This is why, as Bailey says: "Crisis situations have
a diagnostic value". In Tundwa such situations are of particular 
interest because Tundwa*s social structure is not such that one could 
easily say in advance what line the alignments of any individual are 
going to take. This is mainly because of the absence in Tundwa of
1. F.G. Bailey, i960, p.15.
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any corporate or other more or less permanent groups in which the 
individual would he subsumed and to which he would owe a loyalty.
Each individual in Tundwa is linked to many others through the cross­
cutting networks of kinship, friendship, neighbourhood and economic 
ties. In any political conflict he may find that some of these link­
ages would dictate one kind of allegiance, whilst other linkages may 
dictate the opposite allegiance. In such a situation he may remain 
neutral or he may decide that his interests are best served by support­
ing one side and ignoring his links with the other. In making such a 
choice a man is generally influenced by his position in a community 
which is by no means socially or economically undifferentiated. Men 
tend to align themselves politically with men who are of the same 
social stratum and economic status as themselves. As we have seen 
however there are sometimes contradictions between a man’s social 
status and his economic status* There are some men who have achieved 
a high status through wealth or piety irrespective of their descent 
status. The political alignments of such men are particularly im­
portant because they indicate the present significance of achieved 
as opposed to ascriptive status in the social organisation of the 
village.
In order to fully understand the significance of political 
action in Tundwa however we must not only assess the influence of 
internal social factors such as these, but we must also take into 
account the fact that Tundwa is part of a wider political system. The
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history of the people1s relationship with the Central government goes 
a long way towards explaining some features of political conflict in 
Tundwa today.
The historical “background to factionalism
Three points emerge from examination of Tundwa*s political 
history over the last one hundred years. The first is that political 
conflict is no new phenomenon in this community. During the nineteenth 
century the town was divided on at least two occasions hy rival claim­
ants for the office of king. The protagonists were all Waungwana, 
and they were supported in their "bids for power by their clansmen.
If necessary they had to be prepared to fight, and for this they 
needed many slave and Waungwana soldiers. It seems fairly clear then 
that power in this period was based on wealth and force of numbers, 
and that only the Waungwana entered the political arena.
The period of British rule was in complete contrast to that 
which preceded it, and it was also a period in which political relation­
ships of a completely different nature were established. Common 
clanship, wealth, or religious piety all became irrelevant in achiev­
ing political power. The real power was now vested in the Colonial 
government. Government officers appointed the headman of the village, 
and the man appointed needed only minimal support in the village 
itself. In order to gain the position a man had to be able to con­
vince government officers of his loyalty to the government. Although 
all three men who have held the office were Waungwana, the last two
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were not wealthy men and could not have hoped to gain power in pre­
colonial times. As far as one can judge from the available evidence 
(oral tradition and the Faza Visitors1 Book) this was a period of 
political inactivity in the village. There are many reasons for this. 
The rich Waungwana were dispossessed of their slaves hut not of their 
wealth in land. Their economic power in the village was as strong as 
ever and it was a long time before there were substantial changes in 
wealth differentials in the community. In so far as the political 
office of king was transformed into that of a mere administrative 
functionary the wealthy Waungwana were also dispossessed of their 
political poi^er. But no other stratum rose to challenge them, and 
the colonial power appears to have unknowingly reinforced the local 
ideology of stratification.
The period since Independence has seen the resurgence of 
divisive political conflicts in the community — but with a difference. 
The coming to power in Kenya of an African government has threatened 
the whole basis of status relations in Tundwa, and as we have seen 
the Waungwana have had to adjust accordingly. But in addition 
elections were instituted just before Independence, thus reintroduc­
ing the necessity for a candidate for political office to have local 
support as well as government approval. The most important feature 
of this development was that it brought women and the ex— slaves into 
the political arena for the first time. As we have seen, adult women 
outnumber men in the village, and their votes in any election are
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therefore vital. Political leaders are only slowly beginning to 
realise this. Most men would agree with Baishe when he said that 
only men know what is right and sensible, and that women can easily 
be swayed and misled. Women in general are not as politically 
educated as men. Even now they do not attend political meetings, 
because to mix with men so openly would be considered improper. They 
do not hold any political office in the village and are not represented 
on the village committee. Nor do they play much part in politico- 
religious disputes. The mosque is a manfs world and they must pray 
at home if at all. With the introduction of elections however aware­
ness of the political issues at stake is no longer vital. What 
matters now is numbers.
In pre-colonial times slaves x^ere of course excluded from 
public’life. Even now Wachumwa men rarely attend political meetings 
and never speak in them. But since the Wachumwa form 27fo of the total 
population of the village their votes too are important, and in any 
division amongst the Waungwana they could hold the deciding vote. As 
we have seen however their freedom to vote as they wish is compromised 
by their economic position. I shall return to this point later.
There is another feature of the post-Independence period how­
ever which counteracts the importance of the introduction of elections. 
Since Kenya became a one-party state in 19^4y it has "been illegal to 
organise any opposition to the government. Other than KANU no political 
parties are allowed. Any political activity is therefore suspect.
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This is the reason for the cloak and dagger tactics of the factions 
in Tundwa. It is also the reason why the factions are not organised 
groups and why their leaders must gain government approval before they 
can achieve any public office.
At the present time then any political leader in Tundwa has to 
achieve two objectives if he is to be entirely successful* Firstly 
he has to have a basis of local support in the village and secondly 
he has to gain government approval. I shall discuss these two object­
ives in turn, beginning with the matter of local support.
The significance of inter-personal linkages in determining political 
allegiances
Since there are no ready-made groupings in Tundwa from which 
a leader can expect support, inter-personal linkages are very import­
ant in Tundwa politics. The most important kind of linkages are 
those of kinship - or rather kinship reinforced by friendship, since 
the existence of a kinship link between two people need not auto­
matically involve them in social interaction. The other kinds of 
inter-personal linkages which are important are those of friendship 
and neighbourliness. All these are ties between equals, and a man 
may reasonably expect support from people with whom he maintains 
contacts of this kind.
Ties of kinship and friendship are important in two respects. 
Firstly it is clear that the leaders and main supporters of each 
faction are bound- together by a network of inter-personal ties, and
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Diagram 70
The network of link a o*es binding together the leacjers and main supporters 
of Taction 2
SHATXIBU
'SHARIF
HUSSEIN
J K  BAISHE
Key__.'L.
----- >----- Kinship (as in Diagram 6)
— ---------  Friendship
I........... . Sharif
(i)..............  Sharif Kvith affinal or maternal connections
vit h W aungwana
II ........... .Mwngvana
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in particular, ties of kinship, I have tried to indicate this in 
Diagrams 6 and 7» where I show how the most active supporters of the 
two factions are linked to their main leaders. As can he seen from 
the diagrams, not all the links are direct, Shahibu, for example, 
is linked to Baishe through three other men, all supporters of Shahibu, 
Chains of linkages of this kind are quite common.
Comparison of the network of linkages binding together Paction 1 
and Paction 2 is of some interest. Whereas the two main leaders of 
Paction 2 are themselves linked by kinship and affinal ties, and are 
thereby more or less equally linked to their main supporters, the 
support for Paction 1 comes from two different sources, Madi had
1
one set of relatives and friends whom he brought in as supporters, 
whilst Muhaji had quite a different set. There was only one link 
between these two sets of supporters - that between Dumber 6 (Madi’s 
wife) and Number 16 (the mother’s brother of Madi’s wife, a man who 
was also affinally linked to Makka). Hobein by contrast brought 
in very few supporters. He was in fact more closely linked by kin­
ship to the leaders of Paction 2 (his cousins) than he was to either 
Muhaji or Madi, Most of his close relatives were therefore faced 
with a choice between their kinship link with Hobein and their link 
with Mudathir and Shahibu, Most of them chose Mudathir and Shahibu, 
the wealthy and dynamic leaders of Paction 2, rather than the colour­
less and less wealthy Hobein, Hobein*s only real supporter amongst
1, Madi’s following, as shown in Diagram 6, may usefully be compared 
with the diagram of his own and his wife’s kinship set given in 
Chapter III (Diagram 3, p*95)*
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his close kin was his father1s sister*s son, a man who would probably 
have supported Faction 1 in any case (he was a poor mwungwana man 
married to an ex-slave woman, and also the next-door neighbour of Makka). 
Apart from this man Hobein was affinally linked to Madi and to Number 10, 
one of Madi’s women supporters. When Faction 1 split into two, with 
Madi as the leader of one section and Muhaji as the leader of the other, 
their supporters divided accordingly. (The line of division is shown 
in Diagram 1). In this situation Number 16 abstained - he did not 
vote in the October election. It would have been logical for Hobein 
to have followed Madi, since he had some kinship links with him, but 
instead he followed his friend Muhaji, with whom he had no kinship 
links. He took with him his father*s sister*s son, but no-one else. 
This was partly what Mudathir meant when he said, "Hobein has no jamaa 
on his side, he is all alone". He also meant however that Hobein 
had gone to a side that was predominantly supported by ex-slaves, 
whom no proud mwungwana would count as amongst his jamaa.
Another factor that emerges from examination of these two 
diagrams is the importance of certain crucial friendships. (in some 
cases these might better be described as political alliances). The
most obvious case is the friendship between Hobein and Muhaji* As a
man whose descent status was suspect, Muhaji needed an ally amongst 
the *pure* Waungwana in order to gain Waungwana support. Hobein, 
for his part, needed Muhaji*s supporters since he had so few of his 
own. Other important political friendships were those between Mudathir
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and Shahibu and Sharif Hussein, and that between Madi and the headman. 
Inter-personal linkages are not only of importance in binding 
together the leaders of a faction and their main supporters. Political 
leaders also use these linkages as a basis for recruiting wider support. 
Here we have to consider the structure of political factions, For 
reasons which I have already stated, a faction cannot organise itself 
as a political party with a formally recognised leadership and known 
party members. Each faction is however informally structured. At 
the head of each faction there are the main or focal leaders who 
either contend themselves, or put forward other candidates for public 
office. Behind the main leaders -there are what we may call second- 
rank leaders - the close political allies of the leaders who help 
to determine what position the leaders should take on any issue, who 
speak out in public meetings and who are most important in recruiting 
support for the main leaders. Behind these second-rank leaders there 
is yet another rank of what we may call active supporters - men and 
women who are open in their support for the faction and whose main 
role is to recruit voters for it, The men shown in the two diagrams 
are the men of these three ranks. Beyond them are the mass of 
supporters for the factions - people whose only political action may 
be to vote in an election. It is through the second-rank leaders 
and active supporters that these voters are recruited. Thus, to take 
a particular example, Mudathirfs link with Nassibu (his sister1s 
husband1s brother) was not just important in itself. It was also
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important in that Nassibu in his turn had a set of relatives and 
friends whom he could "bring in as supporters when the occasion arose. 
Members of Nassibu1s set of relatives and friends again have other 
links which they in their turn can use to bring in support. Thus 
the leader of any faction is linked to his supporters through a series 
of overlapping sets of relationships.
At this point we may usefully compare the significance of 
women in recruiting support as opposed to that of men. The effective­
ness of women in bringing in voters is indicated by the fact that more 
women than men vote in elections. It was also indicated symbolically 
in October by the way in which women gathered together in three groups 
before the voting took place. That women should be more successful 
in recruiting support than men would seem to follow reasonably enough 
from the intensive nature of the links which women maintain with each 
other as opposed to those which men maintain with other men (see 
Chapter III). When Baishe said scornfully that women vote for a 
person, ,!only because he is their jamaa" (relative or friend), he 
was in fact making a statement of some importance. In general the 
political loyalties of women are determined by their loyalties to 
other women with whom they are in relationships of mutual help, and 
not by awareness of the political issues at stake - some of which may 
in any case not concern them directly.
By contrast, the relationships of men with their male kin are 
far less intensive than those of women with their female kin, though
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men usually maintain far more extensive non-kinship links than women.
Two consequences follow from this* Firstly, in any political dispute 
men are more likely to have links with "both sides than women. Secondly, 
since these links are likely to be less intensive than those which 
women maintain, a man has more room for manoeuvre* In any political 
division a man may therefore follow one of three courses of action. 
Firstly, if he feels his links with both sides to be equally strong 
he can abstain from supporting either side* That many men follow 
this course of action is shown by the voting figures. Secondly he 
may make an assessment of the balance of forces and vote for that side 
which appears to be the strongest. (it is always better to have 
been a supporter of the candidate who will later stand between you 
and the government). That many men follow this course of action 
was clearly shown in the October election. Whereas the women 
supporters of Madi and Muhaji stayed firm, most men felt it would be 
in their best interests to support the obviously stronger Baishe.
We must add however that another factor was also influential here in 
that Faction 1 was far more conscious of the importance of women 
voters than was Faction 2. Muhaji in particular went out of his way 
to recruit women supporters. Finally, a man may consider the 
political issues at stake, and in view of his own economic and social 
position decide which side will best support his interests. In many 
cases the outcome of this consideration may be the same as if he had 
followed the second course of action. This will be so for example 
if he is economically dependent on men in the strongest faction.
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Economic considerations are always of more concern to men than they 
are to women since it is men rather than women who are the main income 
producers here.
The economic significance of factional disputes
Any person in Tundwa could, if he wished, claim a link with 
almost anyone else in the village if he followed out the chains of 
kinship and friendship emanating from his own set of close friends 
and relatives. There are no sharp discontinuities in the overall net­
work of inter-personal linkages. If we were to limit our investiga­
tions of political action in Tundwa to the use made by political 
leaders of inter-personal linkages therefore we would have no explana­
tion for the political divisions in the town. Obviously there are 
other factors operating here with over-ride this overall network, and 
which cause people to emphasise some of their linkages at the expense 
of others. One factor which is obviously of importance is economic 
self-interest. In some cases a man may even disregard his links with 
close kin if his economic interests are at stake. This is shown for 
example by the case of the old headman’s son, Boa. As the headman 
was closely aJLlied with Paction 1 one might have expected his son to 
support the same side. But Boa, unlike his father, was a moderately 
wealthy man. He had given his father a small shamba from which the 
old headman derived a small income, and he had a large new shamba of 
his own which, in 19&5? he had completely planted with cotton (a cash 
crop). He was wealthy enough to lend out small sums of money to other
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men® His economic interests therefore lay with Faction 2 rather 
than Faction 1 and he voted accordingly. In the middle of 1965 Boa 
consummated this relationship with Faction 2 by marrying Shahibu1s 
brother’s daughter.
If we compare the leadership and main support of Faction 2 with 
that of Faction 1 we find that, by and large, Faction 2 is dominated 
by rich men and their close kinsmen. Faction 1 on the other hand is 
dominated by men in the middle range of incomes - men rich enough to 
gain respect, but also poor enough to resent the hold on the town of 
the very rich. This is shown in the following table where I have 
set out the range of incomes derived by the leaders and main supporters 
of each faction (these are the same men shown in Diagrams 6 and 7)*
It is also shown in the different policies pursued by the two factions, 
for whereas Faction 1 helped the government to collect taxes, the main 
concern of Faction 2 was to avoid or reduce taxes.
Table 17* Income categories of Faction leaders and their main supporters
(men)
Income Category FACTION 1 FACTION 2
Leaders^ Supporters Total Leaders^ Supporters Total
I.C.1 over £600 per year 1 2 3
I.C.2 £450-£600 per year MB 1 1 1 3 ... 4._
I.C.3 £300-£450 per year 1 1 MB 3 3
I.C.4 £150-£300 per year 3 4 7_ 3 3
I.C*5 £50-£150 per year »*» 4 4 3 3
I.C.6 below £60 per year 1 1 MB _ _
Total 3 11 14 2 14 16
1. Madi, Hobein and Muhaji.
2. Mudathir and Shahibu.
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Faction 2 not only had some of the richest men in the town 
amongst its most vociferous supporters, hut most of the other rich men 
supported this faction in the elections. Such men are not simply 
rich; they are also powerful. Amongst the main supporters of Faction 
2 were to he found five of the town’s principal money-lenders, whilst 
Faction 1 had the support of only one small-time money-lender (who was 
affinally linked to the headman). All the other money-lenders in the 
town appeared to give their tacit support to Faction 2, though not 
all of them voted in the elections. Moreover, six of the town’s 
seven shopkeepers were known supporters of Faction 2 (four of them 
appear in the tahle ahove). The sympathies of the seventh were 
unknown, hut his shop was very small. Shopkeepers are important 
because they are suppliers of credit to their customers. In addi­
tion, the rich men who support Faction 2 are those who are most likely 
to employ labour on their land from time to time and they are also 
those who can give or lend land to others, particularly kinsmen. Such 
men thus have a measure of economic control over many other men in 
the town, and they use this power for political ends. On the strength 
of their economic links they can either recruit support for Faction 2 
or they can force men who would otherwise have voted for Faction 1 to 
abstain.
This use of economic power for political ends is a fairly new 
factor in recent Tundwa history, though in pre-colonial times wealth 
was a necessity for any political leader. Under colonial rule a man
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could gain power only by ingratiating himself with the colonial 
authorities and the extent of power so gained was very limited* It 
is only since Independence and the institution of elections that a man 
has been able to gain political power through local support. It is 
not surprising therefore that men have begun to use their economic 
power for political ends. In addition however rich men in Tundwa 
stick together* The reason for this is that the leaders of Paction 1 
used their links with the government against the rich men (in the tax 
assessments that is) and as a result gained support from the poorer 
sections of the community. In this situation the wealthier men of 
the town drew together to defend their interests. (This seems to 
be rather an unusual situation if we are to judge from other studies 
of factionalism which have been made. In many cases rich men appear 
to compete with each other for power. I shall return to this point 
however in the second section of this conclusion).
Economic realities thus impinge on political loyalties in two 
ways. Other things being equal, a man will generally vote with and 
for men of roughly equivalent economic status to himself. Wealthy 
men will generally vote for Paction 2, whilst the poor and moderately 
well-off will vote for Paction 1• Some men however are economically 
dependent on men richer than themselves, men whom it is in their own 
self-interest not to oppose.
Although economic self-interest plays a very large part in 
influencing both the character of political action in Tundwa and the
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direction of people1s allegiances, it is not the only factor of 
significance. We have already seen that a man may weigh up his 
economic interests against his kinship loyalties. Another factor 
that is of primary importance is his awareness of belonging to a 
stratified society.
Politics and stratification
In order to fully understand the nature of political action 
in Tundwa we have to see the situation as the Bajunis themselves see 
it. In pre-colonial times — and I speak now in terms of how the 
people themselves remember this period - political action was solely 
the affair of the Waungwana. The Waungwana were, after all, by far 
the largest category of people in the village. The Wachumwa played 
no part in political affairs since they occupied a position of com­
plete economic dependence. The Sharifs were 1 strangers’, resented 
for their claims to superior status, and greatly outnumbered by the 
Waungwana. They were allowed to play some part in religious affairs 
(watched over jealously by the Waungwana), but they were more or less 
excluded from the political arena. The Waungwana might be divided 
amongst themselves, but they were united in excluding others from 
the political field.
In spite of the many changes which have since taken place, 
both in colonial times and since Independence, the Waungwana still 
think of themselves as the rightful ’rulers’ of the town. Moreover 
it would not be much of a distortion of reality even at the present 
time to say that, in order to be an important political leader in 
Tundwa, one must come from the Waungwana stratum. Why should this be
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so? We have to remember that the Waungwana form 64$ of the townfs 
population. Even were the Masherifu to ally themselves with the 
Wachumwa in one faction (a most unlikely eventuality), they would 
still he outnumbered by the Waungwana. Nor could a leader from any 
other stratum gain a majority vote in the town unless he was supported 
by some, at least, of the Waungwana. And until the present time the 
Waungwana have not been prepared to support a candidate from any other 
stratum. This is shown by the fact that all the main leaders of the 
factions are Waungwana, as are their closest political allies and 
nearly all their most active supporters. Nevertheless there are 
four ex-slaves amongst the active supporters of Faction 1, and five 
Sharifs amongst those of Paction 2 (see Diagrams 6 and 7)« The 
position of these people in the factions is revealing however. The 
only important political figure amongst the ex-slaves is Makka* As 
we have seen, Makka did not arise independently as a leader of the 
ex-slaves - he owes his position solely to the patronage of the 
Waungwana leaders of Paction 1. He never spoke in public meetings 
and he was not politically active on his own account. Amongst the 
Sharif supporters of Paction 2 only Sharif Hassan and Sharif Hussein 
were at all important, and neither of them could be described as even 
second-rank leaders. The close political allies of Mudathir and 
Shahibu were Baishe and Nassibu, not Sharif Hassan or Sharif Hussein. 
What I am trying to suggest is that whereas the two Waungwana factions 
might draw strength from alliances with other strata they keep a firm
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hold on the main leadership* Not only this hut members of the other 
strata at present appear to accept this position* Why should this 
he so? Why is it that no Sharif or mchumwa puts himself forward as 
a candidate for political office?
We might have expected that, as the richest stratum in the 
village, the Masherifu would he in a good position to compete for 
political offices* But we have to remember that they are a very 
small category - comprising only 7.9$ of ^he population* They could 
not gain power therefore without Waungwana support* And one reason 
why this has not been forthcoming is that the Masherifu are not very 
popular in the town* Their wealth is envied, they are sometimes 
accused of being mean, and occasionally there are suggestions that 
they have achieved their wealth by exploiting others. (i could 
find no actual evidence of this except for the case of Sharif Mohamed 
which I described in the preceding chapter)* Also their assumption 
of superiority is resented and any claims they make on these lines 
are often belittled* I do not want to over—emphasise the extent of 
feeling against the Masherifu - they are not publicly belittled or 
derided* It is rather that the Waungwana have set certain limits 
to the expression of their descent status, and so long as they keep 
within these limits they are tolerated and even respected. When I 
asked a mwungwana man why no political leader in the town was a Sharif 
he replied that they were afraid of destroying the respect they enjoyed 
as people topmost in the social hierarchy (M ,juu katika dara.ja" ).
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If the Masherifu are a rich hut very small category in the 
village, the Wachumwa are far more numerous hut poor. Although they 
are no longer slaves they are still subject to some economic control 
hy men of higher strata and very few of them have achieved a position 
of wealth. Even today they can not marry the daughters of men of 
higher strata and they are still despised as racially and socially 
inferior to the free-horn men of the town. One would not then have 
expected them to accept Waungwana patronage so readily. We have to 
remember that although the leaders of Paction 1 (which are supported 
hy most Wachumwa) are poorer than those of Paction 2 they are in 
other ways men of very similar standing, Madi, Hobein and Muhaji 
are as proud of their descent status as any other Waungwana, All 
three remember their clan names with pride - names which establish 
them as noble and free-born men. Hone of them are married to ex­
slave women. In this they are far more like Mudathir and Shahibu 
than they are like the Wachumwa. Why have the Wachumwa not formed 
a political faction of their own to challenge this Waungwana hegemony? 
Hot only would the Wachumwa seem to have a good local reason for 
rejecting Waungwana leadership, but in addition the whole trend of 
wider political developments would seem to be in their favour. They 
have been despised as *Africans1 in the past; now the country is 
governed by Africans. This development has already improved their 
situation, if only marginally. Waungwana are now much more careful 
not to refer openly to people as ‘slaves* since to do so would impair
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their image with the government* But one might have expected that 
the Wachumwa themselves would have reacted favourably to the new 
situation ~ that they might even have identified themselves with the 
new African government and have risen against their former masters*
Some Waungwana, I was told, were afraid of this very eventuality and 
went around saying that now the Waohumwa would wish to enslave them, 
the noble ones I But this did not happen* We have to remember 
that the aspirations of the Wachumwa are formed in terms of the local 
stratification system* Although they do not wish to be referred to 
as ’slaves* any longer, neither do they wish to be called ’Africans’ -
a name which to them is synonymous with ’slaves’* Their aspirations
can be summed up in the following common phrase ; "Everyone wants to 
be a mwungwana now". This is nicely illustrated by the following 
incident — the only occasion on which I ever heard the matter discussed 
openly* A mwungwana woman, Mwanaisha, was sitting with other women 
outside a house on the occasion of a funeral feast* Amongst the
other women was Tuma, a mchumwa woman. Mwanaisha began to joke,
saying, "I am not a Bajuni. I am an African. My father and mother
LoolcS You can see 
I am an African - I have African hair". The other women laughed 
heartily at this, and one of them pointed to Tuma - "And she is her 
sister. They are of one kind". Tuma was very annoyed at this and 
protested vehemently that she was not an African. "I am a Bajuni* 
she asserted*
came from Kisumu /an up-country African town
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Two points can be made about this incident* The first is 
that Mwanaisha would probably not have made such a joke about herself 
five or six years ago* It is a reflection of the reversal of roles 
that have taken place in the wider political system, whereby Africans 
now rule the country* But it is also of interest that, in spite
of this, Tuma would not accept the appellation* To her the title
1Mwafrika* was synonymous with 'slave* - and this indeed was how the
other woman had meant it to be taken*
One reason then why the Wachumwa do not form a faction of 
their own in direct opposition to the Waungwana is that they are 
unwilling to openly identify themselves as ex-slaves. But this is
not the only reason* Many of the Wachumwa are too dependent on 
Waungwana money-lenders, shopkeepers and employers to actively oppose 
the Waungwana. If they are to survive economically they must give 
at least tacit assent to the status quo. In addition there is a 
conservative element amongst some older ex-slaves, who think of the 
Waungwana as the rightful and proper leaders of the town. Such 
people are often partially or wholly dependent on their former masters 
for food and clothing or help in times of need. (i described two 
such cases in Chapter V). Waungwana foster such ties. They do 
not refer to these people as their slaves and they help them when 
necessary. Faction 2 was effectively able to play on linkages of 
these two kinds in order to win some Wachumwa support, though it seems 
more likely that their power showed itself in Wachumwa abstentions
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than in active support. This would explain the apparent political 
apathy of Wachumwa men which I commented on in the previous chapter.
The Waungwana leaders of Faction 1 had no economic links of 
this nature with the Wachumwa, hut they had links with them of a 
different kind. Wot only this hut they were more aware than the 
leaders of Faction 2 of the political importance of the Wachumwa 
category. Their links with the Wachumwa were hased on maternal and 
affinal ties. These kind of ties put them at a disadvantage relative 
to other Waungwana, hut gave them a positive advantage in recruiting 
Wachumwa support. The most important figure in this respect was 
Muhaji, whose mother was an ex-slave. Through his mother Muhaji 
was linked, directly or indirectly, with many Wachumwa. In addition 
three of Faction 1*s other Waungwana supporters had Wachumwa wives 
and three more had Wachumwa mothers (see Diagram 6). By playing on 
these linkages Faction 1 was easily ahle to enlist Wachumwa support.
In this connection Faction 1fs nomination of Makka as Chairman of 
the Village Committee was a clever move to gain Wachumwa support. As 
Chairman, Makka appeared to have been given an important position, 
though it was in fact Madi who ran the meetings. Nevertheless the 
appearances were there. Makka was in fact little more than a puppet 
for the leaders of Faction 1, but he certainly brought in some Wachumwa 
support. But the support of too many Wachumwa men was neutralised by 
their dependence on rich supporters of Faction 2, for Faction 1 to be 
completely successful.
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I am therefore making two points about the significance of 
stratification on politics in Tundwa# The first is that it is the 
Waungwana who monopolise positions of political leadership in the town, 
and they use their links with other strata in order to gain support* 
But the Waungwana are not united, and never have been. Their present 
internal conflicts are basically a matter of wealth differentials, 
with the leaders of Faction 2 trying to preserve their superior wealth 
and economic power, whilst the leaders of Faction 1 are trying to 
undermine the economic power of the wealthy minority in the town. It 
is worth pointing out I think that a conflict of this kind amongst 
the Waungwana could not have occurred in pre-colonial times, when 
the competitors for power were all men of wealth* Men like the 
leaders of Faction 1 have only been able to gain power in the town 
by taking advantage of their links with an external power - the 
Central government* They discovered that under the new graduated 
tax system they had a weapon which they could use against the rich 
Waungwana and Masherifu, since by informing on them to government 
officials they could get their taxes increased. Their natural allies 
in these moves were the Wachumwa who, more than others, have been ex­
ploited by the rich men of the town. The natural allies of the rich 
Waungwana were the Masherifu, whose economic position is very similar 
to that of the rich Waungwana. The second point I am making then 
is that since wealth differentials largely reflect the lines of social 
stratification it is not surprising that we find the Masherifu allied
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with the rich Waungwana, whilst the Wachumwa ally themselves with 
the poorer Waungwana,
But there is something more to this pattern of alliances 
than simply a matter of wealth differentials, important though these 
are. There is also the matter of differences in social status. The 
Wachumwa are poor Because they were once slaves, and even if they 
achieve wealth they are still treated as socially inferior. The 
Masherifu are concerned to maintain their superior social status to 
other Waungwana, and will generally not marry their daughters to 
Waungwana men, no matter how rich such men may Be, There is also 
then, in this pattern of alliances, an element of loyalty towards 
the other members of one's stratum. I am not suggesting that either 
the Masherifu or the Wachumwa act together corporately in political 
disputes. What I am suggesting is that each individual Sharif and 
each individual mchumwa acts politically in accordance with his 
status in the community, and that if he is unable to do this he will 
generally abstain. That this is not simply a matter of economics 
is shown by the fact that even the poor Sharifs (such as Number 7 
and Number 10 in Diagram 7) support Inaction 2, and even rich Wachumwa 
(such as Makka and his sister's husband — who were richer than any 
of the Waungwana leaders of Faction 1) support Faction 1. These men 
are not acting according to their economic interests, but in solidarity 
with other men of the same social status.
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The two ideologies
Finally I would like to examine the relationship between 
the Central government and the political leaders of Tundwa* In 
Chapter VII I pointed out the contrast between the ideology of the 
Central government and that of the village® The dominant ideology 
of the Central government is essentially an ’African’ and egalitarian 
one® The dominant ideology of the village is an ’Arab* one and this 
has many implications. The claim of the Waungwana and Masherifu to 
have originated from Arabia is very important to them. It asserts 
at one and the same time their nobility, their status as free born 
men and their racial superiority. It also asserts their religious 
piety, for we must not forget that the language of Islam is Arabic.
I will return to this latter point shortly*
We have seen that political leadership in Tundwa is monopolised 
by the Waungwana, and we have also seen that no political faction can 
be successful in gaining power unless its leaders have government 
approval. To gain this approval a leader must subscribe - or at 
least pay lip service to ™ the ideology of the Central government®
Sven for the leaders of Faction 1 this is difficult, for few Waungwana 
are genuinely in sympathy with a "government of slaves".
But in addition men who wish to be leaders must have a basis 
of local support, if only because a man who has no local support is 
of little use to the government in promoting self-help schemes. This 
is why elections are now held. And in order to gain support in the
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village any political leader must also subscribe to the dominant 
ideology of the village. Even the Wachumwa subscribe negatively 
to this ideology to the extent that they refuse to be called ’Africans*. 
In order to be entirely successful then a man must be able to mani­
pulate both ideological systems - that of the government and that of 
the village. No existing leader has been entirely successful in 
this since the two systems cannot really be reconciled, Madi was 
perhaps the most successful in manipulating the ideology of Africaness 
and thus in gaining government approval. His success was directly 
related to his long sojourn in Machakos, an up-country African town 
in Kenya* But he had little support in the village, and I heard 
a young man one day even question Madi’s status as a mwungwana.
When Faction 1 split in two even the Wachumwa did not follow Madi,
By contrast Mudathir and Shahibu were so committed to the status quo 
in the village that they found it hard to gain government approval*
As far as most Waungwana are concerned, any change in the 
status quo (and the government is continually demanding changes) 
represents a direct threat to their position. To maintain their 
standing with the government they must support these changes,whilst 
to maintain their position in the village they must oppose them* We 
can see this very clearly in their reactions to the government’s in­
sistence that they build a school in Tundwa* For government officials 
the building of a school represented ’progress’, but it looked very 
different to the Waungwana* As far as they were concerned a school
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would, oppose religion, and religion is one of the buttresses of their 
status. All the political leaders in Tundwa were men respected in 
the town for their religious Respectability1* They were all men 
who could read and recite the Koran and from whose lips pious Arabic 
phrases were wont to drop* They were the kind of men who were always 
invited when maulidi feasts (at which special Koranic prayers are 
recited) are held* Mudathir and Shahibu were the patrons of a mosque 
and Muhaji and Makka were Koran school teachers. In Chapter V I 
pointed out that, for historical reasons, religious learning is 
directly associated in Tundwa with descent status* Until today it 
is Waungwana and Masherifu who most frequent the mosques and who 
thereby have the greatest say in their control* This is why control 
of the Friday mosque was so important for the political factions in 
Tundwa. The mosque is a symbol of Islam, and Islam is part of the 
Arab civilisation with which the Waungwana have identified themselves 
for so long. It is not surprising therefore that the project for 
building a school, which would compete directly with religious teach- 
ing, met with little enthusiasm in Tundwa. Faction 2 was prepared 
to support the project only in so far as this would gain them govern” 
ment approval and oppose She&th Luki*s position, Shahibu and Mudathir 
were not really committed to the idea however and preferred (symbolic™ 
ally) to work on the repair of the Friday mosque rather than build 
the school. The position of Madi is again of interest. Of all the 
political leaders he was the one with the least religious learning.
He was also a strong supporter of the school - a position which in his
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case cannot "be explained "by any quarrel with Sheikh Luki, Madi 
had no quarrel with Sheikh Luki and was in fact linked to him in­
directly hy kinship. But again Madi gained little or no support in 
the town for his position (though he gained greatly in government 
approval), and the Wachumwa gave their main support to Muhaji, a Koran 
school teacher who was bitterly opposed to the school.
In many ways then the relationship between government and 
people - and in particular between the government and the political 
leaders of the village - is a very ambivalent one.
In this conclusion I have attempted to analyse the complex 
of social factors which contribute to the character of political 
action in Tundwa. I am not trying to suggest that any one of these 
factors is pre-eminent and over-rides all others, since I think that 
to do so would involve an over-simplification of the social reality 
which exists in Tundwa today. Not only this but I think that political 
action arises here precisely because the various frameworks of social 
action - economic, kinship and stratification - do not coincide. 
Political divisions are an expression of conflicts and contradictions 
in the social organisation of a community which is undergoing many 
social, economic and political changes, and they must be analysed as 
such.
Conclusion
To conclude this thesis it is necessary to discuss briefly the
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methodological and theoretical context in which it was written. The
methodological approach adopted in the hook owes a great deal to
Turner (1957) und Bailey (i960), and basically it is the method of
1
situational analysis. In the first part of this thesis, by separat­
ing out the various fields of social action, I was able to deduce 
certain structural principles and to illustrate the way in which these 
principles operated in practice. I was there using cases basically 
as 11 apt illustration" (to use Gluckmanfs term). I also attempted 
to show however, that the many exceptions to the principles were of 
interest in themselves, as they indicated either a conflict of prin­
ciples or a change in the principles themselves. When we come to 
deal with the analysis of political action in Tundwa however, the 
method of illustrative cases is no longer useful. We are here deal­
ing with a situation in which there are no clear cut structural 
principles and in which the individual is often faced with a conflict 
of loyalties. The most useful way of analysing situations such as 
these is to examine in detail a series of connected cases, or crisis 
situations, in which people have aligned themselves on one side or 
another. Turner calls such extended case studies fsocial dramasf, 
and he argues that: "the dynamic interaction of specific persons and
groups in the process which I have called the social drama falls with­
in the province of the sociologist no less than the analysis of the
1. The term 1 situational analysis1 was, I believe^first used by Van 
Velson, 1964, p.xxv.
2* See Gluckman*s Introduction to Epstein (ed„), 196>7» p*xiv.
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statistical and ideal norms of social structure. In the social 
drama we see social structure in action'1 • Whilst agreeing whole­
heartedly with the first part of this statement, I would argue that 
the social drama highlights not "social structure in action", but 
rather the inconsistencies and contradictions of any social structure 
and in particular the contradictions resulting from rapid social 
change. It seems to me that the term 1 social drama1 is very apt 
for descriptions of situations which are essentially dramatic, and 
they are dramatic precisely because social structure does not provide 
clear principles for action.
There is a theoretical as well as a methodological reason 
for using the method of situational analysis. To use this method 
is to assume that people act, not so much in accordance with precise 
and rigid structural principles, but in accordance with the logic or 
dynamic of the situation. Each crisis is a new and unique situa­
tion in some way, and it thus requires a new assessment both of 
principles of action and of direct advantage to be gained from any 
course of action. The influence of the dynamic of events could be 
seen many times in the development of factional conflict in Tundwa.
In particular we may recall the action of Paction 2 in supporting the 
proposal to use the madrasa building as a school - a position which 
they probably would not have taken if they had not been concerned 
simply to oppose Sheikh Luki,
1, Turner, 19579 P*231«
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The comparative analysis of factionalism
In taking factionalism as my main interest in this thesis 
I have not had a large body of comparative material to draw upon. The 
study of factionalism as such has been of interest to anthropologists 
only in the last ten years. Some of the more important recent writ­
ings have been by Firth, 1957* Beals, 1959» Beals and Siegal, i960,
Nicholas, 1963 and 19^5» Mayer, 1966, and Boissevain, 1968* The
main aim of most of these writers has been to give a sociological 
definition of factions in order to distinguish them from other types 
of social groupings such as political parties or opposed moieties.
There has also been some attempt to distinguish types of faction.
In particular Beals and Siegal distinguish between pervasive and 
schismatic factionalism, Mayer distinguishes between factions in 
terms of the type of leaders they have and the methods these leaders 
pursue, and Boissevain distinguishes between establishment and anti­
establishment factions. Finally there are the beginnings of a dis­
cussion about the social concomitants of factionalism. In particular 
it has been suggested that factionalism is always associated with 
social change. I shall discuss each of these points in turn.
The definition of factions
Nicholas (19^5) gives the most exhaustive definition of 
factions, though some of the points he makes arise from earlier 
writers. His definition is in the form of five points which can be 
briefly summed up as follows:
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1. Factions are conflict groups,
2. Factions are political groups,
3* Factions are not corporate groups,
4, Faction members are recruited by a leader,
5* Faction members are recruited on diverse principles. (Nicholas
1965, p.27-29),
There are several points which may be made about these pro­
positions. The first is Nicholas*s use of the word 1 group*. This 
usage has been superceded I think by Mayer1s article of 1966 in which 
he points out that factions can better be described as quasi-groups 
based on a series of action sets. Quasi-groups are essentially ego-
centred and "the actions of any member are relevant only in so far as
1they are relations between him and ego or egofs intermediary".
Nicholas hints at this point however in his third and fourth proposi­
tions where he says that factions are leader oriented and that they 
are not corporate groups. His usage of the term 1 corporate* is how­
ever a misleading one. He uses the term as if it were synonymous 
with *permanent* or with * institutionalised*, Whilst the concept 
of institutionalisation may be more or less synonymous with corporate­
ness, the notion of permanence is not. In using the term in this way 
Nicholas creates for himself a non-existent problem because, as he 
shows, many factions exist for long periods. If we are to accept 
Radcliffe—Brown*s definition however, corporateness has the following 
implications. A corporate group must act together, must have a leader
1. A. Mayer, 1 9 6 6, p.98*
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and must own some property in common. Whilst factions have leaders 
who instigate action on the part of their followers, factions do not 
own property in common, I would therefore agree that factions are 
not corporate groups, but not for the reason which Nicholas suggests.
It is probably the last two propositions which are the most
important and one can add some additional points to Nicholasfs
analysis. Paction leaders can usefully be compared with leaders of 
other kinds. In some societies leadership or authority roles are
institutionalised (all traditional rulers - such as the Mukama of
Bunyoro or the Paramount Chief of the Ashanti for example — would 
fit into this category). Paction leaders do not occupy a role how­
ever, they create one. They are not appointed or elected, they arise 
spontaneously. Paction leaders may also be compared however with
other spontaneous leaders - such as for example, the Prophets who
2
arose amongst the Nuer in response to colonial rule. Such leaders 
used existing structural groups and existing principles of fission 
and fusion in order to gain support. (The Grand Sanusi operated 
similarly among the Cyrenaican Bedouins). Paction leaders however 
recruit support on diverse principles. In addition however there is 
no evidence that Nuer Prophets competed with each other in order to 
createa following as faction leaders do. The Nuer Prophets and the 
Sanusi holy men were able to unite the discrete elements of a tribe
1. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, 1950, p.41*
2. P.P. Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p.185-9*
3. See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 1949*
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a g a in s t  a  common enemy. P a c t io n  le a d e rs  b y  c o n t r a s t  a lw a y s  have
r i v a l s ,  and  f a c t io n a l is m  c re a te s  c o n f l i c t  w i t h i n  a  c o m m u n ity . T h is
r a is e s  a  p ro b le m  w h ic h  no w r i t e r  has so f a r  a t te m p te d  t o  a nsw e r -  why
1
i s  i t  t h a t  f a c t i o n a l is m  does n o t  o c c u r  i n  a l l  s o c ie t ie s ?  Why i s  i t  
t h a t  i n  one s o c ie t y  o r  co m m u n ity  a  le a d e r  can  u n i t e  a l l  b e h in d  h im  
w h i l s t  i n  a n o th e r  f a c t i o n  le a d e rs  c h a l le n g e  each  o t h e r  and d iv id e  th e  
com m un ity?  I  s h a l l  r e t u r n  to  t h i s  p o in t  s h o r t l y .
The f i n a l  p o in t  w h ic h  I  w is h  to  make a b o u t N ic h o la s f s f i v e  
p r o p o s i t io n s  c o n c e rn s  th e  e th n o g ra p h ic  exam p les  f ro m  w h ic h  he c la im s  
t o  have  d e r iv e d  th e m . He g iv e s  f i v e  exam p les  -  th e  B a M b u ti p y g m ie s , 
as d e s c r ib e d  b y  T u r n b u l l  ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,  th e  Ndembu, as d e s c r ib e d  b y  T u rn e r  
(1 9 5 7 )>  v i l l a g e  o f  V u n io k i  i n  F i j i  as d e s c r ib e d  b y  M ayer (1 9 6 1 ) ,  
th e  v i l l a g e  o f  N a m h a ll i  i n  I n d ia  as d e s c r ib e d  b y  B e a ls  (1 9 5 9 ) an(i 
Japa nese  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t i o n s  a t  S ta te  l e v e l  d e s c r ib e d  b y  S c a la p in o  
and M asumi (1962). To th e s e  b r i e f  exam p les he adds a m ore e x te n d e d  
a n a ly s is  o f  G o v in d a p u r ,  an  I n d ia n  v i l l a g e ,  and  th e  I r o q u o is  -  b o th  
d ra w n  fro m  h is  own re s e a r c h .  I t  seems to  me h o w e v e r, t h a t  i f  we 
a c c e p t N ic h o la s * s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f a c t i o n s ,  o n ly  t h r e e  o f  th e s e  exam p les 
a re  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  f a c t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  -  i . e .  t h a t  o f  V u n io k i ,  t h a t  o f  
N a m h a ll i  and  t h a t  o f  G o v in d a p u r .  The c o n f l i c t s  w h ic h  o c c u r  i n  th e  
B a M b u ti b an d  a re  n o t  r e a l l y  f a c t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t s  s in c e  th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
u n i t s  a r e ,  as N ic h o la s  sa ys  " t h r e e  p a t r i l i n e a l  g ro u p s  w i t h  a fe w  
a f f i n e s  a t ta c h e d  t o  e a ch " ( p . 2 3 ) .  The c o n f l i c t  th e n  in v o lv e d  th e
1 . Some w r i t e r s  -  e .g .  B o is s e v a in ,  1968  -  s u g g e s t t h a t  i t  d o e s . I  
s h a l l  d is c u s s  h is  a rg u m e n t s h o r t l y .
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"simple recruitment of supporters along kin lines'1 (p.23). One 
conflict between two brothers which threatened to split such a group 
was swiftly suppressed, thus indicating I think that conflict here is 
a matter of the opposition of existing structural groups, not factional­
ism. The so-called factions in Japanese political parties may have 
begun as factions but they now appear to have become institutionalised 
groups, (This would seem to be an inherent possibility in any 
factional conflict, but it does not mean that xve must use the same 
term to describe the social unit as it is at the beginning and as it 
is at the end of the process). The same criticism could be applied 
to the Iroquois example - the 1 factions1 described by Nicholas seem 
to have long ago solidified into political parties which could exist 
independently of particular leaders - indeed it is noticeable that 
Nicholas barely mentions leaders in this section of his article.
Conflicts and rivalries amongst the Ndembu are much more 
difficult to label. In Ndembu villages there is rivalry for the 
headmanship and the various contenders each have their followers. 
Unsuccessful candidates occasionally secede from the village, taking 
their followers with them. But who are these followers? As Gluckman 
says in the Foreword to Turner1s book ; "Each crisis marks the culmina­
tion of a period of altering alignments of power and shifts of allegiance 
within the village - though matrilineal attachment is always dominant 
in the end" (my underlining). The matrilineage amongst the Ndembu 
is a very unstable unit, as Turner clearly shows, but the aim of
1. Gluckman in Turner, V.W., 1957» p.xii.
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political leaders in competing for the headmanship of a particular 
village is alxmys to provide a solid residential base for such a unit. 
Political leaders may make alliances with the leaders of similar matri- 
lineally based groups in order to gain power but they do not seem to 
appeal for supporters on any other principle. (This situation is 
however beginning to change, especially since cash crops were intro­
duced into the area and wealth differences became more important).
Are we to call this kind of conflict factionalism or is it the opposi­
tion of already existing structured groups? It seems in fact to 
fall somewhere between the two, which is why I am doubtful about 
this example.
Having made these points however I think that Nicholasfs 
definition is a reasonable and useful one, and it has certainly been 
of use to me in formulating my own material.
Theories of factionalism
A definition however is only the first step towards a theory 
and I do not think it can be said that Nicholas puts forward any 
hypothesis about factions or about factionalism. At present the 
ethnographic material is so limited that it is difficult to make 
general statements about factions. One example will, I hope, make 
this clear. Nearly all the examples of factionalism come from 
communities or societies which are relatively complex, in the sense 
of being socially and/or economically differentiated. (This 
generalisation does not of course apply if one includes the examples
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of the BaMbuti and Ndembu which I do not consider to be factionalism). 
Indeed one can go even further and say that a majority of the examples 
are either from Indian villages or from overseas Indian communities*
One could not of course assume from this that factionalism is a 
peculiarly Indian vice (or virtue as some would have it), but simply 
that Indianists have taken more interest in the subject than others.
On the other hand one might be able to argue reasonably that factions 
(as defined by Nicholas) are only found in societies which are socially 
and/or economically differentiated. It may be that this is aimply a 
function of the definition itself, for in order for a leader to recruit 
followers on diverse principles (kinship principles, principles of 
social stratification and economic principles are the ones usually 
suggested) one must have a society in which there are such diverse 
principles. By this definition a society which is organised primarily 
on kinship principles can never have factionalism. But there may be 
more to it than this. It is noticeable I think that the community 
which I have analysed in this thesis is far more similar to many 
Indian communities than it is to most African communities (judging 
at least by the ethnographic evidence). It is a stratified community 
in which differences of wealth are marked. It differs from most 
Indian communities however in the looseness of its kinship structure - 
but in this it would also seem to differ from many African communities. 
Is this a mere coincidence, or does socio-economic differentiation 
have something to do with factionalism? I do not think that one can
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give a definitive answer to this question at present, though it would 
seem to he a reasonable hypothesis. Certainly however it focuses 
attention on the nature of the principles on which faction leaders 
recruit support, and we may now examine these more closely. Only 
Nicholas and Mayer give details of the kinds of principle on which 
the leaders have recruited support and it is of some interest to com­
pare these two examples with the situation in Tundwa.
Mayer (1966) describes an election for a Municipal Councillor 
in Dewas town (India) whilst Nicholas describes the election for 
panchayat (village council) members in Govindapur (also India). It 
emerges that kinship was the most important principle on which leaders 
recruited support in both these elections, whilst economic factors 
come a close second (in Govindapur economic dependence was the nature 
of these economic links between supporter and leader; in Dewas Mayer 
does not specify the nature of the economic factors). Caste appeared 
to be less important - though since castes are endogamous kinsmen are 
also caste fellows. In Tundwa I did not make a quantitative analysis 
of peopleTs motives for allying themselves with one faction rather than 
another - indeed I doubt very much if the information would have been 
easy to obtain in this form. But judging from the composition of 
the two factions it would appear that kinship, economics,and social 
stratum were all important in determining alliances.
Following Bailey, Nicholas argues that where one caste is 
dominant, caste affiliation is not particularly significant in
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determining political alliances. By 'dominant' these writers appear 
to mean primarily superiority in numbers, though ritual status and 
wealth may also be important. The dominant caste is itself the 
political arena and it is generally divided amongst itself. Govindapur 
is a community with a dominant caste, the Mahisya. Although the 
social strata in Tundwa are by no means as rigid as caste groups, 
the situation there would appear to be similar to that described by 
Nicholas for Govindapur, with the Waungwana, divided amongst them­
selves, as the sole figures in the political arena. But I have 
argued that the other two strata allied themselves according to their 
status in the total framework of a stratified community,,whereas 
Nicholas argues that in such situations caste does not very much in­
fluence political alignments. It is true that in Govindapur caste 
groups appear to have been divided. Nevertheless there does appeal' 
to be some evidence that caste was significant in alignments and that 
people expected it to be so. In Dewas there was no dominant caste, 
and although we might have expected from the above argument that 
caste would have been more important here in determining alliances, 
it seems in fact to have been less so. It seems to me more likely 
that caste would be important where there was a dominant caste group 
(or stratum preponderating in numbers) rather than where there was 
not, for the simple reason that the smaller groups or categories would 
be more insecure in such a situation and more anxious to assert their 
positions vis-a—vis the dominant group.
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The evidence is not however substantial enough to confirm 
or refute this argument and other factors would also have to be taken 
into account - in particular the character of inter-strata relations 
in each case. One factor in such relations is the extent to which 
the lines of social stratification coincide with those of wealth 
differentials. In Tundwa I have shown that they do coincide to a 
large extent. They are also often found to coincide in many caste 
societies. There is however an interesting contrast between factional­
ism in Tundwa and factionalism in many Indian communities. As we 
have seen economic factors play a large part in factionalism in Tundwa. 
One of the factions was supported largely by the richer section of 
the population together with some of their economic dependents, whilst 
the other faction was led by only moderately well-off men supported 
by the poor men of the community. In such a division there were many 
poor men who were economically dependent on the rich men and who i^ere 
so paralysed by their conflicting loyalties as to be unable to act.
In Tundwa then there is a fairly clear horizontal division of the 
society which is reflected in the existence of the two factions. Most 
of the Indian material presents quite a different picture however.
There, a faction leader needs wealth in order to succeed. The wealthy 
men of a community are rivals for political power and they divide the 
community vertically in their attempt to gain power. What is the 
reason for this difference? As we saw, Tundwa in pre-colonial times 
followed a pattern very similar to this latter model - all the
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competitors for power were rich men. The reason the community is now 
divided on different lines is partly a matter of historical accident 
and partly a matter of the nature of the posts available for competi™ 
tion. In the colonial period the only post of importance was that 
of village headman, and this was a post without power or sanctions 
attached to it. There was no competition for it because the headman 
was appointed by the colonial government. And since it had few 
rewards to offer very few people would have wished to hold it. Only 
a fairly poor man could have been interested in the salary offered 
and therefore the post fell into the hands of poor Waungwana. With 
the coming of Independence this post, that of Deputy Headman, and 
the new post of Councillor were all in the hands of fairly poor men. 
Suddenly these posts acquired a new significance since their holders 
had a large part in assessing tax rates under the new scheme of 
graduated taxes. Obviously only the rich men had much to lose in 
this situation and they rapidly set about organising opposition to 
Paction 1. The institution of elections provided them with a means 
of competing for the positions, and their economic power ensured their 
success. But it is still in their interest to stick together.
Although the relevant comparative material is not always 
available the Indian situation seems to have been very different.
There was no sharp break with the past as there was in Tundwa, and 
the posts available for political competition seem to have offered more 
rewards (both in terms of political power and economic benefit) than
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they did in Tundwa, Rich men would always therefore have been 
interested in controlling such posts, and they have done so until the 
present time.
This brings me on to another point however — the distinction 
between types of factions, Boissevain (1968) argues that factional 
oppositions always involve an ’establishment1 and an anti-establishment 
faction, and that, 11 the establishment/opposition conflict is basic 
to all human societies” . He is discussing the factional oppositions 
in a Maltese village, and in particular the establishment of two 
religious factions based on loyalties to two different saints. He 
shows that parish priests are often controlled by the local establish­
ment — a clique of wealthy and influential persons. Towards the end 
of the last century however a particularly independent parish priest 
was able to challenge this establishment in one Maltese village and 
he set up a faction devoted to a new saint. ”He recruited his follow­
ing. ..not surprisingly from the anti-establishment elements in the 
village; the uninfluential, the poorer families and, so several 
informants indicated, many young men... The supporters of St. Joseph 
/the new sain^7" still occupy the lower rungs of the local prestige 
ladder" (p* 11). The factions had in the meantime become institu­
tionalised. The point I want to make here however is that the 
division in this community too was a horizontal one, as in Tundwa.
But it is demonstrably not the case that this kind of conflict "is 
basic to all human societies". In many of the Indian cases ’the
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establishment1 is itself divided and there is no real anti-establishment 
opposition. The fact that, in elections, some candidates stand for 
the Communist Party is misleading. As Nicholas points out, "there 
are as many •rich peasants* in the Communist camp as there are in the 
Congress". Rich men support the Communist party simply because 
their opponents support the Congress party. In the same way Paction 1 
in Tundwa was associated with one M.P. whilst Paction 2 was associated 
with the other. M.P.2 later supported a left wing splinter group at 
national level and Paction 2 continued to support him, even though 
this was a faction led by the richest men of the town. Boissevain*s 
distinction does not then seem to be very useful, and is certainly 
not universal.
Mayer*s distinction between factions on the basis of their 
leadership and the methods used to gain power seems to be more useful. 
Mayer distinguishes for example between leaders who act as *brokers* 
and leaders who are * patrons*. Whereas patrons offer direct benefits 
to their followers, brokers offer to intercede with a third party on 
behalf of their supporters. However, in a situation such as that of 
Tundwa a leader must be both patron and broker if he is to succeed.
He must both be able to offer direct benefits to his supporters (such 
as loans or credit) and he must also be able to intercede with the 
government on behalf of his supporters. One reason why Paction 1 did 
not succeed in keeping its position was that its leaders had little to 
offer (or alternatively to threaten with) in the local situation.
1. Nicholas, R., 19^3, p.29®
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Mayer also distinguishes between, leaders who offer general benefits 
to all and leaders who offer specific benefits to a few key figures 
in the hope that these will then each bring in their own supporters.
Again however I think that it is possible to follow both these 
methods - as leaders in Tundwa did, though they put most of their 
faith in the second method. Mayer makes other distinctions concern­
ing the linkages between leaders and supporters - how direct or in­
direct these are and whether or not lateral linkages exist between 
supporters. He argues that a leader whose supporters are all directly 
linked to him will follow a different plan of campaign to another whose 
supporters are linked to him more indirectly* This may in some cases 
be a useful distinction, but the information I have from Tundwa (see 
earlier diagrams) suggests that both factions there are similar in 
this respect.
A different kind of distinction is made by Siegal and Beals.
They distinguish between 1 pervasive * factionalism and Schismatic1 
factionalism. This seems to me to be the least useful of all dis­
tinctions. Siegal and Beals define factionalism as, "overt conflict 
within a group which leads to the eventual abandonment of cooperative 
activities". Nicholas disagrees with this on the grounds that it is 
too negative - factions have a positive function, he argues, in 
organising political activity. For Tundwa this definition seems largely 
irrelevant. For men at least there are few cooperative activities 
which can be abandoned. On the other hand it is possible for people
1. Siegal and Beals, 1960, p.399*
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to be factionally opposed without extending this hostility to all 
social occasions* In Tundwa for example, at the height of the 
factional disputes many private maulidi feasts were held* All 
faction leaders were invited to all feasts and all attended and ate 
together amicably. Following this basic 'definition, Siegal and 
Beals describe a type of factionalism which they describe as pervasive. 
Unlike schismatic factionalism which is ,!conflict between two well- 
organised groups”, pervasive factionalism seems to be without rhyme 
or reason. 11 Analysis of opposed groups involved in any single
dispute shows relatively few indications of consistent differences 
between them in terms of policy or kinds of people who belonged”
(p.397)* This distinction seems to me to be implausible* Factions 
in reality lie somewhere between these two extremes. They are never 
well-organised because there is always the possibility that marginal 
supporters may change sides at the last minute* At the same time 
there is always some kind of social reason why people support one side 
as opposed to another, as there is also some element of purely personal 
sympathy or antipathy*
Finally I turn to the point that Siegal and Beals make con­
cerning the association of factionalism with social change. Nicholas 
agrees with this, as does Boissevain* Boissevain argues that social 
change causes an increase in factional conflict because it introduces 
new techniques for factional fighting, new posts to be competed for 
and new ideologies which may be used as symbols by opposing sides.
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Boissevain also adds that social change threatens established elites* 
All these points would seem to me to "be important, but perhaps they 
presuppose a more fundamental question. I would agree that factional­
ism is always associated with social change, but I would also argue 
that all societies are undergoing some form of social change. What 
we have to know then is, with what kind of social change is factional­
ism associated? No writer seerns to have an answer to this question, 
and on the available evidence it is difficult to come to any satis­
factory conclusion. But as a conclusion to this thesis I suggest 
the following very tentative hypothesis concerning the conditions 
necessary for factionalism to arise - I assume here all the proposi­
tions which Nicholas puts forward. Factionalism, I would argue, 
arises only in face to face groups or small communities in which there 
is some social or economic differentiation. In situations where the 
lines dividing one social or economic category from another become 
blurred as a result of external pressures, and where these pressures 
may be modified in some way by political action, factions will tend 
to arise. Depending on factors which are not at present clear to me 
such factions will either represent rivalry between men of the higher 
socio-economic categories, each of whom will use their socio-economic 
position in order to try and monopolise political power, or it will 
represent a division between the rich and influential in the community 
as opposed to the poor and uninfluential. In any situation where 
numbers count the latter category of people are always important
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because they are usually more numerous than the rich. They must 
either represent themselves then or be represented by rich or 
moderately well-off patrons*
Testing the usefulness of this hypothesis will depend on 
further worlo. It seems to fit the case of Tundwa and also the other 
cases of factionalism which I have discussed here, but other studies 
may show it to be invalid.
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